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Abstract of the Ph.D. dissertation 
 
The global crisis produced negative externalities both for the financial services industry and for 
the real economy by contributing to enhancing the debate on the systemic risk. In fact, in response to 
the banking crises, regulatory agencies encouraged more efforts to monitor, analyse and understand 
systemically important financial institutions to better identify the determinants of the bank’s 
contribution to the overall systemic risk. Furthermore, public authorities launched banks’ rescue 
programs to contain the systemic risk, ensure the solvency of financial institutions, and restore the 
confidence in financial markets. For instance, the US governments launched TARP in the October 
2008. A few months later, the British government announced a public intervention of 740 billion 
euros to insure bank’s assets. Finally, de Larosière Group (2009) and Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (2010) revealed deficiencies in the bank’s corporate governance by identifying a strong 
link with risk-taking and systemic risk. (Ellis et al., 2014).  
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate the potential sources of systemic risk by analysing 
respectively: i) financial interdependencies among banks: quantifying network effects and the stress 
at which banks are exposed (Battiston et al., 2012) during banking crises by bridging the banking 
literature with the social network literature; ii) public bailouts:  understanding whether safety-nets 
may create (or mitigate) systemic effects (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007) intended as fuelling (or 
smoothing) bank moral hazards of rescued banks and the possible introduction of competitive 
distortions in the banking system; iii) corporate governance: investigating the link between bank’s 
board diversity and bank’s risk. 
Paper 1 analyses both the cohesion evolution of the European banking sector during the pre-crisis 
and post-crisis period and whether network effects, measured in terms of bank’s centrality, may help 
to predict substantial changes in the level of bank’s contribution to systemic risk. 
Paper 2 explores the systemic effects of public bailouts by analysing both the effects on rescued 
banks’ activities and the competitive effects of such public policies on rescued banks’ competitors. 
Furthermore, the paper also investigate on the evaluation effects of these policies in short-term period 
by using the event-study approach.  
Paper 3 investigates whether corporate governance mechanisms may impinge on the bank’s risk-
taking, with a particular focus on the board diversity
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Background of the PhD thesis: An introduction to systemic risk, 
aims, and contributions of the dissertation to the banking literature 
 
1. Introduction 
The global crisis produced negative externalities both for the financial services industry and for 
the real economy by contributing to enhancing the debate on the systemic risk.  Particularly, the theme 
has raised a renewed attention among policymakers, scholars, and practitioners on three different 
traits related to: i) the prediction of the systemic risk; ii) the evaluation of the optimal safety-net for 
the financial stability; iii) the functioning of the bank’s corporate governance.  
The motivations are related to three specific issues. First, in response to the banking crisis, 
regulatory agencies encouraged more efforts to monitor, analyse, and understand systemically 
important financial institutions to better identify the determinants of the bank’s contribution to the 
overall systemic risk. Second, public authorities launched banks’ rescue programs to contain the 
systemic risk, ensure the solvency of financial institutions, and restore the confidence in financial 
markets. For instance, the US governments launched TARP in the October 2008. A few months later, 
the British government announced a public intervention of 740 billion euros to insure bank’s assets. 
Third, de Larosière Group (2009) and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) revealed 
deficiencies in the bank’s corporate governance by identifying a strong link bank corporate 
governance, risk-taking, and systemic risk. (Ellis et al., 2014).  
Hence, this dissertation aims to investigate the potential sources of systemic risk by analysing 
respectively: i) financial interdependencies among banks; ii) public bailouts; and iii) bank’s corporate 
governance mechanisms with a particular focus on the board diversity.  
The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, I describe the theme of the 
systemic risk by clarifying the concept of systemic events and the related definitions of systemic risk 
across different perspectives. Then, in Section 3 I highlight why I focus on the systemic risk in 
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banking rather than in other sectors (financials and non-financials). Section 4 reports the state-of-art 
on the causes of systemic risk by distinguishing between theoretical and empirical papers in banking. 
In Section 5, I discuss the aims, the motivations, and the contributions to the literature of the following 
dissertation. Finally, I explain why I stress the European banking sector as the context of the analyses 
in Section 6. 
2. Systemic events and systemic risk 
 During the last years, the consciousness and the importance of preventing systemic events in the 
financial system are increasing by rising the attention of policymakers, supervisory agencies, 
practitioners, and scholars. Even though the concept is common in the economics literatures, it seems 
to be better described by an epidemic disease, whose effects and transmission mechanisms affect a 
significant part of economic actors (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000).  
 Before providing any definition of the systemic risk, I first clarify in advance the concept of 
systemic event and its related characteristics. Systemic event is any event triggers a loss of confidence 
in the financial system, so that it determines adverse consequences for the real economy (Hendricks, 
2009). Past studies usually distinguish between systemic event in the narrow sense and the systemic 
event in broad sense (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). On the one hand, a narrow systemic event 
consists in a situation where the release of bad news about a financial institution or its failure leads 
to a trend of adverse effects on other institutions and on financial market as whole. In turn, systemic 
events in the narrow sense may be strong or weak in relation to institutions involved experience 
situations than are less intrusive than a crash.  On the other hand, broad systemic event consists in a 
systematic shock may lead to simultaneous negative effects on a large part of financial institutions or 
markets. Systemic events related to systematic shocks are either strong or weak in relation to the fact 
that most part of financial institutions in the financial market crash or not. The core apprehension 
associated to systemic events lies in the possibility of prejudging irremediably working foundations 
of financial markets, such as their effectiveness and efficiency. Moreover, any systemic event may 
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also produce negative externalities, whose effect could propagate above and beyond financial markets 
by paralyzing the real sector.  
After having clarified basic concepts, it is possible to provide a first definition of systemic risk, 
namely the risk of experiencing systemic events in strong sense, whose operating scope may be either 
national or international (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). This definition encloses two key elements 
- shock and propagation mechanism. According to the prominent financial literature, shocks may be 
both idiosyncratic and systematic. On one hand, idiosyncratic shocks affect only the wealth of a single 
financial institution or, at least, the price of a single asset. One the other hand, systematic shocks refer 
to generalized business cycle fluctuations or sudden increases in interest rates. The second key 
element event is about how the transmission mechanism operates. It may operate through either bad 
information or impaired financial exposures. In the last three decades, international banking 
authorities, practitioners and scholars have tried to identify other alternative definitions (Giesecke 
Kim, 2011).  Among others, different definitions provided by scholars converge to three broad-
spectrum issues: 
• Probability of idiosyncratic events experienced by a single operator may interrupt the 
functioning of the banking system and the financial system (Kaufman and Scott, 2003).  
• Potential default of an operator provokes other banks’ defaults in financial markets. This 
definition is related to the concept of contagion. (BIS, 1994) 
• Generalized loss of confidence or loss of value for operators in the financial markets, so 
that the uncertainty threatens both the functionality of markets and the real economy. 
 All the definitions outline that the systemic risk materializes itself through the transmission of 
financial stresses from an institution to others. 
In the following paragraph, I explain why banks are more likely to trigger systemic events in 
comparison with non-financial firms and other financial firms. 
 8 
3. Why systemic risk in banking? 
 Banks are more likely to threaten the financial stability and pose systemic issues than non-financial 
firms and other financial firms. By and large, this issue seems also to be confirmed by government 
approach in facing non-financial firms’ distresses. In fact, the failure of non-financial firms is not 
generally considered as posing systemic risk (Stern and Feldman, 2004). These authors argue that 
government interventions to support non-financial companies is often driven by the intent of 
protecting their banking creditors (Wildasin, 1997; Rodden, 2000b). For instance, the Korean 
government bail Hanbo Steel to prevent the failures of its creditor banks. Similarly, the Japanese 
government supported the real state in market to preclude any potential spillover effect for banks 
having more exposures in real estate assets (Gup, 1998).  
 I do not discuss that non-financial firms are not important, whilst I do want to outline that banks 
may create risks to the financial stability and negative externalities to real economy more than other 
players of the economic system. This explain why government worldwide rushed to prop up illiquid 
banks in response to the last financial crisis. Beyond these considerations, bank may threat the 
financial stability mainly because of their exclusive traits. Indeed, banks differ in many aspects from 
both non-financial firms and other financial institutions. Firstly, banks activities are based on the 
liquidity-producing function (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), representing the most traditional 
explanation on why banks may trigger systemic events. Particularly, banks make use of an innate use 
of the leverage since they are willing to accept a maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities in 
return for a premium given by the difference between the interest rate on the lending activities and 
the interest rate on the deposits. As a result, the existence of banks is crucially reliant on the access 
to liquidity for banks available in different forms (e.g. deposits, funding on the interbank market, 
funding from public authorities). This justifies why during the last financial crisis and when the 
liquidity dried up in the bank sector, different authorities intervened to preclude generalized collapse. 
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 Secondly, bank’s balance sheets are characterized by a higher level of opacity by impeding a clear 
assessment of the bank’s real soundness. For instance, Morgan (2000) observe that bank are similar 
to black boxes since “money goes in, and money goes out, but the risks taken in the process of 
intermediation are hard to observe from outside”. Furthermore, the quality of loans and the same 
financial products are not immediately perceivable given their intangible nature. 
 Thirdly, banks’ risks do not depend only on exposures listed in their balance sheets. In fact, banks 
are heavily involved in off-balance activities that contribute in changing their risk profile even if they 
do not take further positions (Mayordomo et al., 2014).  
 Fourthly, banks are deeply different from other financial institutions. First, most part of banks’ 
business is related to the activities with other banks (e.g. activities on the interbank market, foreign 
exchange market). This explain why the collapse of a single bank spread to others, since competitors 
are important business partners posing counterparty risks. Second, the liquidity risk is less effective 
in insurance companies because of the inverted revenues stream of their activities (Mülhnickel and 
Weiβ, 2009). In fact, they rely on long-term liabilities, so that they are able to decrease their exposures 
to liquidity risk. Furthermore, they are less interconnected than banks. It entails a lower probability 
of contagion among insurers (Bell and Keller, 2009). In this respect, Mülhnickel and Weiβ (2009) 
show that insurers may determine systemic risk only in a particular situation: when insurers start 
carrying out non-core activities and are more similar to banks. This perspective seems to be supported 
by Geneva Association (2010) and International Association of Insurance Supervisors (2012), 
measuring insurers’ systemic importance in relation with level of diversification in non-insurance 
activities.  
However, the 2007 financial crisis have underlined a new specific trait about why banks may 
threaten more the financial stability than other financial institutions. Acharya et al. (2013) observe 
that banks may also determine a detrimental transfer of uncertainty to their home-governments. This 
problem is even more severe when banks are larger. For this reason, regulators started paying 
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attention on particular financial institutions – Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs) - 
whose collapse could endanger both the financial stability and the real economy because of their level 
of entangledness in the banking system.  The problem of entangledness is crucial since it could 
determine both shocks transmission and ineffectiveness of the macro-prudential policies. To 
counterbalance potential threats for the financial stability, supervisory agencies worldwide introduced 
a new set of additional regulatory rules aimed at improving the banking sector's ability to absorb 
shocks, to improve risk management and governance, to strengthen and promote banks' transparency 
and disclosures both at bank-level and at system-level, and to restore the level playing field in the 
banking industry (e.g. additional capital buffers and issuance of bail-in-debt). Additionally, larger 
banks benefit from implicit guarantees (e.g. government bailouts in case of bank distress) that smaller 
banks do not. In fact, Basel III required the introduction of additional capital requirements to bush 
their opportunity costs and reduce governments’ activities over the banking industry. 
4. Causes of systemic risk 
 In this paragraph I will discuss the determinants of systemic risk in banking. For this purpose, I 
will focus on theoretical models and empirical studies. Firstly, I will analyse macroeconomic and 
microeconomic models. Secondly, I will focus on the empirical literature.  
4.1. Theoretical models on systemic risk 
Although the recent historical events raised the attention of policy makers, supervisory agencies 
and scholars on systemic risk, its importance has always been recognized. The early studies relate the 
systemic risk either to liquidity problems due to their deposits (bank runs) or to the mismatch between 
short-term liabilities and long-term investments (maturity transformation function). 
This section is organized as follows. Firstly, I introduce the bank runs theory since it represents 
the precursors of more contemporary studies. Secondly, I discuss the emerging field of research 
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represented by the network theory (Babus, 2007). Last but not least, I analyse all those studies related 
on the evaluation of aggregate shocks. Finally, I move onto the moral hazard theory. 
4.1.1 Bank run-based models  
This stream of research finds its logical premise in the seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983). According with the aforementioned study, bank runs represent random phenomena usually 
triggered by bank depositors when they experience a sudden liquidity shock (Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983). Furthermore, the banking literature also recognizes that bank-runs are not random phenomena 
led by depositors’ liquidity shock, but might be driven by the fact that they might receive imperfect 
information about risky investments of banks or negative performance of bank’s assets (Chari and 
Jaghanathan, 1988). Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1998) show that depositors may also behave 
compulsory by herding among each other and enact a generalized bank-run. Waldo (1985) shows that 
when these events occur, they create an adverse effect on bank stability since it induces it to fire sale 
by determining both a reduction in asset prices and an increase in interest rates. 
Other scholars extended these seminal papers to allow for the fact that bank-runs cannot be 
considered in a stand-alone basis, since they may create a spillover effect - a cross-country effect and 
a cross-entity effect. On the one hand, Garber and Grilli (1989), extending the Waldo’s model and 
assuming a two-countries setting, demonstrate that bank activity in a given country may lead to fire 
sales of long-term securities and increase the interest rates in the other country. On the other hand, 
Rochet and Tirole (1996) show that the probability of default of one bank is a direct function of the 
liquidity shock hitting the other bank.  
Allen and Gale (2000) put at centre of their analysis the physical exposures among banks in 
different regions. They find that bank failures in the economy depend on the level of the liquidity of 
the banks in the other region and on the number of banks are affected by the deposits withdrawal of 
a given bank. Along the same lines, Flannery (1996) stress better the contagion idea by showing that 
it operates by means of interbank linkages. In his framework, banks receive imperfect signals on the 
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quality of their borrowers and, thus, they may not discriminate between bad and good counterparts in 
the interbank market. As a result, if an adverse event occurs (or negative shock), healthy banks might 
not satisfy their obligations and experience larger losses due to temporary increase in the interest 
rates. 
4.1.2 Network theory in banking 
 Allen and Gale (2000) and Flannery (1996) prelude the development of banking network theory, 
mainly based on the concept of interconnections among financial institutions (De Bandt and 
Hartmann, 2000). 
 The theoretical literature provides two alternative explanations on the possible implications of 
banking network on bank risk-taking and financial stability. For instance, Leitner (2005) develop a 
model based on the assumption that bank returns rely on the investments of other banks with which 
the bank is connected with and analyses the trade-off between risk-sharing and contagion risk. In this 
setting, the structure of the network has an important advantage because it might prevent bank 
defaults and contagion. Furthermore, analysing the network formation in the interbank market, Babus 
(2007) outlines that bank interconnections might strengthen the overall financial stability to detriment 
of bank’s risk. In fact, more-interconnected network in the interbank mark could be more resilient to 
contagion by lowering its risk. In her framework, financial institutions have incentives to behave in 
order to reach the optimal level of safety. 
 Conversely, Zawadowski (2013) points out that network structure may transmit crisis. This stance 
could justify the activities of central banks (or government) as a lender of last resort in the banking 
system. Similarly, Haldane and May (2011) stress that network formation increase the level of 
complexity in the banking system to detriment of the financial stability. Hence, financial 
interconnections might be related to higher level of systemic risk. Additionally, this relation might 
not be necessarily monotonic, because it is function of the general wealth of the banking system and 
the nature of the links among banks (De Bandt and Hartmann, 2000).  
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4.1.3 Macroeconomic conditions 
This strand of literature stresses mainly the relation between bank fundamentals and 
macroeconomic shocks. This strand is strongly related to the seminal papers of Jacklin and 
Bhattacharya (1998) and Chari and Jaghanatan (1988). The assumption is that news about possible 
economic downturns could transmit negative signals about bank’s loans to all depositors. For 
instance, Hellwing (1998) points out that the non-contingent nature of bank deposit contracts 
represents an important source of the bank’s vulnerability to systematic shocks. Indeed, in case of an 
adverse macroeconomic shock bank deposits represent an element of rigidity for banks because they 
have a fixed nature unrelated to bank’s returns. In this contest, Chen (1999) points out that a negative 
macroeconomic shock may especially increase the probability of contagion and by endangering the 
conditions of the banking system creating negative feedback loops between the wealth of the banking 
system and macroeconomic conditions. 
Furthermore, macroeconomic conditions may also create incentives for banks to expand their 
activities (e.g. low interest rates) and induce managers to pursue risky lending strategies (so-called 
moral hazard problem) by increasing the financial instability (Banerjee, 1992; De Bandt and 
Hartmann, 2000). The moral hazard is intrinsic part of the bank activities because of their reliance on 
the use of the leverage for the financial intermediation (Dewatripoint and Tirole, 1994). In fact, in 
response of generalized distresses in the economy, central banks may find optimal to intervene on the 
banking sector to restore the confidence and the stability. Among others, Diamond and Rajan (2005) 
show that expansive monetary interventions may produce two effects. On the one hand, they may 
encourage banks to continue investing in riskier projects because of lower interest rates. This issue is 
confirmed in Adrian and Shin (2010). In fact, the authors find that lower interest rates spur banks to 
increase their risk-appetite due a greater tightness of the balance sheets. In turn, this situation 
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encourages uncontrolled credit booms.1 On the other hand, expansive monetary interventions may 
encourage banks to loosen monitoring efforts on the borrowers because of increased liquidity in the 
interbank market (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2006).  
4.2 Empirical studies on systemic risk  
4.2.1 Empirical studies on systemic risk before 2007-financial crisis 
The recent financial crisis is only one of a series of systemic events in the history (e.g. Great 
Depression, Asian Crisis, and Nordic Crisis). In the empirical literature, majority of studies associates 
systemic risk to macroeconomic conditions ignoring that banks may endogenously trigger systemic 
risks. Particularly, previous studies detect that macroeconomic fluctuations may pose systemic risk. 
On the one hand, Gorton (1988) analyses the US banking sector during the National Banking Era by 
finding out panics are not random phenomena as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), but normal reactions 
of depositors to cyclical downturns. Gonzalez- Hermosillo et al. (1997) show that market and liquidity 
position of the banking sector help to explain bank distresses during different episodes in the USA. 
Calomiris and Mason (2000), using data on US banks during the period from January 1930 to March 
1933, show that as well as macroeconomic fundamentals bank-specific variables play a role for bank 
survival odds. As well as the strong impact of macroeconomic conditions, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) investigating the determinants of a large number of banking crises occurred in 45 
countries during the period from 1980 to 1994 find that the existence of explicit deposit insurance 
scheme and some law may play a central role in threating the financial stability and posing systemic 
risk.  
The empirical literature also investigated the release of relevant information on banks and on 
economy as a potential source of systemic risk. In finance literature, the common method to evaluate 
                                               
1 I assume a definition of credit boom in line with De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) referring to a situation where banks 
herd among each other, exploit low interest rates in the economy, and experience troubles simultaneously whey they 
reach a certain turning point of the cycle. 
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spillover effects of particular information is the event study method, based on the standard capital 
market equilibrium model (CAPM). For instance, Aharony and Swary (1983) analyse the effect of 
three bank failures on other financial institutions in the United States before 1980: National Bank of 
San Diego (1973), Franklin National Bank of New York (1974), and Hamilton National Bank of 
Chattanooga (1976). They find that the failures of the aforementioned banks caused significant 
abnormal returns for other entities (especially, small and medium bank). Wall and Peterson (1990) 
find that negative stock prices responses can also generated by bad news. The literature also stresses 
the fact that there are also other kind reactions to the release of bad news. For instance, Calomiris and 
Mason (1997) find that analysing the 1932 Chicago Crash during the Great Depression, they find 
statistically significant deposit withdrawals from banks during their period of investigation. 
Additionally, they also find that contagious withdrawals also led to other failures. 
Overall, the previous empirical literature considers as main causes of systemic: risk the release of 
bad news, the reaction of depositors to economic downturns, and macroeconomic conditions. 
Whereas, there is only some evidence (Calomiris and Mason, 2000) indicating that banks’ 
fundamentals can cause systemic risks to the banking sector. 
4.2.2. Evidences on systemic risk in the post-crisis period 
 The 2007-2008 Financial Crisis has raised new attention on the debate about the systemic risk and 
its determinants. More recent studies report both internal factors (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2013; Pais and Stork, 2013; Jorion, 2009; Acharya and Thakor, 2016; Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Pais 
and Stork, 2013; Mayordomo et. al, 2014) and external factors (e.g. institutional and macroeconomic 
factors) (Anginer et al. 2013) explain the level of systemic risk in the banking system. 
 In this context, the main explanation of systemic risk is the bank’s size (Jorion, 2009). The idea 
lies in the special status of large banks and in their possible effects in terms of spillovers over their 
counterparties. Elyasiani et al. (2007) measure systemic risk and potential spillover effects of large 
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versus small banks by estimating the changes in the level and volatility of the stock returns. They find 
larger institutions have higher volatility than smaller ones.  
 The larger bank’s size is often associated with an aggressive use of the leverage (Stern and 
Feldman, 2004; Acharya and Thakor, 2016). Penas and Unal (2004), analysing M&A operations, find 
that mergers among banks have a positive effect on bond returns if the resulting bank becomes larger. 
The reason lies in the fact that bondholders profit from both the potential implicit guarantees in bank’s 
size that reduces the likelihood of default. In principle, leverage should impose market-discipline on 
banks (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994; Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Acharya 
and Viswanathan, 2011). In contrast, the managers and the creditors of these institutions can take 
advantage of the bank’s size maximising leverage aggressively in the expectations of achieving 
higher returns (Adrian and Shin, 2010). In particular, some scholars show that banks exploit mainly 
the short-term leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; 
Acharya and Thakor, 2016; Acharya et al., 2013; Goel et al., 2014). It increases both the bank’s risk-
taking and market fragility in view of any possible liquidity shock (Balasubramanian and Cyree, 
2011).  
 DeFerrari and Palmer (2001) show that the reference to the term large should be studied in relation 
to the bank’s involvement in different activities, such as activities in derivatives market, trading 
activities and the geographic extent of operations. In line with this argument, De Jonghe (2010) finds 
as well as bank size (the main driver of banks’ tail betas, using the Extreme Value Theory) the level 
of diversification may increase large banks’ systemic risk. Brunnermeier et al. (2012) stress more 
deeply the linkage between diversification strategies and banks’ systemic risk, by documenting that 
banks with higher non-interest income have a higher level of systemic risk than traditional banks, 
whose activity is based only on deposit-taking and lending.  
 Developments in the financial innovation encouraged new financial products including a wide 
range of structured derivatives (Stulz, 2010). In fact, during the last years, there has been an extensive 
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intra-system activities on the derivatives markets for hedging purposes (Calmès and Théoret, 2010). 
Many large banks play significant roles in the construction, sale, and trading of these products. A 
higher degree of participation in these markets makes banks more prone to threaten the financial 
stability, even if each class of derivatives (credit derivatives, interest rate derivatives, foreign 
exchange derivatives equity derivatives) has a different impact on bank’s systemic risk. Mayordomo 
et al. (2014) find that banks’ holdings of credit and foreign exchange derivatives have an increasing 
effect on systemic risk, while holdings of interest rate derivatives have a decreasing effect.  
 After the beginning of the financial crisis, much attention was devoted to bank’s executive 
compensation to detriment of corporate governance (Bebchuck, 2007; Falenbrach and Stulz, 2010; 
Beltratti), namely the set of internal and external mechanisms ensuring that decisions (e.g. definition 
of objectives and actions) at different levels of bank’s organisation are taken in favour of its 
shareholders (Zingales, 2010). Whilst, there is no a general consensus in the literature on the effect 
of executive compensations on bank’s risk and how they affected the last financial turmoil. On the 
one hand, some scholars support the view that executive compensation formulas may have spur 
managers to undertake riskier investments to detriment of shareholders (Bebchuck et al., 2011).  On 
the other hand, others argue that shareholders might use executive compensations as a means for 
inducing top managers/executives to accept higher levels of riskiness (Beltratti and Stulz, 2010). 
 Systemic risk posed by banks may be either worsened or reduced by countries’ institutional 
factors. Anginer et al. (2013) study the relation among the institutional factors, the regulatory 
environment and the level of competition in a particular country and bank’s systemic risk by attaining 
two important results. Firstly, they show that when financial systems become more competitive, the 
bank’s contribution to the overall systemic risk tends to decrease, especially in those countries with 
strong investors’ protection and less generous safety-net mechanisms. Secondly, bank’s systemic risk 
is higher in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, greater government ownership 
of banks, and public policies that restrict competition. It suggests that mechanisms that reduce the 
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market power of large banks are associated with higher financial stability. 
5. Aims of the thesis, motivations, and contributions 
 The following PhD dissertation include a collection of three studies: 
1. Bank’s centrality in the European banking market and systemic risk 
2. Public bailouts, bank’s risk, and spillover effects: the case of European banks 
3. Government interventions and gender diversity in bank’s boards in Europe. 
More specifically, the aim of this dissertation is to investigate the potential sources of systemic 
risk by analysing respectively: i) financial interdependencies among banks, ii) public bailouts, and 
iii) corporate governance mechanisms with a particular focus on gender diversity in the bank boards.  
First, although the last financial crisis has shown the intertwined nature of the banking system, none 
of studies, mentioned in Section 6, take fully into account the financial dependencies among credit 
institutions to explain bank’s contribution to systemic risk. On the one hand, previous studies show 
that bank’s size (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990; Boyd and Gerler, 1993; Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Kane, 
2000; Penas and Unal, 2004; Ennis and Malek, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013; Pais and 
Stork, 2013; Jorion, 2009), the financial leverage (Acharya and Thakor, 2016), the extent of 
diversification activities (Brunnermeier et al., 2012), the holdings of financial derivatives 
(Mayordomo et. al, 2014), and other external factors (Anginer et al. 2013) may affect the level of 
systemic risk of larger banks. On the other hand, network studies in banking analysed the problem of 
bank’s interconnectedness by using, for instance, co-movements between asset returns to generate 
the network structure in a particular market (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2009). Both literatures offer 
different possibilities of research because the banking literature usually analyses the behaviour of 
banks with little focus on how banks are related to other institutions, while the literature on network 
formation is focused on linkages making up the overall network (Mistrulli, 2010; Craig and Von 
Peter, 2014, Pecora and Spelta, 2015). In contrast with Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009), I bridge the 
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banking literature to the social network literature. Thus, the aim of this study is to understand how 
topological properties of large banks may predict bank’s contribution to the systemic risk. To our 
knowledge, this is the first study aimed at testing how measures of centrality, quantifying network 
effects due to financial interactions among banks predict the bank’s contribution to systemic risk. 
This allows for enlarging the understanding of the large and complex financial institutions and the 
risk posed by their financial dependencies and explaining why some larger banks are riskier than 
other bank of comparable size. Therefore, quantifying network effects is crucial to potentially identify 
the stress at which banks are exposed (Battiston et al., 2012) during banking crises. 
 Second, Anginer et al. (2013) show that as well as bank-specific variables institutional factors 
and macroeconomic factors may influence the level of systemic risk in the banking sector. Among 
their results, they find that bank’s contribution to systemic risk is higher in those countries 
characterised by greater government ownership of banks and strong public policies restricting the 
competition. Furthermore, in their study, they focus mainly on the national deposit insurance 
characteristics without taking into account, for instance, specific public policies undertaken by 
national governments during banking crises. Indeed, in response to the 2007-08 financial crisis 
authorities and governments worldwide launched rescue measures for their national banks by 
acquiring large stakes in banks with the aim of restoring the financial stability and reducing spillover 
effects to the real economy. Besides these considerations, an emerging body of literature posits that 
public bailouts may create economic distortions in the banking sector (Hakenes and Schnabl, 2010; 
Gropp et al., 2011; Dam and Koetter, 2012) by raising the fundamental question “bail or not to bail 
out banks”. Dam and Koetter (2012) find that a change of bailout expectations increases the 
probability of bank default. This is in line with the Merton’s argument (1977) that is the presence of 
these arrangements may encourage banks to take additional risk in order to maximise the value of the 
put-option value on the insurance corporation’s funds. Additionally, Gropp et al. (2011) argues that 
the effects of public bailouts might not exhaust their effects on the protected banks but also to their 
competitors. In fact, Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) observe that the possibility of future bailouts 
 20 
increases the bank’s risk of protected banks’ competitors because these policies create incentives for 
protected banks to expand by depressing the competitors’ margins due to a higher level of rivalry in 
the deposit market. This distortion is even more severe in presence of generalized distresses in the 
banking industry (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). By now, there is currently no evidence in the 
literature on whether these policies undertaken by national government restore the financial stability 
or smooth the systemic risk in the banking sector by reducing moral hazard problem. In addition, 
there is no other study investigating on the impact of such policies in Europe on banks during the 
whole crisis period. Furthermore, the majority of previous studies focus mainly on the rescued banks 
neglecting possible spillover effects on the rescued banks’ competitors. Thus, this is the first paper 
aiming to provide a comprehensive evidence of the effects of public bailouts on bank conduct in 
Europe (15 countries) during the whole crisis period by considering both the direct effect on rescued 
banks and the spillover effects on banks’ competitors. Then, we also document that European 
investors do not welcome the introduction of such policies in the banking system. The resulting 
evidences also contribute to timely debate on optimal safety-net. 
 Finally, as a further source of systemic risk investigated, I focus on the corporate governance 
mechanisms with particular focus on gender diversity in bank boards. After the beginning of the 
crisis, many publications dealing with the causes of the financial crisis do not even take into account 
the corporate governance of the banks, with the only exception of remuneration schemes. Majority 
of studies conclude that heavily-incentivised and short-term oriented executive compensation 
schemes were the major causes of the last financial crisis (Beltratti and Stulz, 2010; Falenbrach and 
Stulz, 2010). Conversely, de Larosière Group (2009) observed that poor corporate governance 
mechanisms of the banks played a central role in the financial crisis, without any reference to 
executive compensations. Similarly, the Basel Committee on banking supervision paid attention on 
the need of enhancing the corporate governance of the banks because a better corporate governance 
improves the efficiency of monitoring by representing the foundation for a sound financial system 
(Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, BCBS, 2010). Surprisingly, recent studies do not 
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postulate any support for the hypothesis of the corporate governance failures in banks. For instance, 
Beltratti and Stulz (2010) do not find any evidence that banks with better governance (measured as 
Corporate Governance Quotient) over-performed during the crisis. Whilst, they also find that more 
shareholder-friendly boards experience poor performance during the crisis. Erkens et al. (2012), 
focusing on the board composition, find that financial institution with more independent directors 
experience a worse performance of stock returns during the crisis. Among board characteristics, 
gender diversity in bank boards has become one of the major issues in the corporate governance 
literature. However, the academic research has yet to reach a general consensus on the relation among 
board diversity, bank performance, and risk. Furthermore, little is known whether all laws and other 
policies aiming at enhancing bank governance are effective for the sake of the financial stability 
(Caprio et al., 2007). 
6. The EU-banking sector as context of analysis 
In this dissertation, I focus on the European banking market because it represents an important 
field of investigation for several reasons. 
First, the EU-banking market is bank-based system, since banks play a central role for the credit 
allocation favouring both the mobilization of savings and the monitoring on investments. This is in a 
sharp contrast with a market-based market, such as US banking market, where financial markets carry 
out the credit allocation.  
Second, in contrast with other markets, the European bank system is characterised by that majority 
of bank activities are run by Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs). In fact, they 
represent the 65% of the whole banking sector. In contrast, the American system is historically 
widely-fragmented and characterised by a large quantity of small credit institutions. 
Third, supervisory agencies pursue their stability objectives to enhance the stability of the financial 
sector in different ways. For instance, in case of bank’s default, EU-supervisors might tolerate the 
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possibility that an ailing bank may operates even if it does not comply with the minimum regulatory 
capital required in order to spread bank panics. Conversely, in the US context, authorities may 
intervene through Prompt Corrective Actions (PCAs) in the case in which the failing bank does meet 
the capital requirements. Additionally, the FIDC may also dispose the closure and a possible takeover. 
Fourth, both systems handled with the last financial crisis in different ways. In Europe, national 
governments are supposed to define the local schemes for the ailing banks. Once defined, the 
European commission approves the rescue package based on the premise to not distort the level-
playing-field. In the USA, the banks submitted their needs of funding on the US Treasury. In turn, 
the latter decided on the approval on the bank’s requests. In addition, the Central banks could also 
intervene on the banks directly. This feature is not provided for the EU regulations 
Fifth, the central banking activities are run differently. The FED accomplishes its aims 
independently in regards of the monetary policy. By contrast, European Central Bank (ECB) 
refinances credit institutions only through liquidity extensions. Alternatively, it may operate on the 
corridor of the standing facilities (as in 2009). 
Sixth, the 2007-2008 financial crisis raised new challenges for the European Union and determined 
new institutional settings. In fact, the EU-institutions agreed to establish the creation of the Banking 
Union, based on the Single Supervisory Mechanism,2 a Single Resolution Mechanism3 for banks, and 
a common European Deposit Insurance Guarantee.4 
                                               
2 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) places the European Central Bank as the central prudential supervisors of 
financial institution in the Euro Area. According to the SSM, the European Central Bank monitors directly the largest 
banks, while the national supervisors continue to monitor the smaller ones. The aim is to tackle problems early on. 
3 The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) applies to banks under the SSM. In case of bank’s failure, the mechanism 
allows bank resolution to be managed through a Single Resolution Board and a Single Resolution Fund, financed by the 
whole banking sector. The purpose is to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks in order to reduce the costs for 
taxpayers and real economy. 
4 The European Deposit Insurance Scheme would apply to deposits below 100.000 euros of all banks in the Euro Area. 
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The last financial crisis revealed the interconnections among financial institutions might drive the shock 
propagation and amplification throughout the banking system. In this paper, we analyse the cohesion 
evolution of the European banking market during the whole crisis and investigate whether topological 
properties of banks in the European network predict changes in the bank’s contribution to systemic risk. 
First, we find that that the EU-banking sector become more interconnected during the European sovereign 
debt crisis than during the US-mortgage crisis. Second, we find that the bank’s network measures help 
to predict substantial changes in the bank’s contribution to systemic risk (at least 3%). Our results are 
robust to sample selection issues and potential omitted variable bias.
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1. Introduction 
Do financial interconnections matter? Does the bank’s centrality in the European banking market 
predict changes in the bank’s contribution to systemic risk? 
In the following paper, we seek to provide some evidence on these timely questions on the role of 
financial interconnections for the systemic risk. First, since 2008 the last financial turmoil has 
reminded how crucial it is to acknowledge that the consequences of bank’s default may not be 
considered in stand-alone basis (Battison et al., 2012; Zawadowski, 2013). Financial regulators used 
to monitor the level of entangledness of the banks with their size: larger balance sheets, stronger 
spillover effects in case of a possible bank’s failure. Second, it is also in line with the timely debate 
among policymakers and scholars in proposing new frameworks (e.g. early-warning signals) for 
monitoring the financial stability and understanding the structure and the network dynamics among 
banks. A network perspective entails that the banking system is a complex network where nodes are 
the banks and the links are the financial dependencies among each other.  
Though recent papers have investigated what are the key contributors of the systemic risk 
(Brunnermeier et al., 2012; Anginer et al., 2014; Mayordomo et al., 2014; Acharya and Thakor, 
2016), to the best of our knowledge, there is currently no evidence about how topological properties 
of the banks contribute predicting substantial changes in the level of systemic risk. 
Our main findings are as follows. After mapping all the interconnections among all listed banks 
across EU-15 countries, the results indicate that the cohesion evolution of the European banking 
sector changes continuously over the time span by showing that the level of interconnectedness 
among banks is higher during the period of the European sovereign crisis (Battiston et al., 2012) than 
during the period of the US-mortgage crisis period. In fact, during this period, many European banks 
received state aids from public authorities through rescue package measures (Berger et al., 2016) to 
counterbalance spillover effects on the banking system. Second, to address whether bank’s centrality 
predicts substantial changes of systemic risk, we use ordered logit models in which we regress the 
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changes of SRISK and the marginal expected shortfall on social network centralities and a set of 
control variables. We find that bank’s network measures help to predict changes in the bank’s 
contribution to systemic risk around at least 3% by reaching the peak of 5% in some specifications. 
In addition, we also perform several sensitivity tests to assess the robustness of the results. On the 
one hand, we employ different cut-offs to define what represents a substantial change in the bank’s 
contribution to systemic risk. On the other hand, we run regressions to tackle sample selection and 
omitted variable issues. In all cases, we obtain results which are qualitatively and quantitatively 
unaltered to the main findings. 
To examine the research questions, we build a unique dataset on the interconnections among all 
listed banks in the European banking sector during the period from 2005 to 2013. The reason why we 
focus on the European banking market is twofold. First and foremost, the European banking market 
is at the centre of important regulatory changes, such as the Banking Union (for instance, the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism,5 the Single Resolution Mechanism6 for banks, and the common European 
Deposit Insurance Guarantee7). Second, analysing European countries permits to cover the European 
sovereign debt crisis that has shown that the spillover of the 2007-08 crisis produced effect far beyond 
2009, as suggested in other papers (among others, Aït Sahalia et al., 2012, Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2016).  
However, addressing the research questions of this paper is challenging because information on 
banks’ interactions are often hidden because of the well-known issue of confidentiality constraints. 
To overcome this problem, we rely on the linear Granger-causality test to generate the economic 
network in line with Billio et al., (2012) among all the banks across EU-15 countries. Although some 
                                               
5 The Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) places the European Central Bank as the central prudential supervisors of 
financial institution in the Euro Area. According to the SSM, the European Central Bank monitors directly the largest 
banks, while the national supervisors continue to monitor the smaller ones. The aim is to tackle problems early on. 
6 The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) applies to banks under the SSM. In case of bank’s failure, the mechanism 
allows bank resolution to be managed through a Single Resolution Board and a Single Resolution Fund, financed by the 
whole banking sector. The purpose is to ensure an orderly resolution of failing banks in order to reduce the costs for 
taxpayers and real economy. 
7 The European Deposit Insurance Scheme would apply to deposits below 100.000 euros of all banks in the Euro Area. 
When a bank is placed to insolvency, the national deposit insurance schemes and EDIS will intervene to protect 
depositors. 
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weaknesses related to the aforementioned method, it allows constructing a network by using only 
partial information, such as the availability of share prices, and evaluating the dynamics of shocks 
propagation from a bank to others after allowing for the autocorrelation of asset returns (Billio et al., 
2012). The main weakness is related to the fact that it is suitable only for those banks which are listed. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First and foremost, this paper maps the 
financial dependencies among banks in the European banking sector by using the Granger-causality 
test and then analyses whether network-based measures of connectedness predict changes in systemic 
risk at bank-level. Quantifying network effects is crucial to potentially identify the stress at which 
banks are exposed and thus bank’s contribution to the overall systemic risk (Battiston et al., 2012). 
In turn, this is also related to the more general issue of financial networks concerning the 
understanding of the systemically important financial institutions.  
Second, we provide novel evidence since we extend Billio et al., (2012) along two dimensions: i) 
the countries analysed; ii) the time period analysed. On the one hand, we focus on the European 
banking market covering EU-15 countries. Most studies focus on a specific geographic area (e.g. US) 
with little focus on European banking sector, which has been characterised by several and 
unprecedented policymakers’ interventions in regards to the banking system and higher instability 
because of the European sovereign debt crisis. On the other hand, we also extend the time period 
analysed from 2008 to 2013. This extension is essential especially in lights of the last events related 
to the 2007-financial crisis demonstrating that the turmoil did not culminate in 2009. By including all 
the years until 2013, we also able to cover the aforementioned European sovereign debt crisis and 
provide evidence of the shock propagation during the whole financial crisis period. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides how this paper is related to the 
previous literature, highlights the main contribution, and develop the research hypotheses. Section 3 
presents the data and describe the main measures used. Section 4 describes the methodology. Section 
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5 reports the evolution of network dynamics, while Section 6 and Section 7 show our main findings 
and robustness tests, respectively. Section 8 provides concluding remarks and policy implications. 
2. Literature, contributions, and research hypotheses 
The 2007-08 financial crisis raised new attention on the debate about the systemic risk. This paper 
is related to two strands of the literature.  
The closest strand of literature that this paper is related to is the emerging body of the determinants 
of systemic risk.  Many papers have investigated bank’s characteristics and macroeconomic and 
institutional factors as the main contributors of the systemic risk. In this context, the main explanation 
of systemic risk is the bank’s size (Jorion, 2009), since large banks in case of default may create 
spillover effects not only for the banking system but also for the real economy (Elyasiani et al., 2007). 
Furthermore, larger bank’s size is often related to more aggressive use of the leverage. In theory, the 
leverage should impose market-discipline on banks (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991; Diamond and Rajan, 
2000; Acharya and Viswanathan, 2011). In contrast, the managers and the creditors of these 
institutions can take advantage of size maximising leverage aggressively in the expectations of 
achieving higher returns (especially short-term leverage (Adrian and Shin, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 
2010; Shleifer and Vishny, 2010; Acharya et al., 2013; Acharya and Thakor, 2016). It increases both 
the bank’s risk-taking and market fragility in case of a liquidity shock (Balasubramanian and Cyree, 
2011). Besides these arguments, empirical studies have also looked for evidence of financial 
innovation and the related holding of derivatives (Calmès and Théoret, 2010; Mayordomo et al., 
2014), the level of diversification (De Jonghe, 2010; Brunnermeier et al., 2012), the bank’s executive 
compensation schemes (Bebchuck, 2007; Falenbrach and Stulz, 2010; Bebchuck et al., 2011), and 
the countries’ institutional factors (Anginer et al., 2014). 
The second strand of the literature that this paper is related to is the fast-growing research on 
networks in economics and finance. Mainly, the literature has focused either on network effects or 
network formation (Allen and Babus, 2009). Scholars have used network analysis to investigate the 
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interbank market and tiering (Freixas et al., 2000; Karlan et al., 2009; Craig and Von Peter, 2014), 
the investment decisions (Cohen et al., 2008; Hochberg et al., 2007), the IPO characteristics (Bajo et 
al., 2016), shock propagation dynamics (Billio et al., 2012), and the dependency among bank’s 
portfolios (Lagunoff and Schreft, 2001: de Vries, 2005; Cifuentes et al., 2005). However, although 
many applications, the literature on financial networks is still scant and at the early stage.   
Despite the increased attention to investigating the systemic risk, little research analyses 
empirically how bank’s interconnections predict changes in the bank’s contribution to the overall 
systemic risk defined as the risk of default of considerable number of financial institutions in the 
banking sector. For this purpose, we bridge the banking literature to social network literature as the 
banking literature examines the behaviour of banks with little emphasis on how they relate to others, 
whereas the literature on network formation is more focused on linkages among nodes that make up 
the network (Craig and Von Peter, 2014). A remarkable exception is a recent paper by Billio et al. 
(2012), which quantifies interdependences among banks. In their study, they find that financial 
institutions become more interconnected during their sample period from 1996 to 2008.  
However, this paper may be considered either an examination or an extension of the previous 
literature on the systemic risk. First and foremost, this paper maps the financial dependencies among 
banks in the European banking sector by using the Granger-causality test and then analyses whether 
network-based measures of connectedness predict changes in systemic risk at bank-level. Thus, the 
logical premise is to examine the structure of the European banking sector and its evolution over the 
period starting from 2005 to 2013. Quantifying network effects is crucial to potentially identify the 
stress at which banks are exposed and thus bank’s contribution to the overall systemic risk (Battiston 
et al., 2012). In turn, this is also related to the more general issue of financial networks concerning 
the understanding of the systemically important financial institutions. Indeed, there is some evidence 
that a specific network position given a certain network structure may be either beneficial or 
detrimental (Podolny, 1994; Gulati, 1995; Gulati, 1998). 
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Second, we provide novel evidence since we extend Billio et al., (2012) along two dimensions: i) 
the countries analysed; ii) the time period analysed. On the one hand, we focus on the European 
banking market covering EU-15 countries. Most studies focus on a specific geographic area (US) 
with little focus on European banking sector, which has been characterised by several and 
unprecedented policymakers’ interventions in regards to the banking system and higher instability 
because of the European sovereign debt crisis. On the other hand, we also extend the time period 
analysed from 2008 to 2013. This extension is essential especially in lights of the last events related 
to the 2007-financial crisis demonstrating that the turmoil did not culminate in 2009. By including all 
the years until the 2013, we also able to cover the aforementioned European sovereign debt crisis and 
provide evidence of the shock propagation during the whole financial crisis period. 
In this paper, the primary idea is to understand whether the bank’s network centrality may be 
helpful to predict changes in the bank’s contribution to the overall systemic risk. In absence of specific 
predictions, we borrow some hints from the previous works in anthropology, economics, and 
sociology focusing on the spreads of infections and epidemics (Bailey, 1975; Morris, 1993), where 
the crucial characteristic of network processes in these studies is the concept of centrality (broadly 
defined as the relevance of the position of an agent in the network). It is widely-accepted that network 
connections may produce benefits for agents (Podolny, 1994; Gulati, 1994; Gulati, 1998; Larson, 
2011; Acemoglu et al., 2016) both direct and indirect. Conversely, links may also expose banks (or 
other agents in the financial system) to negative payoff since they may be involved in cascading 
defaults (Allen and Gale, 2000; Blume et al., 2011; Acemoglu et al., 2016). Billio et al., (2012) 
suggest that financial companies tend to become more interconnected among each other over the past 
decade by reaching the peak of connectivity among banks and other financial institutions during the 
US-mortgage crisis period. Furthermore, they find that the increased connectivity is also related to 
higher level of the centrality of financial institutions. Speculatively, we expect that during periods of 
generalized bank’s distresses, a higher centrality is positively related to changes in the systemic risk. 
we also expect that not all bank’s network centralities predict changes in the systemic risk. In fact, 
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there is some evidence that institutions suffered more losses during the first part of the recent financial 
turmoil were those ones that greatly influenced other institutions and not the institutions that were 
influenced by others (Billio et al., 2012).  
3. Methodology 
3.1 Building the financial network 
To quantify the network effects for each node, we build the financial network. As mentioned, as 
well as identifying the shock propagation during the waves of crisis this process is auxiliary to define 
the topological properties of nodes (centrality measures). To construct the network, the underlying 
idea is that there exists a relation, given two banks i and j in a specific year, whether the time series 
of the asset returns of bank i’s Granger-causes significantly the time series of assets returns of the 
bank j’s.  
For any given year t of the sample period (from 2005 to 2013) we construct the adjacency matrix 
Xt to compute the centrality measures. Since the aim is to investigate the dynamics of shock 
propagation and its implications for systemic risk, we also take into account the directionality of the 
relation. Thus, the adjacency matrix for each year might not be symmetric and, thus, each cell takes 
the value of one only if the asset returns of bank j have predictive power for those of bank i. To build 
the matrices over the sample period, we follow a multi-step procedure. First, we calculate all EU-15 
listed banks’ assets returns (133 banks). Secondly, we rely on the linear Granger causality method8 
to identify the bank’s interconnections (Billio et al., 2012). Although banks’ interactions are often 
hidden because of the well-known practice of the confidentiality, the Granger causality test allows to 
construct a measure of interconnected based only on partial information (e.g. availability of share 
prices). As well as to identify the network, the method is particularly suitable because it allows 
evaluating the dynamics of shocks propagation from a bank to others after adjusting for the 
                                               
8 In this framework, given two-time series – i and j – the time series i’s granger-causes the time series j’s if the past values 
of i predict the values of j after controlling for the information contained in the past of values of the latter. 
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autocorrelation of asset returns (Billio et al., 2012). Following this study, we assume that the bank’s 
asset returns follow a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity GARCH model (1,1)9 
process defined as 
!",$%& = (",$ + *"$+",$  (1) 
where +",$~-.(0,1) and  *"$ = 3" + 4"(!",$5& − (")7 + 8"*"$5&7 "$ 
Then, I employ the following mathematical specification10 
!",$%& = 9"!",$ + :";!;,$ + <",$%&  (2) 
!;,$%& = 9;!;,$ + :;"!;,$ + <",$%&   (3) 
where the error terms are two uncorrelated white noise processes, while the other coefficients 
represent the parameters of interest. Hence, if the coefficient of the equation (2) is statistically 
different from zero, it means that the time series j’s granger-causes the time series i’s. Furthermore, 
if the :;" is also significant, it entails that as well as time series i’s affects j’s, there exists a feedback 
loop between the two bank’s time series of asset-returns. The same procedure is repeated year by year 
along the sample period, which is from 2005 to 2013. Finally, we evaluate the possible rejection of 
the Granger-causality test and define an indicator of relation (of Granger causality) such that 




and (= → =) ≡ 0. This step is auxiliary for the construction of the matrices of adjacency among all 
European banks. 
3.2 Regression framework 
For this analysis, we model the changes in the systemic risk as different functions of centrality 
measures and a set of explanatory variables. More specifically, the main analysis makes use of the 
                                               
9 Lo (2012), Getmansky et.al. (2004), Billio et al., (2012) suggest that considering the autocorrelation of returns in the 
specification allows for the liquidity risk of a given bank. 
10 Along the same line of Billio et al. (2012), the i and j are two stationary time series. 
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ordered logit model (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004), which may be able to predict changes in 
the bank’s contribution to the systemic risk. Additionally, this empirical framework allows avoiding 
that my results are driven by small changes in the systemic risk. Hence, our regression framework is 
based on an ordered logit model, where the dependent variable takes either the value of 1 if the bank 
i’s experience a decrease in systemic risk, compared to the previous year, of more than 3% (DROP) 
or the value of 2 if the changes in the systemic risk ranges between -3% and 3% (always compared 
to the previous year) (CONS) or the values of 3 if the bank systemic risk increases compared to the 
previous year by more than 3% (RISE). Moreover, in alternative specifications, we also employ 
different threshold for the change in the bank’s risk to exclude that our results are dependent on the 
cut-off that was previously chosen. 
We rely on the following specification for an ordered logit model with three categories modelling 
the probability of an observation i’s of the dependent variable in year t falling into one of the ranges 
expressed above: 
QRS",$ = 1T = 1 − Q(S",$ > 1);               (4) 
QRS",$ > VT =
WXYRZ[%\]^,_T
&%WXYRZ[%\]^,_T
                 (5) 
and k=1, 2  
where Xi,t is the vector of independent variables for observation i’s in year t and ß are the 
coefficients of the variables of our interest and the other explanatory variables. Finally, we cluster 
standard errors at bank-level to allow for serial correlation within bank. In some robustness checks, 
we also cluster standard errors at country-level and bank-country-level. Along the same line of Ferrer-
i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), we also account for time and bank fixed effects.  
4. Data and Variables 
We start from the sample of all EU-15 listed banks available in Datastream (133 banks). Second, 
we consider all those banks whose data information is also available in Bankscope (100 banks). Third, 
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to enhance the comparability among the banks in the sample, we focus only on those banks classified 
as bank holding companies, commercial banks, and cooperative banks and adopting IFRS accounting 
standards. This criterion is required to avoid that my estimates are driven by national accounting 
regimes. Fourth, we exclude banks if they have: i) no information on the components of the financial 
intermediation activities (deposits and loans), ii) no information on regulatory capital ratios iii) total 
assets less than 1 billion of euros. This latter criterion is applied both during the pre-crisis period and 
the post-crisis period to avoid any possible bias (Mayordomo et al., 2014). Finally, we also stipulate 
to remove banks for which I do not have an annual reports to allow the hand-collection of the 
corporate governance variables. These criteria lead to a final sample composed of yearly information 
for 61 banks from 2005 to 2013. Although the small size of my sample, the sampled banks represent 
the 70% of the total assets of the EU-15 banking sector. 
As outlined before, we match data from different data sources for the statistical analysis. The data 
on bank’s stock prices are from Datastream. We collect data on bank-specific variables from either 
V-Stern Lab (systemic risk measures) or Bankscope (balance sheet and other financial ratios). For 
corporate governance variables, we hand-collect information from annual reports. Finally, the data 
on macroeconomic and institutional factors are collected from World Bank Database. 
4.1 Measures of centrality  
To understand whether a bank is central in the EU-banking market, we use various SNA measures. 
Some scholars have argued that the social network analysis may be of particular interest for 
understanding the implications of interconnections among banks in lights of the recent financial crisis. 
According to the network theory, a network is defined as a set of nodes (in this case, banks) and links 
(namely financial relationships) among. An essential feature of the network structure is the concept 
of centrality, broadly defined as the relevance of the node in a given network. Billio et al. (2012) 
suggest that the centrality may provide some insights into which nodes might be considered 
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systemically important. For this purpose, we use various measures of centrality to investigate the 
dynamics of shock propagation and understanding the node’s contribution to the systemic risk. 
We make use of four social network analysis measures. The degree is the simplest centrality 
measure since it counts the number of bank’s interconnections that a financial institution has in the 
network. In social network analysis, it is considered as measure of prestige due the number of 
interconnections that an agent (in this case, the bank) has in its environment (Wasserman and Faust, 
1994).  
 The second measures that we consider is the Closeness. It is the inverse of the sum of the geodesic 
distance from actor i to all actors (Sabidussi, 1966; Wassermann and Faust, 1994). The underlying 
idea is to analysed node’s centrality by stressing the concept of proximity to all other nodes. The 
higher the score, the lower the distance separating a node from the others. For instance, in statistical 
mechanics, this index is interpreted as the expected time until the arrival of something flowing into 
the network (e.g. shock propagation). A higher value for this variable entails that a lower distance is 
necessary to reach a given node from others. 
The third measure considered here is the Betweenness. In contrast with other centrality measures, 
the latter has another logical premise. It measures the probability with which a node lies on the 
shortest path between any two unconnected nodes (Freeman et al., 1979, Craig and Von Peter, 2014). 
It assesses the centrality of any node as the extent to which a bank may operate as a bridge between 
two unconnected banks (Bajo et al. 2016). Thus, it provides a hint on the control that an individual 
node may exert on what is flowing across the nodes within the network. Finally, we consider the 
eigenvector centrality which measures the importance of a bank in the system by associating scores 
to banks considering how they are connected to the rest of the network (Billio et al., 2012). As 
underlined in Bajo et al. (2016), more extensive networks are characterised by the fact that more links 
are in place. As a consequence, it produces higher centrality measures. This represents a minor 
problem in cross-sectional analysis, while in a panel setting, this might create to a time-bias problem 
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in the estimates since the network might change in size (some operators may exit from the market of 
banks) and in composition (higher/lower concentration). The aforementioned problem is particularly 
severe on extended sample period. For this reason, we normalize all SNA measures. 
4.2 Measures of systemic risk 
Among the proposed (backward- and forward-looking) measures for the systemic risk in the 
literature (Bisias et al., 2012), we consider two specific measures for the main results and the 
robustness tests, respectively SRISK and long-run marginal expected shortfall (LRMES). 
In comparison with backward-looking measures of systemic risk, LRMES and SRISK have various 
benefits. Firstly, both measures are updated frequently, while bank balance sheet information is 
available only on a quarterly/yearly basis. Secondly, being forward-looking measures, they also 
reflect stock market information and, thus, market-expectations. Thirdly, they require for the 
estimation only  publicly available data. Both measures estimate the capital shortfall of a bank during 
a financial crisis based on its stock return volatility and systematic correlation with the market. 
The SRISK is six-month simulated measures of the bank’s contribution to the systemic risk and is 
defined as the expected capital shortfall of the bank in the case if it experienced another financial 
crisis, where another financial crisis (Acharya et al., 2012) is defined whenever a broad market index 
falls around 40% over six months. Higher value of this measure, higher the contribution of the bank 
in case of crisis. Formally, SRISK for the bank i’s at year t is given by the following formula: 
`!a`b",$ = VRc<:M",$T − (1 − V)R1 − d!ef "̀,$TfgI=Mh",$ 
where k referring to the capital regulatory requirement in force, while Debt and Equity are 
respectively the value of value and Equity. We will discuss more in details the LRMES later. 
For these left-tail scenarios, the expected loss of equity value of the bank i’s is called long-run 
marginal expected shortfall (LRMES). This measure also represents one of the factors required to 
estimate the aforementioned SRISK. For the sake of interpretation, the higher LRMES, more equity 
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capital will be drained during a potential systemic event. We use this latter measure as in the 
robustness checks. 
4.3 Control variables 
We also consider a set of control variables. First, we allow for bank’s size, defined as the log of 
bank’s total size (Size). Although being a proxy of the well-established argument of the too-big-to-
fail issues, it also proxies for the bank’s business model, market power and diversification. Regarding 
to the latter issue, there are some arguments that larger banks are also more diversified. 
Second, in the spirit of Acharya and Thakor (2016), we also control for bank capital structure since 
it has been considered as a contributor to the 2007-08 financial crisis. As a proxy for capital structure, 
we use the ratio of bank’s total equity to total assets (Capital ratio). Speculatively, there are some 
evidence in the literature that high financial leverage ratio (especially in the form of short-term 
leverage) leads banks to pursue illiquid and riskier activities (among others, Adrian and Shin (2010)).  
Third, we account for growth opportunities using the Market-to-book ratio (MTB ratio) (Onali et 
al., 2016) are in principle more likely to engage go-for-broke activities and thus show a higher level 
of bank’s risk (Herring and Vankudre. 1987). Fourth, we also take into account Deposits ratio, which 
is given by the ratio between bank’s total deposits to total assets. EBA (2016) reports that banks with 
higher dependency from deposits for their activities are more stable than others. 
Finally, macroeconomic and institutional factors are also considered in my specification to take 
into account the fact that competitive forces may play a central role in determining the bank 
performance. In line with Anginer et al. (2014), we control for the level of the competition and market 
structure by using Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI index), defined as the sum of squared market 
shares expressed in terms of total assets. Then, following the previous work of Demirguç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2004), we control for the gross domestic product annual growth rate to allow for the 
business cycle effects. In line with Billio et al., 2012, controlling for these variables allows to better 
disentangle the possible contagion from common-factor exposures. 
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Table 1 reports all the descriptive statistics for the sample. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
5. The topology of the European banking sector 
Table 2 reports the results for the cohesion evolution of the European banking sector. More 
specifically, we explore the topology of European banking network by analysing the behaviour of the 
network statistics during the sample period from 2005 to 2013. We begin analysing the descriptive 
statistics of the European banking sector at network-level. Then, we also describe the network 
statistics at dyadic-level.  
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
First, we note that the Average Degree, namely the average total number of links with which a 
bank has a Granger-causality relation, is 13.211 in 2005. The indicator rapidly increases over the 
sample period in line with the development of the US-Mortgage crisis. By the end of 2010, the 
average value skyrockets in 2010 by reaching the value of 36 (2010 is the year of the outbreak of the 
EU-Sovereign debt crisis). Similar patterns are verified for the In-degree H-index. 
Turning our attention to the Density, that is the number of links scaled by the total number of links 
possible, the statistics reveal a tendency for banks to move closer among each other over the sample 
span (2005-2013). The network seems to be more cohesive, and the network density increases rapidly 
between the year 2005 and the year 2010, while a sharp decrease is observed for the subsequent years. 
Then, we check whether all the nodes of the resulting network satisfy the property of Closure, 
defined as the number of transitive triples divided by the number of paths of length. This measure is 
based on the assumption that networks expand to reach multiple nodes in only a few steps.  
Moving onto Closure, as well as changing continuously over the time span, it maintains the value 
of at least 0.4 over the whole sample period with the only exception of two years – 2006 and 2008 - 
by reaching its peak of 0.607 in 2009 meaning that the European banking network is composed of 
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strongly interconnected elements. However, the closure property might be resulting too extreme to 
hold across all nodes in a vast network, especially in this case where the number of nodes changes 
continuously over the time. 
We also consider some distance measures to evaluate the average distance within the European 
banking network. First, we consider the average distance among banks in the network. 
Unsurprisingly, the average distance is lower during the pre-crisis period, while it assumes the value 
of 1 during both the US-mortgage crisis period and the EU-sovereign debt crisis. This result appears 
to be consistent with Billio et al. (2012). Second, we also take into account a measure aimed at 
evaluating how dispersed (alternatively, clustered) nodes are around the average distance. The 
corresponding values drop in 2007, 2008, and 2010 respectively (0.616, 0.598, and 0.565). This 
pattern is also reflected in the fact that the average distance among financial institutions in the network 
reduces considerably because of the outburst of the two waves of crisis. 
Finally, another way to look at the cohesion in network studies, it is based on the concept of 
distance. For this purpose, we calculate Compactness, defined as the average of all the reciprocal 
distances. Compactness is higher than 0.500 in all the years of the sample period, by reaching the 
maximum peak in 2010 (0.637). Thus, the economic network appears to be cohesive both in terms of 
distance (Compactness) and links (Density). 
The Granger-causality is, by definition, based on the predictive power of two-time series (Billio 
et al., 2012). Implicitly, it assumes a dyadic feature. For this purpose, we investigate the presence of 
mutual, asymmetric, and nulls dyads for each year of the sample period. Although the period of 
profound financial instability in the European banking sector, mutual state for dyadic relations are 
rare with the only exception of the year 2010, while, unexpectedly, during the whole sample period 
the proportion of null dyads is indeed higher. Furthermore, the percentage of asymmetric dyads is not 
trivial in our sample, indicating that there are some institutions drive the shock propagation and the 
cohesion evolution of the European banking sector. 
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6. Main results 
Table 3 reports the results for our main regressions. The dependent variables are both SRISK and 
MES. All regressions include bank and year fixed effects. The first and the fourth regressions include 
as a measure of social network centrality Degree and a set of bank-level and macro-level control 
variables commonly used in the literature of systemic risk. The coefficient for Degree enters 
regressions statistically insignificant. Turning our attention to other measures of centrality, the 
coefficient on Closeness enters regressions positively and statistically significant. This is an important 
result indicating that higher centrality in the European banking sector is related to an increase in the 
level of bank’s contribution to the overall systemic risk. Whilst, the coefficients on the other measures 
of centrality are not statistically significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
Moving onto control variables, Size is positively related to changes in systemic risk, but it is not 
statistically significant. Although the literature provides unclear results on the effects of bank’s size 
on systemic risk, this result might be in contrast with the too-big-to-fail dilemma that considers bank’s 
size as one of the main determinant of systemic risk. In fact, there is some evidence that large banks 
as well as having higher systemic risk, do not manage properly their risk-taking and are characterised 
by misaligned incentives since the market discipline for them is less effective (Jorion, 2009; Pais and 
Stork, 2013). A possible explanation might be related to the fact that the sample investigated is 
composed by only the largest EU-banks across 15 countries. 
In line with Acharya and Thakor (2016), we find that Capital ratio is negatively related to changes 
in systemic risk. This entails that higher level of bank’s equity buffers helps to reduce bank’s 
contribution to the systemic risk. In fact, the last financial crisis has demonstrated that high bank 
leverage has been one of the main contributor to the financial system. Furthermore, there are also 
some arguments in favour of the fact that highly levered banks are those that firstly suffer from 
portfolio shocks (Acharya and Thakor, 2016). Additionally, Adrian and Shin (2010), and Mian and 
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Sufi (2010) show that higher leverage induce banks to pursue illiquid and riskier activities by 
implicitly assuming that bank’s leverage increases the systemic risk. 
It is worth noting that the coefficient on MTB Ratio is negatively related to bank’s systemic risk 
and statistically significant at 5%. This result supports the view that banks with valuable market 
growth opportunities might have less incentives in engaging riskier activities (Herring and 
Vankundre, 1987), and thus, have a lower systemic risk. 
At macro-level, we also control for level of competition and economic trend (as well as year fixed 
effects). We find some weak evidence that higher concentration in the country where the bank’s 
headquarters are located is related to an increase in the level of bank’s contribution to systemic risk. 
This result appears to be in line with Anginer et al. (2014). Whilst, the coefficient on GDP growth is 
not significant across all specifications. 
Thus far, we have reported ordered logit models with standard errors clustered at the bank-level 
to allow for the serial correlation within bank. However, it may be also possible that errors are 
correlated across different dimensions, such as country or bank and country (Petersen, 2009). As 
indicated in Table 4, the results do not alter when we cluster standard errors at country-level and at 
bank-country level. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 
3 and remain statistically significant. 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
Next, one may argue that the results are driven by the choice of a specific cut-offs of +/- 3%. For 
this reason, we investigate whether the results are sensitive to aforementioned choice. Thus, we check 
whether the results reported in Table 3 changes when I use +/-1% and +/-5% cut-offs for the two 
dependent variables. We find that even using alternative cut-offs, bank’s centrality, defined in terms 
of Closeness, increases bank’s systemic risk and the coefficient remains statistically significant at 5% 
or better. 
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7. Robustness tests and extensions 
7.1 Sample selection issues 
Thus far, we have reported results for the full unbalanced sample. One may argue that the 
unbalanced panel might introduce a possible selection bias that could drive the results (Chhaochharia 
and Laeven, 2009). We therefore run the main specification for only observations that composed the 
balanced sample. The results are reporter in the first four columns of Table 5. The results based on 
the balanced sample are similar to those obtained for the full sample. 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
Then, we drop observations for which we have only few observations. The underlying idea is to 
understand whether a possible little within-country variation in countries with only a few observations 
may drive the results and thus the resulting sample of banks considered might violate the 
representativeness for these countries. When we exclude from the estimation countries with only few 
observations, we obtain similar results. 
Finally, we drop countries from GIIPS (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain). We have 
concerned that the presence of banks from these countries may introduce a selection bias that might 
drive the results. In fact, the literature shows that these countries may have had particularly unstable 
banking system (Acharya et al., 2014; Bruno et al., 2018). Thus, the higher level of systemic risk 
might be led by higher sovereign debt risk in these countries. We therefore re-estimate the main 
specification by dropping banks from GIIPS countries. The results are reported in the last four 
columns of Table 6. Again, the results are very similar to those reported in Table 3 for the coefficients 
of our interest (centrality measures). 
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7.2 Omitted variable bias: corporate governance, managerial entrenchment, and public 
interventions. 
Previous studies have demonstrated that bank’s performance may be affected by bank’s corporate 
governance mechanisms (Chhaocharia and Laeven, 2008) and managerial entrenchment (Onali et al., 
2016). Furthermore, systemic risk may be also driven by policy intervention provided by public 
authorities (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Gropp et al., 2011) (e.g, public bailouts). In addition, 
there is some evidence that governance may affect bank valuation through another channel: the 
ownership structure (Rajan and Zingales, 2005). Thus, we also control for bank’s ownership structure.  
To construct measures to take into account the corporate governance, the managerial 
entrenchment, and ownership structure we collect data from annual reports. Whilst, we use 
Mediobanca document to collect information on public interventions on banks. We explore these 
further channels to avoid that the results reported in Table 3 are driven by other arguments that are 
not taken into account   Specifically, we construct the following variables: i) Board Size is defined as 
the logarithm of board size of directors; ii) Board independence is the ratio between the number of 
independent directors to total board size; iii) Widely bank is an indicator variable equal to one if there 
is no owner with more than 10% of bank share rights, and zero otherwise; iv) Public intervention is 
a dummy variable takes the value of one if the bank has received a public intervention and zero 
otherwise; v) CEO ownership is the percentage of CEO equity stake in the bank; vi) Board ownership 
is the percentage of board members’ equity stake in the bank. Therefore, the results are reported in 
Table 6 and confirm previous evidences. 
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
7. Conclusions 
The last financial crisis has revealed the entangled nature of the financial system and the related 
implications for systemic risk. The lack of data and the confidentiality issues limit the study of the 
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financial interdependencies among banks and their implications for the systemic risk and financial 
stability. In this paper, we first try to overcome this problem by generating the European banking 
network by only considering the bank’s asset returns, and then we provide another attempt aimed at 
bridging the banking literature with the social network analysis to better enlarge the understanding of 
systemically important financial institutions. In particular, after analysing the topology of the 
European banking market across 15 countries to explain its cohesion evolution over the whole crisis 
period, we stress whether EU-larger banks’ topological properties predict the bank’s contribution to 
systemic risk. For this purpose, we use four well-established measures of centrality in the social 
network analysis literature: i) degree; ii) closeness; iii) eigenvector centrality; and iv) betweenness. 
We provide interesting results. First, we show that the cohesion evolution of the European banking 
network changes sharply over the sample period from 2005 to 2013. In line with Billio et al. (2012), 
the level of connectivity and the density among banks (measured in terms of assets’ returns) are 
rapidly increased in 2007 in comparison with the non-crisis period. In addition, we also show that 
this connectivity is even higher in the outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis (2010) than US-
mortgage crisis by providing further evidences that the global financial crisis did not exhaust its 
contagion effects in Europe in 2009, as other papers supposed (among others, Aït Sahalia et al. 
(2012)), while it dropped drastically in 2013.  
Second, we find that bank’s centrality expressed in terms of proximity, help to explain changes in 
systemic risk (Closeness), while Degree, Betweenness, and Eigenvector centralities do not. 
We also acknowledge for some limitations in this study. First, although we use the Granger 
causality test has the advantage of quantifying network effects by merely using bank’s assets returns, 
it may be interesting to understand whether these results are sensitive if considering real financial 
exposures among banks (for instance, either the interbank market or the derivatives market). Second, 
the analysis focuses only on the European Union. It may be interesting to quantify the network effects 
of financial interdependencies across different currency areas and how they interact with each other 
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at aggregate-level. Despite the limitations, our results strongly suggest that more central financial 
institutions are more systemically important. The results are also robust to a variety of tests related to 
the sample selection issues and omitted variables bias.    
This paper would also have some policy implications. First, it contributes to the debate on the 
development of models founded on multiway-data analysis (especially early-warning systems), 
namely simultaneous consideration of individual firm data (including forward- and backward-looking 
measures), macroeconomic variables and indicators of interconnectedness, to allow a better 
evaluation of financial risks. Second, the study hints at the crucial role of financial networks during 
the crisis period. It might help to improve the understanding of the increased complexity of the 
financial system, the behaviour of larger financial institutions, the risk posed by financial 
dependencies and providing the explanation why specific larger banks may threaten the financial 
stability more than other banks of similar size.
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The table shows the summary statistics for the sample. Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigenvector are measures 
of bank’s centrality in the European banking sector. Systemic risk measures are expressed in changes. SRISK is the 
amount of capital that a bank needs if it experienced another financial crisis. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a 
stock given that the market return is below its 5th percentile. Size is the log of total assets. Capital ratio is the ratio of bank 
equity capital over total assets. MTB ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Deposits 
ratio is the ratio of bank total customer deposits to total assets. HHI stands for Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is 
calculated as the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual 
percentage growth rate of GDP.  
 
Variables N Mean SD Min Max 
Systemic risk measures   
Changes in SRISK 542 0.0014 0.0626 -0.3330 0.4957 
Changes in MES 542 0.0901 0.3188 -0.8188 3.0344 
Centrality measures    
Degree 542 0.3248 0.1823 0.0270 1.0000 
Closeness 542 0.6061 0.0889 0.4975 1.0000 
Eigenvector 542 0.1280 0.0492 0.0259 0.3744 
Betweenness 542 0.0053 0.0116 0.0000 0.1250 
Controls      
Size 513 18.0423 2.3573 12.0717 21.6736 
Capital ratio 513 0.0678 0.0449 0.0086 0.4727 
MTB ratio 478 0.9741 0.6405 0.0196 3.5931 
Deposits ratio 519 0.8805 0.6399 0.0663 10.0368 
HHI 523 0.0822 0.0617 0.0174 0.3950 




Table 2. Cohesion evolution of the European banking sector. 
The table reports the descriptive statistics of the European banking sector. Panel A shows the descriptive statistics at network-level, while Panel B 
indicates the descriptive statistics at dyadic-level. Avg. Degree stands for the average degree in the network of 133 banks. H-index is defined as the 
maximum value h such that there exist at least h neighbours of degree no less than h. Density is determined as the number of connections divided by 
the maximum number possible. Closure is calculated as the number of non-vacuous transitive triples divided by number of paths of length 2. Avg. 
Distance stands for the average geodesic distance amongst reachable pairs. SD Distance is the standard deviation of the geodesic distances amongst 
reachable pairs. Compactness is defined as the mean of all the reciprocal distances. Breadth is described as one minus Compactness. Mutuals stands 
for dyads with reciprocated ties. Asymmetrics stands for dyads with unreciprocated ties. Nulls stands for dyads with no tie. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics at network-level 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Avg. Degree 13.211 16.227 17.608 18.456 23.194 30.529 15.712 21.312 13.536 
Indeg H-Index    17.000 23.000 24.000 25.000 27.000 36.000 22.000 25.000 18.000 
Density 0.141 0.169 0.174 0.181 0.227 0.296 0.153 0.197 0.122 
Closure  0.449 0.357 0.414 0.333 0.607 0.553 0.426 0.535 0.388 
Avg Distance 2.173 2.029 2.026 1.988 1.938 1.774 2.225 2.021 2.215 
SD Distance 0.664 0.672 0.616 0.598 0.637 0.565 0.750 0.670 0.666 
Breadth 0.481 0.463 0.446 0.437 0.418 0.363 0.483 0.446 0.507 
Compactness 0.518 0.537 0.554 0.563 0.582 0.637 0.517 0.554 0.493 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics at dyadic-level 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Mutuals 0.020 0.036 0.039 0.034 0.047 0.114 0.018 0.041 0.016 
Asymmetrics 0.242 0.266 0.271 0.294 0.360 0.365 0.270 0.313 0.213 
Nulls 0.739 0.698 0.690 0.672 0.592 0.522 0.713 0.646 0.772 
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Table 3. Main results 
The table reports the estimates for the ordered logit models for changes in the bank’s contribution to systemic risk. The 
dependent variable takes the value of one if there was a drop in the bank’s systemic risk, measured as both SRISK (the 
amount of capital that a bank needs if it experienced another financial crisis) and MES (it stands for the the marginal 
expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5th percentile), of at least 3% relative to previous 
year, it takes the value of two if the bank’s systemic risk remains unaltered and fall into the range (-3%, 3%), and takes 
the value of three if there is an increase in the level of bank’s systemic risk of more than 3%. Degree, Closeness, 
Betweenness, and Eigenvector are measures of bank’s centrality in the European banking sector. Size is the log of total 
assets. Capital ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital over total assets. MTB ratio is the market value of equity divided 
by the book value of equity. Deposits ratio is the ratio of bank total customer deposits to total assets. HHI stands for 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated as the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders 
of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. Robust z-
statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Variables SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK MES MES MES MES 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Degree -0.0152    -0.0101     
(-1.2434)    (-1.5367)    
Closeness  0.5963***    0.3192***    
 (3.9778)    (3.1903)   
Eigenvector   -0.0466    -0.0027   
  (-1.2176)    (-0.1360)  
Betweenness    -0.1785    -0.1481  
   (-1.2193)    (-1.5612) 
Size 0.6838 0.6310 0.7267 0.6385 0.0838 -0.4454 0.0377 0.0558  
(0.7461) (0.6370) (0.7979) (0.6917) (0.1367) (-0.7014) (0.0622) (0.0932) 
Capital ratio -10.1365 -8.1617 -10.3466 -10.0614 -8.4384** -6.3228* -8.8356** -8.3340**  
(-1.4455) (-1.1631) (-1.4660) (-1.4639) (-2.2457) (-1.8332) (-2.3193) (-2.2622) 
MTB ratio -1.2797** -1.2269** -1.2687** -1.2488** -0.2634 -0.2392 -0.2409 -0.2526  
(-2.4503) (-2.3680) (-2.4749) (-2.5105) (-1.0411) (-0.9752) (-0.9512) (-1.0049) 
Deposits ratio -0.3657*** -0.4438*** -0.3637*** -0.3672*** -0.2883*** -0.3561*** -0.2768** -0.2941***  
(-3.2942) (-3.8249) (-3.2906) (-3.3593) (-2.5764) (-3.7644) (-2.5063) (-2.7707) 
HHI 7.3820 4.5572 7.5290 6.7832 8.8763** 7.5420* 9.0562** 8.4277*  
(1.6399) (0.8135) (1.6271) (1.3351) (2.0068) (1.7391) (2.2500) (1.9511) 
GDP growth -0.0667 -0.0787 -0.0624 -0.0666 0.0855 0.0516 0.0953* 0.0856  
(-0.7602) (-0.8120) (-0.6991) (-0.7492) (1.5566) (0.8588) (1.6671) (1.5439) 
∂1 8.8629 38.8185* 9.5477 8.2188 -0.0962 8.3110 -0.7970 -0.5145 
 (0.4579) (1.6552) (0.4973) (0.4215) (-0.0075) (0.5695) (-0.0630) (-0.0411) 
∂2 15.1546 45.3848* 15.8308 14.4980 1.3918 9.9049 0.6842 0.9742 
 (0.7804) (1.9254) (0.8218) (0.7411) (0.1087) (0.6790) (0.0540) (0.0777) 
Observations 478 478 478 478 478 478 478 478 
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
 
 58 
Table 4. Clustering at different level of analysis. 
The table shows the robustness results for the main results by clustering standard errors at different levels (at country 
level, and at bank-country level). The dependent variable takes the value of one if there was a drop in the bank’s systemic 
risk, measured as both SRISK (the amount of capital that a bank needs if it experienced another financial crisis) and MES 
(it stands for the the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5th percentile), of at 
least 3% relative to previous year, it takes the value of two if the bank’s systemic risk remains unaltered and fall into the 
range (-3%, 3%), and takes the value of three if there is an increase in the level of bank’s systemic risk of more than 3%. 
Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigenvector are measures of bank’s centrality in the European banking sector. Size 
is the log of total assets. Capital ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital over total assets. MTB ratio is the market value 
of equity divided by the book value of equity. Deposits ratio is the ratio of bank total customer deposits to total assets. 
HHI stands for Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated as the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded 
shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate of GDP. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 Variables SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
        
Degree -0.0152 
   
-0.0152 
   
 
(-1.2476) 
   
(-1.2434) 















   
-0.0466 
 
   
(-1.2828) 




   
-0.1785 
   
-0.1785     
(-1.2582) 
   
(-1.2193) 
Size 0.6838 0.6310 0.7267 0.6385 0.6838 0.6310 0.7267 0.6385  
(1.0617) (0.9074) (1.1162) (0.9411) (0.7461) (0.6370) (0.7979) (0.6917) 
Capital ratio -10.1365** -8.1617** -10.3466** -10.0614*** -10.1365 -8.1617 -10.3466 -10.0614  
(-2.4525) (-2.2583) (-2.4180) (-2.6448) (-1.4455) (-1.1631) (-1.4660) (-1.4639) 
MTB ratio -1.2797*** -1.2269*** -1.2687*** -1.2488*** -1.2797** -1.2269** -1.2687** -1.2488**  
(-2.9370) (-2.8986) (-3.0177) (-3.2262) (-2.4503) (-2.3680) (-2.4749) (-2.5105) 
Deposits ratio -0.3657*** -0.4438*** -0.3637*** -0.3672*** -0.3657*** -0.4438*** -0.3637*** -0.3672***  
(-4.9831) (-5.8381) (-4.8680) (-5.1670) (-3.2942) (-3.8249) (-3.2906) (-3.3593) 
HHI 7.3820* 4.5572 7.5290* 6.7832 7.3820 4.5572 7.5290 6.7832  
(1.6942) (0.7611) (1.6978) (1.3239) (1.6399) (0.8135) (1.6271) (1.3351) 
GDP growth -0.0667 -0.0787 -0.0624 -0.0666 -0.0667 -0.0787 -0.0624 -0.0666  
(-0.6926) (-0.6846) (-0.6367) (-0.6854) (-0.7602) (-0.8120) (-0.6991) (-0.7492) 
∂1 8.8629 38.8185** 9.5477 8.2188 8.8629 38.8185* 9.5477 8.2188 
 (0.6743) (2.2124) (0.7216) (0.5914) (0.4579) (1.6552) (0.4973) (0.4215) 
∂2 15.1546 45.3848** 15.8308 14.4980 15.1546 45.3848* 15.8308 14.4980 
 (1.1420) (2.5688) (1.1860) (1.0333) (0.7804) (1.9254) (0.8218) (0.7411) 
Observations 478 478 478 478 478 478 478 478 
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 












Table 5. Alternative cut-offs 
The table shows the robustness results for the main results. In these estimate I re-run the analysis presented in Table 2 by 
using alternative cut-offs for the ordered logit model. The dependent variable takes the value of one if there was a drop 
in the bank’s systemic risk, measured as both SRISK (the amount of capital that a bank needs if it experienced another 
financial crisis) and MES (it stands for the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 
5th percentile), of at least 1% (or 5%) relative to previous year, it takes the value of two if the bank’s systemic risk remains 
unaltered and fall into the range [-1%, 1%] (or -5%,5%), and takes the value of three if there is an increase in the level of 
bank’s systemic risk of more than 1% (or 5%). Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigenvector are measures of bank’s 
centrality in the European banking sector. Size is the log of total assets. Capital ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital 
over total assets. MTB ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Deposits ratio is the ratio 
of bank total customer deposits to total assets. HHI stands for Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated as the sum 
of the squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate 
of GDP. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Variables SRISK%1 SRISK%1 SRISK%1 SRISK%1 SRISK%5 SRISK%5 SRISK%5 SRISK%5 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
        
Degree 0.0014 
   
0.0008 
   
 
(0.1948) 
   
(0.0566) 















   
0.0082 
 
   
(0.6020) 




   
-0.0083 
   
0.0479     
(-0.1069) 
   
(0.4443) 
Size 1.5398* 1.3640* 1.5090* 1.5522* -0.9587 -1.1791 -0.9733 -0.9664  
(1.9245) (1.6628) (1.8783) (1.9517) (-1.1208) (-1.1154) (-1.1341) (-1.1259) 
Capital ratio -10.7415 -9.1454 -10.8098 -10.6329 -17.4738** -16.3827* -17.4950** -17.6904**  
(-1.5039) (-1.2984) (-1.5184) (-1.4880) (-2.0278) (-1.8776) (-2.0259) (-2.0449) 
MTB ratio -1.0023** -0.9000** -0.9917** -1.0096*** -1.1252** -1.0578* -1.1178** -1.1189**  
(-2.5678) (-2.3493) (-2.5473) (-2.5935) (-2.1119) (-1.9592) (-2.1227) (-2.1222) 
Deposits ratio -0.1824** -0.2552*** -0.1780** -0.1858** -0.2550** -0.3010** -0.2540** -0.2522**  
(-2.2644) (-3.3022) (-2.2124) (-2.3631) (-2.2292) (-2.3118) (-2.2170) (-2.1841) 
HHI 9.0607*** 7.6389** 9.1859*** 8.9388*** 2.8760 1.0119 3.0165 3.2464  
(2.7515) (2.2624) (2.8001) (2.6833) (0.6477) (0.2290) (0.6565) (0.6617) 
GDP growth -0.0626 -0.0870 -0.0615 -0.0643 -0.0073 -0.0126 -0.0069 -0.0045  
(-1.1653) (-1.4690) (-1.1342) (-1.2029) (-0.0529) (-0.0963) (-0.0493) (-0.0319) 
∂1 28.5943* 49.4148*** 28.1185* 28.7978* -26.3570 9.1642 -26.5523 -26.4865 
 (1.7040) (2.8876) (1.6714) (1.7235) (-1.4673) (0.3941) (-1.4736) (-1.4690) 
∂2 32.2697* 53.2062*** 31.7962* 32.4735* -18.4822 17.5499 -18.6777 -18.6009  
(1.9184) (3.1049) (1.8858) (1.9388) (-1.0306) (0.7510) (-1.0384) (-1.0335) 
Observations 478 478 478 478 478 478 478 478 
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table 6. Sample selection issues 
The table reports the robustness tests for the results reported in Table 2 by allowing for sample selection issues. The dependent variable takes the value of one if there was a drop 
in the bank’s systemic risk, measured as both SRISK (the amount of capital that a bank needs if it experienced another financial crisis) and MES (it stands for the the marginal 
expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5th percentile), of at least 3% relative to previous year, it takes the value of two if the bank’s systemic risk 
remains unaltered and fall into the range (-3%, 3%), and takes the value of three if there is an increase in the level of bank’s systemic risk of more than 3%. Degree, Closeness, 
Betweenness, and Eigenvector are measures of bank’s centrality in the European banking sector. Size is the log of total assets. Capital ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital over 
total assets. MTB ratio is the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Deposits ratio is the ratio of bank total customer deposits to total assets. HHI stands for 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated as the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate 
of GDP. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Variables SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
              
Degree -0.0155    -0.0158    -0.0333***     
(-1.2517)    (-1.2571)    (-2.8049)    
Closeness  0.6088***    0.5905***    0.8018***    
 (3.9752)    (3.9368)    (3.0975)   
Eigenvector   -0.0472    -0.0492    -0.1016**   
  (-1.2293)    (-1.2486)    (-2.3997)  
Betweenness    -0.1791    -0.1825    -0.3958***  
   (-1.2212)    (-1.2489)    (-4.3566) 
Size 0.6684 0.6049 0.7143 0.6252 0.5033 0.4626 0.5515 0.4621 0.5492 0.7889 0.6088 0.6080  
(0.7266) (0.6074) (0.7817) (0.6751) (0.5222) (0.4405) (0.5754) (0.4764) (0.4921) (0.5595) (0.5508) (0.5324) 
Capital ratio -10.1484 -7.7052 -10.3559 -10.1019 -9.9303 -8.0861 -10.1383 -9.8467 -70.3802** -71.5663** -70.9565** -64.6638**  
(-1.4538) (-1.1228) (-1.4730) (-1.4734) (-1.4458) (-1.1714) (-1.4662) (-1.4593) (-2.3717) (-2.2000) (-2.4179) (-2.1570) 
MTB ratio -1.2655** -1.2100** -1.2538** -1.2342** -1.2958** -1.2443** -1.2832** -1.2585** -1.7686* -1.6212 -1.7702* -1.7307*  
(-2.4473) (-2.3629) (-2.4731) (-2.5070) (-2.3546) (-2.2635) (-2.3792) (-2.4077) (-1.8945) (-1.6312) (-1.8805) (-1.8880) 
Deposits ratio -0.3607*** -0.4421*** -0.3587*** -0.3618*** -0.3526*** -0.4295*** -0.3510*** -0.3553*** 0.0060 -0.3033 0.0177 -0.0476  
(-3.2788) (-3.8830) (-3.2745) (-3.3388) (-2.9128) (-3.4122) (-2.9045) (-2.9806) (0.0041) (-0.1886) (0.0122) (-0.0337) 
HHI 7.4369 4.3294 7.5551 6.8508 7.3129 4.5569 7.4429 6.7111 6.0159 2.4156 6.2809 5.1850  
(1.6390) (0.7699) (1.6215) (1.3456) (1.6367) (0.8173) (1.6206) (1.3300) (1.0131) (0.4158) (0.9983) (0.7993) 
GDP growth -0.0642 -0.0790 -0.0602 -0.0640 -0.0792 -0.0915 -0.0745 -0.0788 0.3731* 0.4528* 0.3899* 0.3841*  
(-0.7316) (-0.8195) (-0.6747) (-0.7195) (-0.8947) (-0.9423) (-0.8250) (-0.8765) (1.7225) (1.9069) (1.7201) (1.6995) 
∂1 8.5911 38.9506* 9.3362 7.9982 5.1011 34.9083 5.8785 4.5593 3.8849 50.3369 4.6707 5.8451 
 (0.4423) (1.6554) (0.4847) (0.4090) (0.2500) (1.4167) (0.2904) (0.2220) (0.1643) (1.3571) (0.2004) (0.2428) 
∂2 14.8267 45.4620* 15.5629 14.2208 11.4031 41.4841* 12.1731 10.8485 10.7326 57.7498 11.4694 12.6886 
 (0.7608) (1.9228) (0.8052) (0.7249) (0.5576) (1.6763) (0.5997) (0.5270) (0.4515) (1.5375) (0.4891) (0.5245) 
Observations 469 469 469 469 470 470 470 470 264 264 264 264 
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Table 7. Corporate governance, managerial entrenchment, public bailouts 
The table reports the estimates for the ordered logit models for changes in the bank’s contribution to systemic risk. 
Systemic risk measures are expressed in changes. The dependent variable takes the value of one if there was a drop in the 
bank’s systemic risk, measured as both SRISK  (the amount of capital that a bank needs if it experienced another financial 
crisis) and MES (it stands for the the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5th 
percentile), of at least 3% relative to previous year, it takes the value of two if the bank’s systemic risk remains unaltered 
and fall into the range (-3%, 3%), and takes the value of three if there is an increase in the level of bank’s systemic risk 
of more than 3%. Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigenvector are measures of bank’s centrality in the European 
banking sector. Board Size is defined as the logarithm of board size of directors. Board independence is the ratio between 
the number of independent directors to total board size. Widely bank is an indicator variable equal to one if there is no 
owner with more than 10% of bank share rights, and zero otherwise. Public intervention is a dummy variable takes the 
value of one if the bank has received a public intervention and zero otherwise. CEO ownership is the percentage of CEO 
equity stake in the bank. Board ownership is the percentage of board members’ equity stake in the bank. All controls are 
the same reported in Table 2 (Size, Capital ratio, MTB ratio, Deposits ratio, HHI, and GDP growth). Standard errors are 
clustered at bank-level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
 Variables SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK SRISK 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Degree -0.0154    -0.0144     
(-1.2774)    (-1.1558)    
Closeness  0.6131***    0.5458***    
 (3.9793)    (3.6728)   
Eigenvector   -0.0479    -0.0448   
  (-1.2612)    (-1.1450)  
Betwenness    -0.1918    -0.1595  
   (-1.2991)    (-1.0718) 
Board Size 1.2264 1.6433* 1.2396 1.3209     
 (1.3786) (1.6820) (1.4101) (1.4993)     
Board independence 0.0090 0.0082 0.0092 0.0094     
 (0.8958) (0.8416) (0.9074) (0.9357)     
Widely bank -0.3138 -0.4388 -0.3149 -0.3331     
 (-0.3688) (-0.4952) (-0.3704) (-0.3874)     
Public Intervention -0.0473 -0.1705 -0.0538 -0.0219     
 (-0.1024) (-0.3842) (-0.1167) (-0.0485)     
CEO Ownership     -0.0035*** -0.0032*** -0.0035*** -0.0033*** 
     (-4.9063) (-4.5761) (-4.9638) (-5.0326) 
Board Ownership     0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
     (0.7460) (0.2906) (0.7725) (0.6771) 
Size 0.5374 0.4027 0.5801 0.4705 0.6765 0.6319 0.7200 0.6284  
(0.6309) (0.4462) (0.6832) (0.5518) (0.7269) (0.6341) (0.7784) (0.6710) 
Capital ratio -8.9332 -7.2090 -9.1101 -8.7397 -14.3367** -12.7449* -14.5171** -14.1801**  
(-1.2400) (-0.9800) (-1.2582) (-1.2484) (-2.0079) (-1.7587) (-2.0296) (-1.9998) 
MTB ratio -1.2521** -1.2091** -1.2418** -1.2189** -1.5035*** -1.4238** -1.4941*** -1.4657***  
(-2.3536) (-2.2919) (-2.3650) (-2.4013) (-2.6257) (-2.5266) (-2.6521) (-2.7020) 
Deposits ratio -0.3563*** -0.4337*** -0.3540*** -0.3587*** -0.4363*** -0.4886*** -0.4358*** -0.4314***  
(-3.3668) (-4.1079) (-3.3494) (-3.4703) (-3.8623) (-3.9767) (-3.8931) (-3.9107) 
HHI 6.5079 3.6290 6.6220 5.8019 8.1631* 5.6296 8.2935* 7.6657  
(1.4080) (0.6520) (1.3994) (1.1234) (1.7444) (0.9509) (1.7200) (1.4456) 
GDP growth -0.0763 -0.0878 -0.0720 -0.0768 -0.0488 -0.0614 -0.0449 -0.0490  
(-0.8304) (-0.8787) (-0.7700) (-0.8266) (-0.5430) (-0.6352) (-0.4908) (-0.5383) 
∂1 9.6683 39.6671* 10.3883 8.8498 8.3458 35.8186 9.0428 7.6545 
 (0.5259) (1.7848) (0.5688) (0.4808) (0.4240) (1.5200) (0.4632) (0.3863) 
∂2 15.9414 46.2305** 16.6528 15.1161 14.7112 42.4102* 15.4013 14.0052 
 (0.8632) (2.0655) (0.9075) (0.8176) (0.7450) (1.7920) (0.7861) (0.7046)          
Observations 469 469 469 469 468 468 468 468 
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
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Paper 2: Public bailouts, bank’s risk and spillover effects: the case 




Do EU-rescue program announcements produce a positive effect on financial markets? Do these 
actions influence the financial stability during banking crises? And, especially, are these effects 
limited to rescued banks’ stakeholders or spread out to stakeholders of other banks? By using an event 
study approach, we estimate stock price reactions to the announcement of public bailout programs 
run in Europe between 2007 and 2014. We show that these policies attract negative abnormal returns. 
Second, we hand-collected a dataset on all public interventions in Europe from 2007 to 2014. By 
employing a dynamic difference-in-difference approach, we show that public interventions affect the 
behavior of both bailed-out banks (e.g. by increasing their risk and the supply of credit) and we find 





Since 2007, governments and central banks have faced the financial crisis by a wide range of 
policy actions dealing with impaired bank assets, recapitalizing or restructuring of troubled banks, 
and measures designed to inject liquidity into the banking system.11 Between 2008 and 2014, 
governments in the European Union (EU) approved state aids to banking systems amounting to 45.8% 
of GDP comprising €1.49 trillion of capitalization and asset relief programs and €4.3 trillion of 
guarantees and liquidity measures. Most state authorized aid was in the form of guarantees, some 
€3.9 trillion in total (most of which was granted at the peak of the crisis during 2008).12  
The scale of government aid provided to the financial sector has generated a great debate about 
the justification of these actions (White, 2009; Carletti and Vives, 2009; Beck et al., 2010; CEPS, 
2010; Lyons and Zhu, 2013). Although there is a substantial empirical literature on the effect of public 
bailouts on rescued banks in the US (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010; Berger et al., 2016; Giannetti and 
Simonov, 2013; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Gropp et al. 2011; Duchin and Sosyura, 2014), there is no 
evidence for Europe. This leads us to the following questions: Do EU-rescue program announcements 
calm the financial markets? Do these policies undermine the financial stability during banking crises? 
Do EU-rescue program announcements produce a positive effect on financial markets? Do these 
actions influence the financial stability during banking crises? And, especially, are these effects 
limited to rescued banks’ stakeholders or spread out to stakeholders of other banks? 
We show that EU-rescue programs are not value-enhancing policies in the short-term period. Both 
national and cross-country reactions are negative and statistically significant in two out three event 
windows. This adverse reaction by investors may be due to the idea that government intervention 
impose either restrictions on banks reducing their profitability or dilution of shareholding rights 
(Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2016). This issue is also in line with the information-signalling perspective 
                                               
11 See BIS (2009), Group of Thirty (2009) and Brunnermeier (2009) for detailed perspectives on the causes and consequences of the 
global financial crisis. For European insights see De Larosière (2009) and Goddard et al. (2009). 
12 Information from the EC State Aid to the banking sector scoreboard: 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/financial_economic_crisis_aid_en.html.  
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according to which the government commitment toward national banks may raise uncertainty, by 
conveying bad signals on the overall wealth of the banking sector. Interestingly, reactions are not 
statistically significant looking at the post announcement two-day event window (0, 1). This may be 
a signal that the market is able to anticipate public announcements (Bayazitova and Shivdsani, 2012). 
Our second finding is that public bailouts produce both a direct effect on the rescued bank’s risk and 
a spillover effect on their competitors. On the one hand, banks receiving a public bailout increase 
their risk by augmenting their volume and worsening the quality of their lending activities (and thus 
lessening their monitoring activities). Although these policies may stimulate the supply of credit, they 
create incentives for banks to pursue riskier (NPLs ratio) and more illiquid (Liquid assets ratio) 
strategies. On the other hand, public bailouts determine a spillover effect on their competitors running 
through their margins. Since rescued banks receive public protection and are able to aggressively 
expand the supply of credit, the competitors’ margins may decrease (Gropp et al., 2011). In our 
sample, this effect is statistically and economically significant at 5% during the whole post-bailout 
period. 
To examine our research questions, we build a dataset on all public interventions provided by 
national governments in Europe for a sample of 296 commercial banks across 15 countries as of 2007 
to 2014. The reason why we focus on European banks is threefold. First, it allows studying a more-
extended period covering the sovereign debt crisis (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2016). Second, past works 
(e.g. Dam and Koetter, 2012; Berger et al., 2016; Kick et al., 2016) are one-country setting studies 
without providing a comprehensive view of the effects of public bailouts across different countries 
both in the short-term and in the long-term periods. Third, focusing on Europe allows us to cover 
different rescue measures for banks (e.g., state guarantee schemes, recapitalization, and provision of 
loans).  
The main contribution of this paper is manifold.  
First, we provide novel empirical evidence on the stock market reaction to rescue program 
announcements, comparing the effect for banks that are directly involved in the program and their 
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competitors. Although there is some evidence in the economics and finance literature that these 
announcements might create (or destroy) value for the investors in the country where the 
announcement takes place (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012; Fiordelisi 
and Ricci, 2016), little is known on how investors from other countries may react to the 
announcement. Assessing spillover effects in market reaction has important policy implications, since 
public authorities may find optimal to announce policy interventions to restore the confidence in the 
financial markets.  
Second, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first paper to provide some evidence on the 
influence of public bailouts on bank conduct in Europe during the whole crisis period by finding that 
the economic impact of these policies is substantial. In doing so, we also document the mechanism 
through which public bailout affect the risk-taking of rescued banks. This evidence also provides 
some insights into the debate on the optimal safety-net among supervisory agencies, policymakers, 
and scholars. 
Third, as far as we are aware, this is the first paper providing empirical evidence on the spillover 
effects for rescued banks’ competitors, on both their level of risk and activities during the crisis 
period. Spillover effects attracted less attention in the literature (apart few exceptions, as Calderon 
and Schaeck, 2016; and Gropp et al., 2011). By studying the relation between competitors’ conduct 
and their activities at bank-level by covering the Eurozone crisis, we shed some lights on the fact that 
public bailouts create incentives for rescued banks to expand by amplifying the competition (Hakenes 
and Schnabel, 2010).  
We have to address various empirical challenging in this paper. First, information on public 
interventions is usually dispersed among several data sources. We overcome this problem by bringing 
to bear a unique hand-collected dataset including information on all bailouts issued by public 
authorities in Europe from 2007 to 2014. 
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The second challenge is related to our identification strategy. Because of the behavioral 
component13 of the public bailouts (Dam and Koetter, 2012), naïve regressions raise endogeneity and 
reverse causality concerns. For example, troubled banks may be aware of their financial fragility so 
that they may adjust their riskiness independently of the public bailout in order to avoid the default.14 
Previous papers in the economics and finance literature use an instrumental variable approach to deal 
with endogeneity (Dam and Koetter, 2012; Berger et al., 2016; Kick et al., 2016). For instance, Dam 
and Koetter (2012) exploit regional political factors, such as state parliament election, the vote share 
difference, 15 and the possibility that State and federal prime ministers are from the same party to 
allow for endogeneity and make inferences on causal explanations for the moral hazard channel for 
bank bailouts. Conversely, our empirical framework is based on a fully saturated difference-in-
difference model (Autor, 2003; Angrist and Pischke, 2008) to identify the causal effects of public 
bailouts on rescued banks and their competitors. First, it accommodates for a dynamic interpretation 
of public bailouts effect and may detect the presence of any anticipatory effects in the bank conduct 
and, then, any reverse causality issues (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). Second, it is also suitable because 
it fits situation when the treatment variable changes over the time-span in different locations (Cerulli, 
2015). 
The third challenge of our paper is related to the identification of the rescued banks’ competitors. 
This step is auxiliary to identify the spillover effects of these interventions. Based on the bank’s size 
and home-country (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012), we match rescued banks with their non-
rescued peers through their propensity to be treated over the sample period.16 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional background of 
public bailouts in Europe during the crisis period. Section 3 discusses how this work is related to the 
previous literature and highlights the main contributions to the literature. Section 4 discusses the 
                                               
13 Bank bailouts are unlikely to be randomly assigned (Dam and Koetter, 2012; Berger et al., 2016; Kick et al., 2016). 
14 Additionally, the treatment may be partially driven by unobservable factors to the econometrician (Angrist, 2006; Dam and Koetter, 
2012).  
15 Dam and Koetter (2012) define this variable as the difference between the vote share of total votes cast for the governing coalition 
less the vote share cast for the strongest opposition party per municipality in state parliament elections. 
16 We use a propensity score matching technique based on a probit model procedure. 
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development of our testable hypotheses. Section 5 describes our empirical framework. Section 6 
presents data and variables, while in Section 7 we report the results. Section 8 provides our concluding 
remarks. 
2. Institutional Background: Public Bailouts in Europe 
As of the wake of the 2007 financial crisis, governments and other public authorities launched 
emergency measures to stabilize the functioning of the European banking sector and to mitigate the 
negative externalities of bank defaults on the real economy. According to the European Commission 
State Aid Scorecard (2012),17 in 2011 EU-governments allocated more than € 3 trillion to bail their 
credit institutions out under the coordination and close cooperation of the Council of the European 
Union, the European Central Bank, and the European Commission.  
The public interventions were launched across Member states in accordance with guidelines of the 
Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin) and as long as they were temporary, of limited 
amount, and based on the scrutiny of European public authorities to ensure the level-playing-field in 
the European banking industry and to avoid any abuse onto taxpayers’ funds.  
To counterbalance the spillover effects of the crisis, each member state proceeded differently to 
fund banks. Generally, all rescue measures may be related to three different categories: i) state 
guarantee schemes, ii) recapitalization, iii) provision of loans (e.g. credit lines and liquidity facilities), 
iv) “bad banks” measures, and v) nationalization of distressed financial institutions. Each one of the 
emergency measures had a specific aim. The guarantee schemes were aimed at calming markets by 
lowering risk-premia and at preventing potential bank runs. The public authorities made extensively 
use of recapitalizations to restore banks’ capital base. Last but not least, a number of public authorities 
has also introduced the provision of loans to strengthen bank’s liquidity positions. Finally, and in the 
worst cases, public authorities resorted either to purchasing of impaired assets by taking over the 
related risks inherent in them or to nationalizing distressed banks with the aim of restructuring them. 
                                               
17 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html 
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3. Related Literature and Contributions 
The first strand is related to the previous literature on the impact of macroeconomic and financial 
sector policy responses to counterbalance the effects of financial crises (Baba and Packer, 2009;Aït-
Sahalia et al., 2012; Pennathur et al., 2014 Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2016). These policies have the general 
aim to restore the confidence in the financial investors and handle with the potential fragilities of the 
banking system in short-term period. 
The closest strand is the large empirical literature on the effect of public bailouts on rescued banks. 
Past studies analyze the value of banks’ financial claims (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010) bank’s 
liquidity creation (Berger et al., 2016), lending activities (Diamond and Rajan, 2000; Diamond, 2001; 
Giannetti and Simonov, 2013), and risk-taking (Dam and Koetter, 2012; Gropp et al. 2011; Duchin 
and Sosyura, 2014). In principle, public bailouts have stabilizing effects especially during financial 
crises since they may impinge on the cutback of bank’s risk (Bhattacharya et al., 1998; Diamond and 
Rajan, 2005; Hoshi and Kashyap, 2010) allowing the survival of undercapitalized banks and the 
repayments of bank’s creditors.  
The third strand of the literature our study is related to is the emerging body of research on the 
spillover effects of public bailouts on rescued bank’s competitors. Indeed, there are some evidence 
and theoretical arguments outlining the possibility that government interventions affect not only 
bailed-out banks but also non-bailed-out banks (Acharya and Yorulmazer 2007; Hakenes and 
Schnabel, 2010; Gropp et al., 2011; Calderon and Schaeck, 2016). Such public policies might distort 
the competition in the banking industry. Although public bailouts have the stabilizing effect to 
support the survival of undercapitalized banks, the presence of rescued weak banks (not exiting the 
market) distorts the optimal resource allocation undermining the competition. Indeed, as well as 
arguing the bank’s possibility to anticipate public bailouts, Gropp et al. (2011) show that a higher 
protection of the banking industry may encourage a stronger competition among financial institutions 
by tightening bank’s margins. 
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The starting point for our paper is Gropp et al. (2011): in comparison with other papers in the 
literature which analyze the effects of public bailout policies on banks’ risk-taking, the authors focus 
not only on the effects of government bailout on protected banks’18 risk-taking, but also on the 
competitive effects of these policies across OECD countries in the year 2003. To this end, they 
construct a measure of bailout perception based on bank rating data to understand the effect of such 
government policies on the risk-taking of competitor banks and rescued banks. Briefly, they find that 
government guarantees increase the riskiness of competitor banks, but they do not find any evidence 
that such policies affected protected banks. Nevertheless, their article does not take into account 
effective support measures to banks (e.g. recapitalization, guarantees, and provision of loans) and 
refers to non-crisis period. 
In lights of these considerations, this analysis can be considered both an exploration and the 
extension of the literature on the effects of public interventions on bank’s risk along four dimensions. 
First, this is the first paper investigating on the effects of public bailouts on bank’s risk at bank-level 
across 15 European countries. In fact, other paper in the literature are “one-country setting” studies 
(Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012, Dam and Koetter, 2012; Gropp et al., 2013; Berger et al. 2016). 
It allows us to take into account the variation in crisis management across countries. Second, to the 
best of our knowledge, this is also the first paper analyzing empirically the effects of public bailouts 
on the competition at bank-level over the financial crisis. Calderon and Schaeck (2016) provide some 
evidence on the distortive effects of public bailouts on the competition but at country-level. Third, in 
our investigation we cover the whole financial crisis period including both the US-mortgage crisis 
and the sovereign debt crisis periods, while other papers focus mainly on period of limited turbulence 
(Dam and Koetter, 2012; Berger et al., 2016). It is more appropriate this setting here since it allows 
us to evaluate how such policies work on the bank’s behavior in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 
This is also consistent with the growing literature on other public interventions upon the banking 
                                               
18 In Gropp et al. (2010), protected banks are those financial institutions protected by government guarantees. 
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system (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2016). Fourth, this paper aims at examining the market reaction of 
European financial market to the announcements of national public bailout programs (or in absence 
of the entry into the force of the programs) to evaluate whether these interventions are value-
enhancing for international investors in the short-term period. Past studies focus mainly on the impact 
of other macroeconomic and financial sector policies with little emphasis on bailout programs with 
the only exceptions of Veronesi and Zingales, (2010) and Fiordelisi and Ricci (2016). 
Complementarily to these studies, we analyze both the market reaction to the national announcements 
of these policies for those banks located in the country where the announcement takes place and the 
cross-country reaction of the banks in other countries in Europe. 
4. Testable Hypotheses 
In this section, we develop our hypotheses. In the first sub-section, we develop the hypotheses 
related to the market reaction of EU-banks to national bailout program announcements. In the other 
two sub-sections, we develop the hypotheses referring to the effect of public bailouts on bank’s risk 
and activities and the spillover effects of public bailouts on non-bailed-out banks respectively. 
4.1 Market reaction to public bailout programs 
International investors pay attention to policy actions. The goal of bailout rescue programs is to 
restore the confidence in financial markets (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 
2012; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2016). For this reason, governments and other public authorities may find 
optimal to announce policy interventions. These interventions may create value for banks in the short-
term period. On the one hand, during a period of generalized distresses in the economy, the banking 
system could be subject to bank-run of short-term creditors since they might refuse to roll their short-
term lending over (Veronesi and Zingales, 2010). In the seminal paper of Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983), the scholars demonstrate that bank runs are not efficient for the banking sector. Thus, the 
shareholders indirectly may find beneficial a policy intervention aimed at preventing a potential bank-
run. The reaction might have worth especially for those banks being more likely to experience a bank-
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run. On the other hand, interventions might create also a negative effect on bank’s value. For instance, 
when a bank is involved in a rescue package program (or any other authority), its shareholders might 
react negatively to the announcement (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2016) since the bank might experience 
either restrictions or prohibitions on bank’s activities and corporate decisions (Sapienza, 2004; Berger 
et. al., 2016) by not maximizing their value. 
Based on these two conflicting arguments, we might expect both a positive and negative reactions 
to these policy announcements. 
4.2 Direct effects of Public Bailouts on Bank’s Risk 
In principle, public bailouts have the primary role to relieve troubled financial institutions by 
lowering their intrinsic riskiness and strengthening bank capital base. However, the literature provides 
mixed results on the effects of public bailouts on bank’s risk.  
Some studies argue that public bailouts increasing banks’ survival odds through a better level of 
capitalization. This is particularly confirmed during banking crises (Richardson and Troost, 2009, 
Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Additionally, public bailouts can also crowd out risk-incentives 
because rescued banks raise funds at lower refinancing costs than their non-rescued competitors by 
experiencing higher charter values19 and, thus, better margins. Hence, because of lower refinancing 
costs, banks exert more monitoring efforts (Gropp and Vesala, 2004, Mehran and Thakor, 2011) and 
are less prone to pursue risky strategies to avoid losing this rent.  
Along the same lines as the Merton’s argument (1977) about the deposit insurance scheme, other 
set of studies demonstrate public bailouts might encourage banks to take additional risk in order to 
maximize the value of the put-option against the public authorities in charge of the rescue packages 
(Hovakiminian and Kane, 2000; Laeven and Valencia, 2012). This problem is more pronounced 
especially as the number of bank defaults increases in the economy (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2008).  
                                               
19 Following Keeley (1990), charters might be considered the recognised rent to the bank about the possibility to be able to refinance 
at subsidized rates below the market-rate. 
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Thus, the relation between public bailouts on bank’s riskiness is not a clear a priori since it depends 
on whether the charter values explanations dominates (or compensates) the moral hazard argument, 
or vice versa. Cordella and Yeyati (2003) posit theoretically that the net effect of public bailouts on 
bank’s risk depends on the trade-off between the two conflicting effects. 
4.2 Competitive effects of Public Bailouts  
Although we have a relation in mind about the spillover effects of public bailouts on non-rescued 
banks we borrow some hints on the previous theoretical frameworks (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007; 
Hakens and Schnabel, 2010) to develop the other set of testable hypothesis. Besides the direct effect 
of the public bailouts on rescued bank’s risk, the theoretical and empirical literatures argue also about 
a competitive effect of such policies. On the one hand, supporting too-big-to-fail institutions may 
have beneficial effects – both in short-run and in long-run periods - on other competitors because of 
the well-known interconnected nature of financial markets (Zawadowski, 2013). The presence of 
public bailouts reduces the possibility of endangering bank’s counterparts and the real economy 
(DeBandt and Hartmann, 2000). On the other hand, government interventions on ailing banks may 
also create economic distortions in the common level-playing field inducing banks to anticipate the 
future bailouts (Claessens, 2009a; Calderon and Schaeck, 2016). Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) argue 
that the possibility of future bailouts increases the bank’s risk of protected banks’ competitors because 
these policies create incentives for protected banks to expand by depressing the competitors’ margins 
due to a higher level of rivalry in the deposit market. This distortion is even more severe in presence 
of generalized distressed in the banking industry (Acharya and Yorulmazer, 2007). Indeed, banks 
herd ex-ante their rescued-peers in order to increase the likelihood of being bailed out by worsening 
the level of risk and the quality of their lending activities. Thus, we expect that public bailouts are 
associated to an increase in the rescued bank competitor’s risk. 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
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5. Methodology 
5.1 Market reaction to public bailout announcements: Event study 
We estimate the valuation effects of the policy announcements of national programs by using an 
event study approach. Unlike other papers in the literature, we document both the market reaction of 
banks located in the country where the national authority announces the program and the cross-
country reaction of other banks located in any other country of our sample. For this purpose, we 
estimate the market reaction of all listed banks in sample countries over the period starting from 2007 
through 2014 by estimating the daily Abnormal Returns (hereafter, ARs) as the difference between 
the stock returns and the estimated returns.  
We run the event study over all the events listed in Table 2. For each event, we measure both the 
market reaction of all the banks located in the country where the public authorities announce the 
intervention and the cross-country reaction of all other banks located in any other country of the 
sample to the announcement of public intervention.   
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
To implement the event study, we employ the market model as described in McKinlay (1997), 
where the stock returns are expressed as a function of the market portfolio returns. As a proxy for the 
market portfolio, we use the MSCI EUROPE index. The specification is as follows: 
!"# = %" + '"!(# + )"# where *()"#) = 0,  /01()"#) = 23"4  (1) 
Consistent with previous works (among others, McKinlay 1997, and Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2016) 
we employ an estimation window of 252 days that ends 20 days before the announcement to calculate 
the market model parameters. Thus, the ARs are calculated as the difference between the actual stock 
returns and the predicted returns of the market model: 
5!"# = !"# − (%78 + '79!(#) (2) 
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Then, we aggregate the ARs over two-day (0,1) three-day (-1,1), and seven-day (-3,3) event 
windows respectively. Hence the CARs are obtained as follows: 





where t1 and t2 are the starting and the ending date of the event window chosen. It follows that the 









5.2 Regression framework 
We use a three-step approach to investigate on the direct effect of public bailouts on rescued banks’ 
risk and the spillover effects of such policies on their competitors. 
First, we focus on rescued banks by estimating the change in the bank’s risk and the level of bank’s 
activities during the years preceding and following the public bailout. For this purpose, we use the 
following dynamic diff-diff model with three lags and three leads: 
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(5) 
where the dependent variable [\,],^
[\,],^_A
(i indexes bank, c indexes the bank home country, and t indexes 
the observation year) is the quotient of  our measure of bank risk and activities. Pre-Bailout is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if it "s" years before the bank received a public bailout and 
zero otherwise. For example, Pre-Bailout -2 is a variable equal to one if it is two years before the 
bank received a public bailout, while Bailout +2 is a variable equal to one if it is two years after the 
bank received the government intervention. The model is fully saturated with the year immediately 
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before the bank received the public bailout as the excluded category. Furthermore, the coefficients 
on Pre-Bailout (-s) and Bailout(+s) compare the level of each dependent variable "s" years before 
and after the public bailout. Controls is a vector of lagged variables20 related to bank-specific and 
macroeconomic factors. Additionally, using bank-fixed effects allows that each variable is estimated 
using the within bank variation in the dependent variables. We also include bailout-year fixed effects 
to control for bailout-time level trends (XYZ#) and the country-year fixed effects (XFZ#). Finally, we 
use two-way clustered standards errors at bank and country levels (Petersen, 2009; Dam and Koetter, 
2012). 
As aforementioned, we estimate the regressions by quotienting the dependent variables (RWA 
ratio, Liquidity assets ratio, NPLs ratio, Margins ratio, and Loans share) by its lagged value. The 
reason lies in the fact that because of the financial turbulence during the sample period, we need to 
disentangle the effects of the crisis on bank’s risk from those of the public bailouts to identify any 
presence of bank’s moral hazard. We will explain later the variables of the empirical framework.  
Evaluating the effect of such policies on bank risk and level of activities is challenging for different 
reasons. More specifically, public bailouts are not exogenous shocks since public authorities are more 
likely to assign them when a bank is in default. However, it may be argued that ailing banks may be 
aware of their status and modify their conduct endogenously (Dam and Koetter, 2012, Berger et al., 
2016) so that naïve regressions ignoring this fact may lead to biased estimates. Hence, our regression 
setup is appropriate here to identify the effects of the public bailouts on rescued banks’ risk and 
activities. Using lags and leads of the treatment variable (Public Bailout) may help to evaluate the 
presence of any anticipatory effects since banks make decisions not only the ground of past events 
but also formulating expectations of the future. Furthermore, this kind of econometric models allows 
to understand how quickly bank’s risk (or other dependent variables used to test our hypotheses) 
grows/reduces after the public bailout take place and whether this impact accelerates, stabilizes, or 
                                               
20 All controls are lagged by one year to reduce simultaneity problems.  
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mean-reverts (Autor, 2003).  
Then, we focus on the identification of rescued bank’s competitors, namely those banks were not 
targeted by public authorities, but showed similar characteristics to the rescued banks. In our 
regression framework, this step is necessary to evaluate the effects of public bailouts on rescued 
banks’ competitors and, thus, the spillover effects. Our analysis implicitly assumes that public 
bailouts may also influence non-rescued banks. This argument is not far-fetched. Many evidences 
and theoretical models in the literature (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010; Gropp et al., 2011; Calderon 
and Schaek, 2016) outline that public bailouts might trigger changes in competitor banks conducts. 
The main explanation is that they increase the level of the competition in the banking system and 
decrease bank competitors’ charter values. In contrast with Gropp et al. (2011), we follow an 
alternative strategy. First, we identify the non-rescued banks (having the same probability to be bailed 
out) not receiving a public bailout during the sample period. Second, we re-estimate the same fully 
saturated model for only non-rescued banks by excluding the rescued banks. In other words, we 
implement a propensity score matching (hereafter, PSM) technique, based on a probit model, in order 
to measure the spillover effects. This non-parametric approach results in the ex-ante probability of 
receiving a public bailout given a set of explanatory variables, namely the propensity score. The 
advantage of this procedure lies in the fact that allows identifying a reasonable counterfactual sub-
sample of non-treated units with similar characteristics to rescued banks. Along the line of Bayazitova 
and Shivdasani (2012), we estimate the following probit model to estimate to propensity score 
matching:  
Pr	(b" = 1|	d") = e(bOfM",F,#G<,, :QRW;1g",F,#) (6) 
where the dependent variable is a dummy taking the value of 1 if the bank has received at least 
one public bailout during the year from 2007 to 2014. As a key and identifying covariate we use the 
lagged value of bank’s size (Sizet-1). This variable is often used as indicative for bank’s business 
model, diversification benefits, returns of scale, and systemic risk (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012).  
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Furthermore, once we compute the propensity score based on bank’s size, we match rescued banks 
yearly by checking whether the matched banks are from the same home country of the rescued banks. 
In so doing, we use 5-nearest neighbor method that allows to identify the top 5 similar banks for each 
rescued bank in the same year of treatment. Finally, we generate Matched, which is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the bank i’s is selected in a given year among one of the top five similar 
credit institutions of a bank that received a public bailout at time t and zero otherwise. The latter 
variable is then used as a treatment variable to evaluate the spillover effects.   
Finally, we now turn our attention on the spillover effects by estimating the following model using 
three lags and three leads:  
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The dependent variable is defined as before, namely the change in the given measure of bank risk 
and activities. Pre-Matched (-s) is a dummy variable takes the value of one if it is “s” before the bank 
has been selected as “matched bank” and zero otherwise. Matched (+s) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if it is “s” year after the bank has been selected as “matched bank” and zero 
otherwise. Again, we include control variables, bank-fixed effects, and country-year fixed effects. 
Again, standard errors are double-clustered at bank and country level. 
6. Data and Variables 
To empirically investigate our hypotheses, we build a new hand-collected dataset with information 
on public bailouts in Europe for the period 2007-2014. Data on stock prices are from Datastream. 
Then, we collect bank balance sheet data from Bankscope.  
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The sample period starts in 2007, the year of the first bank bailout in European countries21 in 
response to the financial crisis.22 Furthermore, choosing 2014 as the final year of our sample period 
allows us to avoid potential distortions in our analysis due to potentially confounding events. For 
instance, since the beginning of 2015, the European Central Bank has put the quantity easing (QE) 
into practice.  
To define our sample we start from the population of commercial banks,23 reported in Bankscope, 
in 13 European countries, Iceland and Switzerland. We include Switzerland and Iceland for the 
relevance and interconnectedness of their banking system with the banks in the EU (Acharya et al., 
2014; Bruno et al., 2018). Additionally, we consider only banks adopting IFRS accounting standards 
in order to avoid that our results are driven by differences in accounting standards (Onali et al., 2016). 
A total number of 417 financial institutions satisfied these search criteria. Then, we exclude 
institutions that are subsidiaries of foreign banks whose headquarters are not in Europe, since these 
banks are less likely to be rescued from national public authorities. Finally, for the sake of the 
comparability, we stipulate to consider only those banks having a value of total assets more than 1 
billion with a proportion of total loans to total assets and of total deposits to total assets both more 
than 30%. 
The final sample is composed of an unbalanced panel with 1,936 observations for 296 commercial 
banks. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
Table 2 and Table 3 show respectively the steps of the sample selection and a detailed description 
of the number of banks per country. 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
                                               
21 We consider Europe region all those banks whose headquarters are located respectively in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
22 Ryan (2008) highlights that the first effects of the financial crisis find evidence as of 2007. 
23 Commercial banks behave differently from other banks (e.g. investment banks and other specialized financial institutions) by 
showing distinctive incentives and competitive environments (Fiordelisi and Marqués-Ibanez, 2013). Second, the theory on bank’s 
riskiness stresses mainly the lending and deposit bank activities (Cubillas et al., 2015). 
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6.1 Public Bailouts 
We focus on bank bailouts performed by public authorities on EU-commercial banks between 
2007 and 2014. Economists distinguish between explicit guarantees and implicit guarantees (among 
others, Gropp et al., 2011). The latter represent the market expectations that a financial institution is 
rescued even if there is no explicit governmental intervention on. For example, larger banks may 
presumably benefit from a too-big-to-fail protection and, thus, they are expected to be rescued more 
likely.  We focus on the explicit measures since they are supposed to have more impact on banks 
(Philippon and Schnabl, 2013).   
As mentioned before, there are several types of public bailouts. First, recapitalizations are at the 
core of different national rescue programs since they enhance the bank likelihood to survive during 
financial crises (Philippon and Schnabl, 2013). In fact, they are capital injections using public funding 
to strengthen bank capital base. In some cases, this emergency measure may also give rise to a 
nationalization whereby the government acquires a controlling equity stake in the distressed bank. 
Second, guarantees are commitments provided by national governments to repay bank’s creditors 
and depositors as the bank may not be able to repay its creditors. They are issued in the effort to re-
establish confidence in the banking system and avoid potential bank runs. In this regard, they may be 
both past or future oriented depending whether they refer to either existing obligations or future debt. 
Next, liquidity facilities are public interventions aimed to enhance bank liquidity provisions through 
the provision of loans (Credit lines). Finally, governments may also resort to assets relief measures 
which are particular public supports aimed at “relieving” banks from toxic or impaired assets.24 In 
this context, there are two possible schemes. The government may either buy directly impaired assets 
from the financial institutions to prop up them or may arrange transfers of toxic assets to a public 
asset management agency responsible for the managing over the financial markets. 
                                               
24 Impaired assets are both all those assets incorporating high expected losses and long-term assets without incurring high losses, but 
"that still need to be hived off the balance sheet, because of the negative carry they generate due to increased funding costs for banks". 
(P.32, Boudghene and Maes, 2012). 
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[INSERT TABLE 4] 
For the sake of exposition, we prefer using the term public authorities because the decision of 
bailing out financial institutions in Europe require the consultation of several public authorities (e.g., 
central banks, governments, supervisory agencies, bankers’ associations). In some countries, there is 
the direct involvement of the government for the provision of bank bailouts (Ireland, Italy, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom), while in others special entities may rescue banks backed by national 
governments (Denmark, France, and Germany). 
To test our hypotheses, we assume a broader definition of public interventions on banks during 
the crisis period. Specifically, we make use of a two-step procedure to construct the variable of our 
main interest, Public Bailout. First, we collect information on all different kinds of public 
interventions on banks across European countries of our sample by classifying them among 
recapitalizations, guarantees, and provisions of loans. Next, we define three dummy variables for 
each kind of public intervention: i) Recapitalization is a dummy variable taking the value of one if 
the bank i’s received a capital support at time t and zero otherwise; ii) Guarantee is a dummy variable 
taking the value of one if the bank i’s received a governmental guarantee at time t and zero otherwise; 
iii)Liquidity facility is a dummy that takes on the value one if the bank i’s received a credit line from 
public authorities at time t and zero otherwise. As the last step, we create a broader dummy which is 
a combination of the three dummy variables aforementioned. Hence, Public Bailout is a variable that 
takes the value of 1 if the bank i's received at least one of any kinds of public interventions at time t, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Table 4 reports the number of public interventions over the sample period on banks by year and 
by country. 
6.2 Measures of bank risk and activities 
As mentioned, we use all the dependent variables in quotients [\,],^
[\,],^_A
. In our regression framework 
we use various accounting measures for bank risk-taking and activities. Although it may be argued 
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that accounting data are affected by their well-known drawbacks of backward-looking measures, their 
use is appropriate here because the use of market data would drastically constrain our sample size,25 
which is mainly composed of non-listed commercial banks. 
First, we consider RWA ratio which is calculated as the ratio between the bank's assets exposures 
weighted by their intrinsic risk and the bank total assets. It represents a bank measure of riskiness 
from the supervisory viewpoint. As proxies for bank activities, we consider four other measures: i) 
Loans share, ii) Margins ratio, iii) NPLs Ratio, and iv) Liquid assets ratio. To capture the bank-
lending activities, we use Loans share, defined as total loans to total assets. Margins ratio, defined 
as net-interest margins to total assets, is auxiliary to test the charter value explanations and to 
understand whether non-rescued competitors are more likely to behave more aggressively after their 
peer have been bailed-out (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010, Calderon and Schaeck, 2016). To 
understand whether banks lessening their monitoring in lending activities, we use a measure of the 
bank loan quality, namely NPLs ratio, obtained as the ratio between the amount of non-performing 
loans and bank’s total loans. Finally, we consider Liquid assets ratio measuring the percentage of 
total assets that the bank may easily convert into cash.  
6.3 Control variables 
In the empirical analysis, we use a standard set of bank-specific controls. Furthermore, control 
variables are lagged by one year to reduce simultaneity problems. We use Size (the logarithm of 
bank’s total assets) to control for bank’s market power, returns to scale, business model. In addition, 
the inclusion of this variable is important to disentangle the risk effects of public bailouts and those 
implicit ones due to bank’s size (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). In the spirit of Acharya and 
Thakor (2016), we also control for bank’s capital adequacy/structure since it has been considered one 
of the main contributors of the 2007-08 financial crisis. Additionally, the bank risk-appetite literature 
provides some evidence that higher financial leverage may create some incentives for banks to pursue 
                                               
25 Our purpose is to preserve the sample size. 
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more illiquid and riskier lending activities (Adrian and Shin, 2010). For this reason, we use Capital 
ratio calculated which is given by bank total equity to total assets. Finally, we control for bank’s 
profitability by using ROA, defined as the net income of the bank scaled by total assets. Additionally, 
we also include in the specifications M&A dummy, which is a dummy takes the value of 1 if the bank 
is involved in mergers and acquisitions and 0 otherwise. 
6.4 Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 5 Panel A, we report the descriptive statistics. For this purpose, we present mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum. At first glance, our data show a large variability across the banks 
during the sample period. For instance, the RWA Ratio ranges from a low of about 0.66 to a high of 
1.27. Also, the other variables used to test our hypotheses show similar patterns in their range. The 
mean bank in our sample has 6.92 billion €, while its mean ROA is around 0.5%. Only 3% of our 
sample is involved in M&A activities. 
In Table 5 Panel B, we also provide the univariate comparisons between bailed-out banks and non-
bailed out banks along all array of variables used in our tests.26 Specifically, we present the average 
values for bailed-out banks and non-bailed out banks and the p-values of two-sided t-tests. 
Unexpectedly, our evidence suggests that rescued banks do not differ statistically from non-rescued 
banks in terms of RWA ratio, Margins ratio, and Liquid assets ratio. Whilst, our tests provide some 
evidence that non-rescued banks have a higher (lower) variation in Loans share (NPLs ratio) than 
rescued banks. 
Moving onto the control variables, our tests show that banks receiving a public bailout differ in 
terms of bank’s size, capital, and profitability from those that do not: during the crisis, rescued banks 
are larger, less profitable and less capitalized than non-rescued ones. This evidence confirms previous 
results in Brei and Gadanecz (2012). 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
                                               
26 We run two-sided t-test by allowing for the unequal variance between rescued banks and non-rescued banks. 
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7. Results 
7.1 Market reactions to bailouts programs  
We first discuss the empirical findings focusing on the direct effects of the national announcement 
of public bailout programs for the beneficiary banks. Then, we discuss the results for the cross-
country reaction to the national of public bailout programs for the banks located in any other country 
of our sample. Table 7 reports the results. 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results for the event study run on banks located to in the country 
where the announcement of national bailout programs take place. There is some evidence that 
investors of banks located in the country where there was the announcement react negatively to the 
policy intervention. The reaction ranges statistically from 10% (-1,1,) to 5% (-3,3), while the market 
reaction over a two-day event window is not statistically significant. A possible argument for this 
loss of significance might be due to the fact that market anticipates the national announcements 
(Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012; Acharya et al., 2014). The adverse reaction may be related to the 
possibility that government intervention may impose either restrictions on banks reducing their 
profitability or dilution of shareholding rights (e.g. votes, dividends). This is also in line with 
information-signaling perspective according to which the government commitment to national banks 
convey negative information about the wealth of the banking sector by raising uncertainty (Diamond, 
1991). 
Moving onto the evaluation of the spillover reaction to national announcement for banks located 
in other countries of our sample, the evidence suggests there exist contagion-effects, namely the 
possibility that negative events might have the potential to create external information effects for 
other banks (Diamond, 1991; Docking et al., 1997) located in other countries. Along the same line of 
the previous results, the reaction is statistically significance for two out of three event windows. 
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Overall, our results point toward negative abnormal returns related to the announcements (or the 
entry into the force of the related law) of national rescue programs across European countries. In fact, 
the aggregate effect on shareholders of European banks is negative. First, we document that national 
investors of banks do not welcome the announcements of policy intervention in their country. Second, 
we also document that the national announcements of rescue programs produce spillover effects in 
other countries by attracting negative abnormal returns. 
7.2 The direct effect of public bailouts on bank risk 
Table 8 reports the results on the relationship between public bailouts and bank risk. Our estimates 
show that public bailouts impinge on the bank’s risk-taking positively. This effect is statistically and 
economically significant. In our sample, the mean value of RWA ratio is around 0.9672. Hence, our 
results suggest that banks increase their riskiness of around 20% (0.2018/0.9672) during the year in 
which the public bailout is imposed. Furthermore, the increases in the bank-risk taking are 30% after 
one year and 26% after three years from the public intervention, respectively. Then, Panel A also 
shows that relative to the three years preceding the public bailout, the pre-bailout indicator variables 
are not correlated with the quotient of RWA ratio. It allows excluding the presence of reverse 
causality. 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
This result seems due to an increase in the level of lending activities. In particular, we find that 
Loans share increases respectively by 18.52% in the year of the policy intervention, 18.64% in the 
year following the bailout, 19.38% after two years from the rescue, and 13.35% after three years from 
the public bailout. There is also a similar increase in the fraction of non-performing loans. Although 
public bailouts may encourage and increase the supply of credit, they create bad incentives for lending 
decisions by encouraging non-performing loans. This is consistent with Giannetti and Simonov 
(2013). 
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Another interesting result of our evidences is that they are not supportive of the charter value 
hypothesis for European banks during the financial crisis. According to this theory, bailouts affect 
banks’ risk taking through their implications on bank margins (Keeley, 1990). Although we find a 
positive relation between public bailouts and bank’s margins, the coefficients for the post-bailout 
indicator variables are not statistically significant. 
Finally, we find that in the post-bailout period, Liquid assets ratio drops drastically, and this result 
is economically and statistically significant. The mean value of Liquid assets ratio is 1.0149 during 
the sample period. It entails that Liquid assets ratio declines by 75%, 58%, 56% and 76% respectively 
during the following three years after the policy intervention. This result is coherent with Adrian and 
Shin (2010). When banks benefit from lower interest rates in the funding, they increase their risk-
appetite (Mian and Sufi, 2010). 
Hence, our evidences are consistent with the hypothesis that public bailouts affect bank conduct: 
when banks receive public bailouts, they increase their risk by augmenting their volume of lending 
activities and worsening its quality. In fact, although these policies may stimulate the supply of credit, 
they create incentives for banks to pursue riskier (NPLs ratio) and illiquid (Liquid assets ratio) 
strategies (Adrian and Shin, 2010). 
7.3 Rescued banks’ competitors 
In this section, we identify the rescued bank’s competitors. In our framework, we consider rescued 
banks’ competitors, those banks having similar characteristics of the rescued banks (in terms of 
business model, market power, diversification strategies) but did not receive any public support 
during the financial crisis. For this reason, we resort to propensity score matching estimation 
procedure. The aim is to find the most comparable non-bailed-out units. Again, this procedure is 
auxiliary to investigate the spillover effects (or the competitive effects) of public bailouts on non-
rescued banks.  
 86 
The identification of those untreated peers (banks did not receive a public bailout but are similar 
to bailed-out banks) is related to three variables: bank’s size (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012), 
home-country and year of the intervention. The key idea is to identify for each rescued bank in the 
year of intervention its counterpart (similar size) in its same home-country. Thus, we report the results 
of cross-sectional probit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if a bank 
was rescued during our sample period from 2007 to 2014 and are reported in Table 8. 
[INSERT TABLE 9] 
As in Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012), we find that the probability of receiving a public bailout 
is positively related to Size. This result is consistent with the view that banks with higher systemic 
risk are more likely to be rescued to avoid negative externalities for the banking system and the real 
economy.  
Furthermore, in Table 8, we show the means of the two groups (treated and untreated), t-tests for 
equality of the means in the two samples, and the variance ratio respectively. The peers are not 
statistically different from their rescued counterparts. This result is further confirmed by the variance 
ratio (1.00) of treated over non-treated units (Austin, 2009), and Figure 1. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
Finally, we report the goodness-of-fit of our propensity score matching estimation procedure by 
using the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves.27 This test allows understanding the 
quality of the matching based on probit regressions for the identification of untreated peers by 
comparing the true positive rate and the false positive rate. In our estimates, the area under the ROC 
curve is around 0.70. 
Overall, our results show relatively good performance in the identification of the rescued banks’ 
competitors.  
                                               
27 The ROC curve is estimated by comparing and plotting the true positive rate, labeled “sensitivity”, and the false positive rate, labelled 
as “1-specificity”, at various threshold settings.  
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7.4 Competitive effects of public bailouts  
Now, we turn our attention on the spillover effects of public bailouts for non-rescued competitors. 
We refer to these banks as “matched” since we identified them through a propensity score matching 
procedure. Along the same line as before, our main independent variable to test the competitive 
effects of such policies is a dummy taking the value of one if the bank is among the top-five similar 
banks,28 and zero otherwise. As dependent variables, we again use the variables explained in Section 
5.2. 
We make implicitly an identification assumption: public bailouts have spillover effects on non-
rescued banks’ competitors risk and activities. This argument is unlikely to be far-fetched because 
there are some theoretical explanations about the competitive effect of these policies (Acharya and 
Yorulmazer, 2007; Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). Furthermore, the empirical evaluation of our 
assumption has an important policy implication: if such spillover effect is verified public 
interventions should be discouraged in order to avoid risk-increasing incentives in the bank’s 
competitors during banking crises. Conversely, if no spillover effect is verified, it entails that public 
bailouts do not undermine the competition. 
The econometric strategy follows the same lines of the regression framework used in the section 
7.3 for the effects of public bailouts on rescued banks and is based on fully saturated dynamic 
difference-in-difference with three lags and three leads.  
[INSERT TABLE 10] 
Table 10 reports the results. We find that competitor banks endogenously increase their risk-taking 
in response to the bailouts imposed to rescued banks. In fact, the pre-matched indicator variable (Pre-
Matched –(1)) for RWA ratio is statistically significant at 5%, while the coefficient on Bailout (0) is 
also statistically significant at 5% or better. 
                                               
28 We use a 5-nearest-neighbor matching on a propensity score. 
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Furthermore, when a peer received a public bailout, its competitors appear to experience drops in 
their margins. This link is statistically significant at 5%, and their margins decline from the year of 
the bailout to three years later. Since the mean of Margins ratio is 1.0018, the competitors’ margins  
decline sharply by 24% in the year of the intervention, 47% one year later, 48% two years after the 
bailout, and 53% three years later respectively. 
Hence, our results are consistent with the theory that the effects of public bailouts on banks’ 
competitors run through their margins (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2010). When rescued banks receive a 
public bailout, they have incentives to expand the supply of credit aggressively by worsening the 
quality of their loan portfolios. In turn, the augmented protection of rescued banks determines a 
reduction of the competitors’ margins (Gropp et al., 2011).  
8. Conclusions 
This paper is the first attempt to study the effects of public bailouts in Europe both on rescued 
banks and on rescued banks’ competitors. Building a new hand-collected dataset on all European 
commercial banks for the period as of 2007 to 2014, our paper examines three timely research 
questions. First, we find that investors react negatively to national rescue programs. This might entails 
that European investors do not completely believe in the effectiveness of using taxpayers funds to 
prop up illiquid banks in the short-term period. Second, we examine whether public bailouts affect 
the conduct of rescued banks. We find that rescued banks increase their risk by augmenting the supply 
of credit at the detriment of the quality of their loans, measured as the fraction of non-performing 
loans. We also find that when banks benefit from lower interest rates in the funding due to the policy 
intervention, they increase their risk-appetite and pursue more illiquid strategies (Adrian and Shin, 
2010 Mian and Sufi, 2010). Third, we document the presence of spillover effects of these policies 
running through rescued banks’ competitors (Gropp et al., 2011). 
Our evidence suggests a straightforward policy implication for the EU-banking system: public 
bailouts might undermine the overall financial stability. Hence, the optimal safety-nets in case of 
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bank distresses should minimize social costs due to the possible misconduct of beneficiary banks and 
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Table 8. Literature on the effects of public bailouts 
This table summarizes the literature on the effects of public bailouts. 
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Panel A: Effect of Public bailout on Rescued Banks      
Authors Sample Period of analysis Level Method Dependent Variables Key Variables Main findings 
Gropp et al.  
(2010) 
Cross-section of 
banks from all 
OECD countries 
2003 Bank OLS - IV approach Problem loans ratio, 
risk asset ratio, 
liquidity ratio equity 
ratio 




There is no evidence  that public 
guarantees increase the risk of 
protect banks, with the only 




All US listed banks* October 13, 2008 Bank Event Study - - US government interventions 
increase the value of banks' 
financial claims 
Dam and Koetter 
(2012) 
All German banks 1995-2006 Bank IV approach PD Dummy variable: 1 
if the regulator 
bails out the bank, 
0 otherwise 
Bank bailouts increase the 
probability of distress. 
Duchin and 
Sosyura (2014) 
521 US banks 2006-2010 Bank Linear probability 
model with 
Difference-in-
difference models  
Dummy variable: 1 if 
the loans was 
approved and 0 if it 
was denied 
Dummy variable: 1 
in 2009-2010 and 0 
in 2006-2008 – 
Loan-to-income 
They find that approved banks 
(TARP) show higher risk-taking. 
Berger et al. 
(2016) 
Small and medium 
banks in Germany 
1999-2009 Bank IV approach ∆[Z-score(ln)], 
∆(RWA/total assets) 
Dummy variable: 1 
if the bank receives 
a capital support , 
0 otherwise 
They find that capital supports 
decline bank's risk-taking. 
Panel B: Effect of public bailout on rescued banks' competitors 
Authors Sample Period of 
analysis 
Level Method   Main findings 
Gropp et al. 
(2010) 
Cross-section of 
banks from all 
OECD countries 
2003 Bank OLS - IV approach Problem loans ratio, 
risk asset ratio, 
liquidity ratio equity 
ratio 




Government guarantees increase 
only the risk of competitor banks 
Calderon and 
Schaeck (2016) 
124 countries 1996-2010 Country Difference-in-
difference 
estimation 
Lerner Index, Net 
interest margin 
Dummy 
variables:1 in the 
year the 
intervention was 
announced, and 0 
otherwise 
They provide evidence that 
public bailouts increase the 
competition among banks. 
     
  
 
This study All commercial 
banks across 15 EU-
countries 






Ratio, NPLs Ratio, 
Margins Ratio 
Dummy variable: 1 
if the bank receives 
a public bailout, 0 
otherwise 
During the financial crisis public 
bailouts create risk-increasing 
incentives on rescued banks and 
spillover effects 
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Table 9.  
List of significant events across all European 15 countries. 
 
Date Description Country 
30/09/08 The Irish government enacts legislation that guarantees the six major banks' liabilities. IE 
02/10/08 The Irish government launches the State Guarantee scheme. IE 
08/10/08 The UK treasury announces a package of rescue measures to ensure the financial stability. UK 
09/10/08 The Belgian government adopts State Guarantee Scheme. BE 
09/10/08 The Italian government adopts guarantees scheme. IT 
10/10/08 The Danish government adopts State Guarantees Scheme. DK 
10/10/08 The Spain government announces measures aimed at stabilizing its banking system. ES 
10/10/08 The prime minister of the Netherlands announces the recapitalization scheme. NL 
13/10/08 The government of the Netherlands announces a series of measures to ensure the financial 
stability. 
NL 
13/10/08 The UK ministers announce CGS. UK 
14/10/08 The Spanish government announces State guarantees scheme. ES 
14/10/08 Switzerland announces bank bail-out plan. CH 
16/10/08 French sets out Law on Finance including national bailouts. FR 
18/10/08 Germany adopts rescue packages scheme. DE 
20/10/08 The Irish government launches the Credit Institutions Scheme. IE 
20/10/08 The Portuguese parliament adopts a new law to provide guarantees to credit institutions. PT 
23/10/08 The Greek government adopts the GRL Scheme. GR 
23/10/08 CGS comes to effect in the Netherlands. NL 
27/10/08 The Austrian government announces the adoption of measures to stabilize the local banking 
system. 
AT 
30/10/08 Sweden government enacts the Stabilization plan. SE 
25/11/08 The Portuguese parliaments announces other recapitalizations for credit institutions. PT 
12/12/08 The Finnish government enforces State Guarantees Scheme. FI 
22/12/08 Irish government provides injections to the largest Irish Banks. IE 
19/01/09 UK government announces a second program (APS). UK 
28/01/09 The Italian government announces other recapitalization for banks. IT 
29/01/09 Announcement of the amendment of the stabilization plan in Sweden. SE 
03/02/09 The Danish government announces an amendment to extend guarantees to banks. DK 
11/02/09 Sweden: Government recapitalization scheme. SE 
11/03/09 The Irish government announces the adoption of the State loans scheme. IE 
21/11/10 The Irish prime minister announces the request for financial support to the European union 
and International Monetary Fund. 
IE 
04/02/11 The Danish government announces a change in the private sector financial support. DK 
06/04/11 The Portuguese government announces that it has requested financial support from the EU. PT 
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Table 10. Steps of the sample selection  







Steps Search Criterion  Number of Banks 
Steps 
1 
Commercial Banks adopting IFRS accounting standards  in 
Bankscope in the World Region:  Austria Belgium Denmark France 
Germany Greece Iceland Ireland Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain 
Sweden Switzerland UK  
417 
Steps 
2 Removal of all subsidiaries of foreign banks  322 
Steps 
3 
Removal of all banks with a proportion of total loans to total assets 
and of total deposits to total assets both less than 30% and a value of 
total assets less 1 billion 
296 
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Table 11. Sample description 
The table shows the sample composition by country. 
 
 
Country Banks Sample % Obs. Sample % 
Austria 9 3.04 71 3.67 
Belgium 7 2.36 54 6.47 
Denmark 19 6.42 123 6.35 
France 21 7.09 165 8.52 
Germany 8 2.70 58 3.00 
Greece 15 5.07 104 5.37 
Iceland 2 0.68 14 0.72 
Ireland 6 2.03 40 2.07 
Italy 100 33.78 642 33.16 
Netherlands 20 6.76 129 6.66 
Portugal 11 3.72 77 3.98 
Spain 36 12.16 210 10.85 
Sweden 12 4.05 56 2.89 
Switzerland 5 1.69 29 1.50 
United Kingdom 25 8.45 164 8.47 






 Table 12. Distribution of Public Bailout by Year and Country, 2007-2014 
 This table shows the distribution of public interventions on banks in the European banking system between 2007 and 
2014. Panel A reports the number of public bailouts performed by public authorities. Data on public bailouts are taken 
from Mediobanca bulletin and European Commission database. Panel A reports the description of public bailouts by year. 
Panel B depicts the distribution of public bailouts by country. “Recapitalizations” are a capital injection aimed at 
strengthen bank capital. “Guarantees” are any governmental commitment to repay bank’s creditors and depositors in case 
of bank distress. “Liquidity Facilities” are public interventions aimed to enhance bank liquidity provisions through credit 









Panel A: Distribution of Public Bailout by year 
Year Recapitalizations Guarantees Liquidity facilities 
Asset relief  
measures 
2007 1 0 0 0 
2008 8 8 1 2 
2009 16 8 0 2 
2010 6 5 1 1 
2011 12 5 2 0 
2012 9 10 1 2 
2013 5 2 0 4 
2014 1 1 0 1 
Total 61 40 5 12 
Panel B: Distribution of Public Bailout by country   
Country Recapitalizations Guarantees Liquidity facilities 
Asset relief 
measures 
AT 4 3 0 1 
BE 2 1 0 0 
CH 0 0 0 0 
DE 2 1 0 0 
DK 2 1 2 0 
ES 4 3 1 2 
FR 0 0 0 0 
GB 4 3 0 0 
GR 23 12 1 3 
IE 3 5 0 1 
IS 0 0 0 0 
IT 3 1 0 0 
NL 6 4 1 3 
PT 8 6 0 2 
SE 0 0 0 0 
Total 61 40 5 12 
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Table 13. Descriptive Statistics 
 This table reports summary statistics. Panel A reports for each variable the following statistics: number of observations 
(N), mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std. dev), the minimum (Min) and the maximum (Max). Panel B reports the means 
and the results for two-sided t-tests by allowing for the unequal variance between rescued banks and non-rescued banks. 
All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles (with the exception of Size). 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics     
 N Mean Std. dev Min Max 
Dependent variables for the key hypotheses (quotients: Yt/Yt-1) 
RWA ratiot Risk weighted assets scaled by 
total assets 1300 0.9672 0.1393 0.6687 1.2711 
Loans sharet Total loans to total assets 1607 1.0062 0.1126 0.7896 1.2850 
NPLs ratiot Non-performing loans scaled by 
total loans 1283 1.2540 0.4856 0.4730 2.5889 
Margins ratiot Net-interest margins to total assets 1595 1.0018 0.1888 0.6625 1.4503 
Liquid assets 
ratiot 
Liquid Assets scaled by total 
assets 1612 1.0149 0.3550 0.4726 1.9370 
Control variables 
Sizet-1 Log of total assets 1623 16.0602 2.4013 9.8037 21.5128 
Capital ratiot-1 Total equity to total assets 1623 0.0792 0.0458 0.0240 0.2019 
ROAt-1  Returns to total assets 1623 0.0026 0.0094 -0.0235 0.0190 
M&A t-1 Dummy variable: 1 if the bank is 
involved in M&A activities and 0 
otherwise 1623 0.0191 0.1369 0.0000 1.0000 
Panel B: T-tests       
 Non-rescued banks Rescued banks Differences in means 
(p-values) 
Dependent variables    
RWA ratiot 0.9676 .9575096 0.5394 
Loans sharet 1.007246 .9840382 0.0595 
NPLs ratiot 1.242626 1.467333 0.0003 
Margins ratiot 1.002662 .9843199 0.4348 
Liquid assets ratiot 1.016092 .9894152 0.5386 
Control variables    
Sizet-1 15.9635 17.8870 0.0000 
Capital ratiot-1 0.0811 0.0520 0.0000 
ROAt-1  0.0058 -0.0057 0.0000 
M&At-1 0.0325 0.0274 0.7938 
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Table 14. Market reaction to national bailout programs. 
This table shows the event study results for 32 announcements for national bailout programs across 15 countries of the 
European Union over the sample period (2007-2014). It reports Cumulated Abnormal Returns (CARs) the mean 
(expressed in percentage %) and the Z-statistics. The CARs are estimated over a three-day event window (-1,1), a two-
day event window (0,1), and a seven-day event window (-3,3) and adjusted in line with Kolari and Pynnönen (2010) to 
allow for the cross-sectional correlation of abnormal returns. The reaction is estimated for the stock prices of all listed 
banks available in Datastream. Daily Abnormal Returns (ARs) are calculated by using the market model with a 252-day 
estimation window.  We use the MSCI Europe as a proxy for the market portfolio. Panel A reports the results for the 
market reaction to the announcement of national bailout programs, while Panel B reports the results for the cross-country 
market reaction to the announcement of national bailout programs. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Market reaction to the announcement of national bailout programs 
 MSCI EUROPE 
 NAT_ANN 213  obs. 
TEST Media Z 
CAR(-1,1) -2.1783%* -1.6765 
CAR(0,1) -1.6704% -1.4467 
CAR(-3,3) -2.6107%** -1.9718 
Panel B: Cross-country market reaction to the announcement of national bailout 
programs 
 MSCI EUROPE 
 SPILLOVER 2644 obs. 
TEST Media Z 
CAR(-1,1) -0.6269%* -1.8015 
CAR(0,1) -0.3369% -1.1174 
CAR(-3,3) -1.3673%*** -2.5922 
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Table 15. The effects of public bailouts on bank’s risk and activities 
This table shows the results of the effects of public bailouts on bank’s risk and activities. The dependent variables are expressed as the quotients respectively of RWA ratio (ratio 
between the bank's assets exposures weighted by their intrinsic risk and the bank total assets), Loans share (total loans to total assets), Margins ratio (Net interest income scaled by 
total assets), NPLs ratio (non-performing loans to total loans), and Liquid assets Ratio (total liquid assets to total assets). Pre-Bailout is a dummy takes the value of one if it is “s” 
year before the bank received a public bailout and zero otherwise. Bailout is a dummy takes the value of one if it is “s” year after the bank received a public bailout and zero 
otherwise. Our regressions include bank-specific and macroeconomic controls. All the controls are lagged by one year. Size is logarithm of total assets (€ thousands). ROA is 
calculated as net income scaled by total assets. Capital ratio is bank total equity to total assets. M&A dummy is a dummy variable takes the value of one if the banks is involved in 
M&A activities. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The specification includes year-country effects. Standard errors are double-clustered  at bank and country level. All 



































Pre-Bailout (-3) 0.0059 -0.0279 -0.0584 -0.0578 0.0525 -0.0611 0.0554 0.0960 0.4724 0.3951 
 (0.0563) (-0.3018) (-1.0550) (-0.9373) (0.5547) (-0.5971) (0.2526) (0.4317) (1.6450) (1.3730) 
Pre-Bailout (-2) -0.0469 -0.0716 -0.0899 -0.0909 -0.0159 -0.1793 -0.3227 -0.3006 -0.0583 -0.1264  
(-0.4495) (-0.7512) (-1.3120) (-1.1591) (-0.1596) (-1.5303) (-1.4292) (-1.3307) (-0.2540) (-0.5073) 
Pre-Bailout (-1) 0.1551 0.1151 0.0301 0.0213 0.0197 -0.1063 0.0219 0.0382 -0.1175 -0.1773  
(1.5895) (1.1039) (0.4069) (0.2572) (0.1448) (-0.7788) (0.0900) (0.1615) (-0.3832) (-0.5573) 
Bailout (0) 0.1691 0.2018* 0.1519 0.1864** 0.0876 0.0771 0.9210*** 0.9619*** -0.7788** -0.7601***  
(1.5933) (1.6828) (1.4836) (2.0413) (0.4462) (0.4110) (2.7067) (2.9208) (-2.5842) (-2.7461) 
Bailout (+1) 0.3050*** 0.2915*** 0.1657** 0.1876*** 0.0758 0.0131 0.3735 0.4371* -0.5418** -0.5867***  
(3.3146) (3.0144) (2.5732) (3.0286) (0.4124) (0.0720) (1.4271) (1.6847) (-2.4602) (-2.7871) 
Bailout (+2) 0.1608 0.1334 0.0941* 0.1344** -0.0894 -0.1078 -0.4541* -0.3296 -0.5006** -0.5698***  
(1.2605) (1.1664) (1.7066) (2.2846) (-0.5419) (-0.6635) (-1.9723) (-1.2442) (-2.4670) (-2.9158) 
Bailout (+3) 0.2098*** 0.2548*** 0.1583*** 0.1951*** -0.1231 -0.1175 -0.0130 0.0074 -0.8433*** -0.7779*** 
 (4.1877) (3.4526) (3.2902) (3.4364) (-0.8053) (-0.6948) (-0.0913) (0.0453) (-5.6252) (-4.8299) 
Sizet-1  0.2448  -0.0942  -0.2598  -0.5148  0.3542  
 (1.5931)  (-0.7916)  (-1.2077)  (-1.0795)  (1.1242) 
Capital ratiot-1  -0.8969  -1.9068  2.5183  -4.7832  4.1580  
 (-0.5413)  (-1.4106)  (1.2333)  (-1.3127)  (1.2889) 
ROAt-1  -6.5400  -0.8902  -7.6413  6.7116  -13.0740  
 (-1.1123)  (-0.2938)  (-1.6406)  (0.5879)  (-1.3460) 
M&A dummyt-1  0.0603  0.0741  -0.2746**  0.1111  -0.0702 
  (0.9594)  (1.2481)  (-2.5501)  (0.6511)  (-0.4955) 
Observations 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 
R-squared 0.259 0.345 0.362 0.398 0.288 0.383 0.328 0.338 0.353 0.370 
Number of bank 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 134 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time x Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bailout x Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 





















Table 16. Finding rescued banks’ competitors 
This table shows the propensity score matching estimations. We estimate the propensity score matching using probit 
model specification. The propensity score matching is based on k-nearest neighbor method with k=5. The dependent 
variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the bank has received a public bailout during the period from 
2007 to 2014. Size is lagged by one year to reduce simultaneity concerns. The regression uses standard errors which are 
clustered at bank level. At bottom, we also report the ROC test based on the evaluation of the Receiver Operating 
Characteristic (ROC) curves illustrating the goodness-of-fit of the predictive propensity scores. Standard errors are 
clustered at bank and country level. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance respectively at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
 
 
 Variables Bailout   




 (-6.7750)   
Observations 1,623 
Number of banks 293 
Diagnostics for propensity score matching 
Treated mean  70.6301 
Control group mean 70.6086 
T-test (p-values) 0.996 
Variance Ratio 1.0000 















Table 17. Spillover effects of public bailouts. 
This table shows the results of the effects of public bailouts on bank’s risk and activities. The dependent variables are expressed as the quotients respectively of RWA ratio (ratio 
between the bank's assets exposures weighted by their intrinsic risk and the bank total assets), Loans Share (total loans to total assets), Margins ratio (Net interest income scaled 
by total assets), NPLs Ratio (non-performing loans to total loans), and Liquidity Assets Ratio (total liquid assets to total assets). Pre-Matched (-s) is a dummy variable takes the 
value of one if it is “s” before the bank has been selected as “matched bank” and zero otherwise. Matched (+s) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if it is “s” year after 
the bank has been selected as “matched bank” and zero otherwise. Our regressions include bank-specific controls. All the controls are lagged by one year. Size is logarithm of total 
assets (€ thousands). ROA is calculated as net income scaled by total assets. Equity ratio is bank total equity to total assets. Robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The 
specification includes year-country effects. Standard errors are double-clustered  at bank and country level. All variables are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles (with the 































































           
Pre-Matched (-3) 0.0998 0.1108 -0.0766 -0.0844 -0.3359 -0.3366 -0.6382 -0.7273* -0.8482** -0.8772** 
 (0.7991) (0.8529) (-0.8456) (-1.0122) (-1.2994) (-1.3442) (-1.5068) (-1.6632) (-2.3330) (-2.2693) 
Pre-Matched (-2) 0.1472 0.1902 -0.0795 -0.0805 -0.1142 -0.1249 -0.4567 -0.5652 0.2408 0.2057 
 (1.5223) (1.6099) (-1.4313) (-1.6089) (-0.5709) (-0.7360) (-1.2136) (-1.3542) (1.0072) (0.7288) 
Pre-Matched (-1) 0.1744** 0.2198* -0.0390 -0.0434 -0.1566 -0.1926 -0.4891 -0.6154 0.3105 0.2581 
 (2.0292) (1.8513) (-0.8054) (-0.9516) (-0.8459) (-1.3847) (-1.4715) (-1.6174) (1.3689) (0.9023) 
Matched (0) 0.1752*** 0.2352** -0.0035 -0.0021 -0.2176 -0.2459** 0.0715 -0.0499 0.1480 0.1032 
 (6.3624) (2.5716) (-0.1019) (-0.0713) (-1.2062) (-2.0789) (0.5735) (-0.2778) (0.6572) (0.3575) 
Matched (+1) 0.1677* 0.2385 -0.0591 -0.0629 -0.3998 -0.4700** -0.1301 -0.2950 0.3227 0.2457 
 (1.7325) (1.5340) (-0.7604) (-0.8603) (-1.5274) (-2.4373) (-0.3982) (-0.7317) (0.9631) (0.5896) 
Matched (+2) 0.1852* 0.2293 -0.0114 -0.0206 -0.4605* -0.4813** -0.2894 -0.4603 0.0286 -0.0323 
 (1.7928) (1.5436) (-0.1886) (-0.3520) (-1.8726) (-2.4649) (-0.7995) (-1.1311) (0.0963) (-0.0879) 
Matched (+3) 0.1910 0.1880 -0.1445* -0.1618** -0.5500** -0.5328** -0.8552* -0.9968* 0.4716 0.4305 
 (1.5117) (1.2050) (-1.9279) (-2.1038) (-2.1135) (-2.6121) (-1.6957) (-1.8597) (1.5522) (1.2171) 
Sizet-1  0.4104**  0.1008  -0.0036  -0.2109  -0.0080 
  (2.2942)  (0.8209)  (-0.0154)  (-0.3724)  (-0.0201) 
Capital ratiot-1  0.7768  0.0719  3.7190*  -3.5628  0.5973 
  (0.3766)  (0.0562)  (1.7289)  (-0.8393)  (0.1924) 
ROAt-1  -4.5824  -2.9455  -10.8317**  -5.7767  -7.6406 
  (-0.8010)  (-0.9820)  (-2.2380)  (-0.4896)  (-0.8285) 
M&A dummy No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 203 
R-squared 0.169 0.266 0.425 0.446 0.432 0.484 0.313 0.322 0.435 0.441 
Number of bank 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 114 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Bank FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time x Country Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matched x Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 























Figure 1. Balancing for propensity score matching 
The figure reports the performance of the balancing test between rescued banks and non-rescued banks for the pre-
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Paper 3: Government interventions and gender diversity in bank’s 




We are the first to examine the impact of gender diversity in bank boards on the probability and size of public 
bailouts. Our findings, based on a sample of listed European banks over the period 2007-2013, suggest that 
banks with a more gender-diverse board are less likely to receive a public bailout, and receive a lower amount 
of bailout funds (in the form of credit lines and capital injections) as a percentage of total assets. Specifically, 
an increase by one standard deviation in gender diversity decreases the probability of a bailout by at least 4%. 
Gender diversity is also negatively related to bank risk as proxied by the ratio of non-performing loans to total 
loans and positively related to bank profitability as proxied by ROA. Furthermore, consistent with previous 
literature, we also find that more gender-diverse bank boards have higher payout ratios, consistent with an 









































"When there is a very difficult situation, women are called in to do the work. To sort out the mess." 
Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Director 
 
 Does gender diversity in boards affect bank conduct? Are banks with a significant presence of 
women on their board of directors more or less likely to need a government bailout during banking 
crises?  
 In this paper, we are the first to provide evidence on the influence of women in bank boards on the 
probability of receiving a public bailout and the size of the bailout.29 This is a timely question for 
bank regulators and academics alike, because of the public discontent arisen both in the US and in 
Europe with respect to the use of taxpayers’ money to prop up illiquid banks. While recent academic 
papers have investigated the role of gender diversity in the executive board of German banks (Berger 
et al. 2014), there is currently no evidence about the impact of gender diversity in bank boards on the 
likelihood of a public bailout.  
 We bring to bear a unique hand-collected dataset on the presence of women on the board of 
directors of 105 listed banks in 15 European Union countries. Several recent papers have investigated 
the determinants of government bailouts in banks (among others, Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012, 
and Berger et al., 2016) but, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that seeks to determine 
the role of gender diversity.   
 Our main findings are as follows. First, Probit regressions and duration regressions indicate that 
an increase in gender diversity in bank boards leads to a lower probability of a public bailout. These 
                                               
29 In line with Dam and Koetter (2012) and Vallascas et al. (2017), we use the term “public” because the decision of 
rescuing banks usually requires the involvement of multiple public authorities (that is, public administrations, ministers 
of finance, central banks, and special entities). 
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findings are confirmed when we employ an instrumental-variables (IV) approach. Second, employing 
IV-Tobit and panel Tobit regressions to allow for left-censoring of the data, we find that banks 
entering the financial crisis with a more gender-diverse board need less public funds, in the form of 
capital injections and credit lines. However, we find mixed evidence that the proportion of female 
directors in bank board affects the amount of bailout funding granted in the form of guarantees. 
 We are also the first to document the mechanism through which board diversity may affect the 
probability of receiving a bailout. In particular, we focus on the following variables: bank 
profitability, bank risk, and bank dividend policy. Profitable banks, with a relatively low level of 
systemic risk are less likely to receive a bailout (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). Since previous 
literature suggests that gender diversity may affect dividend policy and share buybacks (Evgeniou 
and Vermaelen, 2017), and bank dividend policy also interacts with bank risk (Acharya et al., 2011; 
Onali, 2014) and monitoring incentives (Onali et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017), we also investigate the 
relationship between gender diversity in bank boards and dividend payout ratios. 
 We find that gender diversity in bank board does not affect bank profitability as proxied by Tobin’s 
Q, but it is positively related to ROA. We find evidence that gender diversity in bank boards affects 
bank risk, as proxied by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. In line with Chen et al. 
(2017), we find that more gender-diverse bank boards have higher payout ratios. 
 Our contribution to the previous literature is twofold. 
 First, we provide evidence that the economic impact of gender diversity on the probability of a 
bailout is substantial: considering the most conservative estimates from our regressions, an increase 
by one standard deviation in the fraction of female directors (10.01 percentage points)30 leads to a 
reduction in the probability of a bailout by at least 4.80 percentage points (-0.0048 * 10.01 = 0.0481). 
As a comparison, an increase by one standard deviation in systemic risk (the main variable 
                                               
30 To clarify the magnitude of these effects further, it is useful to point out that the mean of board size is 13.9 (see Table 
4). An additional woman on a board with 14 members increase in the fraction of women on the board by 1/14 = 0.0714 
(that is, 7.14 percentage points). Therefore, an additional woman on board reduces the probability of a bailout by 0.0048 
* 7.14 = 3.4 percentage points. 
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responsible for bailouts according to Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012) as proxied by Marginal 
Expected Shortfall (hereafter, MES), leads to an increase in the probability of a bailout by around 6 
percentage points. Thus, in terms of economic magnitudes, gender diversity is less important than 
systemic risk for the probability of receiving a public bailout. However, it is more important than 
other variables such as bank capital adequacy, deposits, profitability, and growth opportunities.  
 Second, previous empirical studies focus on bailouts in the form of capital supports or capital 
injections,31 overlooking that governments use different tools to restore financial stability (Philippon 
and Schnabl, 2013; Berger et al., 2016). However, public authorities used a variety of bailout 
measures to deal with generalised distress in the banking system (Dewatripoint, 2014). For instance, 
governments make use of guarantees, either on deposits to prevent market panic, or on debts to lower 
risk premia in capital markets. These alternative mechanisms are understudied, despite the fact that 
guarantees have been extensively used by governments. Importantly, the amount of bailout funding 
received by the banks in our sample is a staggering €2,073 million: €231 million for capital injections, 
€352 million for credit lines, and €1,490 million for guarantees. 
 We focus on European banks because of four reasons. First, the Eurozone crisis has protracted the 
period of financial instability in Europe started with the 2007-2008 financial crisis: we focus on a 
sample period going from 2007 to 2013, which includes the Euro Sovereign-Debt Crisis (started in 
late 2009), consistent with recent literature on policy interventions on banks (Fiordelisi and Ricci, 
2016). This allows us to study a longer time series than for the US. Second, we are able to exploit 
information on a broad range of government bailouts (capitalizations, guarantees and credit lines), 
while studies based on US data consider only equity capital injections within the Trouble Asset Relief 
Program (TARP, Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). Third, many EU-member states introduced both 
legal instruments and voluntary gender quotas to promote gender equality in decision-making 
positions (De Cabo et al. 2011, Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). However, it is unclear whether these 
                                               
31 Capital injections consist in capital supports at more favorable conditions in the effort of strengthening banks’ capital. 
Capital injections have been at the core of rescue programs and they have been considered the most effective tool among 
a variety of rescue packages (Philippon and Schnabl, 2013).  
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reforms are binding and may lead to more stable banking systems. Finally, while the empirical 
literature on the impact of board diversity on bank profitability tends to focus on one country 
(Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 2008; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Berger et al., 2014; Liu et al., 2014), 
we examine a sample of banks located in 15 EU-countries. By investigating a cross-country sample, 
our study captures a higher degree of heterogeneity than previous literature (for example, Berger et 
al., 2016) in terms of institutional, socio-economic and cultural factors that may affect corporate 
governance in banks.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview about the 
institutional background for bank bailouts in the EU. Section 3 develops hypotheses that relate gender 
diversity in the boardroom to the probability of bank bailouts. Section 4 describes the dataset and the 
methodology. Section 5 reports the main results. Section 6 provides a discussion of the mechanism 
through which gender diversity affects the probability of a bailout. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Institutional Background 
 The recent financial crisis revealed drawbacks of the EU European Banking System both at the 
member-state level and at the aggregate level because of the absence of a comprehensive Pan-
European regulatory and legal framework for the financial sector and, in particular, the absence of a 
single resolution mechanism and of a single supervisory mechanism (The Larosiére Group report, 
2009).32  
 In response to the crisis, many European countries launched rescue measures to address funding 
problems in banks to restore confidence in the financial system and to limit negative externalities of 
                                               
32 These shortcomings led to the creation of the new European supervisory system, namely the Banking Union (BU). The 
BU is based on three pillars: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and 
the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). The SSM confers to the European Central Bank (ECB) supervisory 
powers over banks deemed to be of “significant” importance for Euro-Area, while leaving the national supervisory 
agencies in charge of supervisory activities of banks outside of the SSM framework. The SRM manages the resolution 
process of banks in distress with the aim to reduce the cost of bank bailouts to the taxpayers by improving bank’s 
incentives to operate prudently (De Haan et al., 2009). The EDIS, which was introduced in 2015 (outside of our sample 
period), is supposed to complement national deposit guarantee schemes (DGS). The main objective of EDIS is to reduce 
the extent to which national DGS are vulnerable to local shocks, and to mitigate two-way feedback effects between 
sovereign credit risk and banks (Acharya et al., 2014). 
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bank distress. The Member States allocated more than €30 billion to support financial institutions in 
accordance with the guidelines provided by the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (Ecofin).33 
European action plans consisted of three bailout measures: capital injections, credit lines, and 
guarantees. Each one of these rescue-packages had a specific aim. Capital Injections, the most 
common form of bailout packages in the aftermath of the last financial crisis (Philippon and Schnabl, 
2013), aimed to strengthen banks’ capital and to ensure the correct functioning and financing of the 
wider economy. Guarantees on deposits and debts had the objective to calm markets in an effort to 
lower risk premia. European governments used Guarantees extensively during the crisis period 
because they did not have to be recorded in the public budget, nor did they require any explicit 
legislative process. Finally, Credit Lines were employed in particular cases to enhance the liquidity 
position of impaired banks.  
 Although US and EU-member states rescue programs share many similarities in dealing with the 
financial crisis, there exist important institutional differences in both the supervisory approach to 
bank distress and in central banking features. For example, due to the widespread fragmentation and 
market-orientation of the US banking system, US supervisory agencies are generally inclined to 
enforce Prompt Corrective Actions (PCA), while European supervisors tend to exercise forbearance 
to avoid bank runs (Dermine and Schoenmaker, 2010). Moreover, the Federal Reserve supported 
financial institutions individually during the financial crisis, while Eurosystem’s authorities, as we as 
the Bank of England, focussed on liquidity extension measures (Stolz and Wedow, 2010).    
 We report the main differences between the US and EU financial systems and approach to bank 
resolutions during our sample period in Table 1. In addition to the abovementioned discrepancies, the 
two frameworks diverge in terms of treatment of depositors in the resolution process (before 2015 
                                               
33 These principles require that:  
i) the value of these rescue arrangements reflect their price in non-crisis market conditions;  
ii) governments can enforce other conditions related to these arrangements, such as instructions for the 
financial institutions’ management, restrictions on banking activities, and removal of management board 
members;  
iii) the state aids be temporary, of a limited amount, and based on scrutiny of European Financial authorities to 
avoid any abuse onto taxpayers’ money and disruptions to the level-playing-field. 
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only the US had national depositor preference) and approaches to address bank distress (supervisory 
actions and rescue measures). For example, EU authorities have to implement a concerted action plan 
for bank rescue measures, to avoid that national measures impair the functioning of the single market 
because of potential distortions in competition (Stolz and Wedow, 2010; Calderon and Schaeck, 
2016).34 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
3. Hypotheses Development: Gender diversity and Public Bailouts  
 Recent literature has investigated the factors affecting the likelihood to receive a public bailout 
(Faccio et al., 2006; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Berger et al., 2016) 
and, specifically, the effects of governance mechanisms on bailout probability (Vallascas et al., 2017). 
However, to the best of our knowledge, the literature has neglected gender diversity in bank boards 
as a factor that may impinge on the probability of a public bailout.  
 We argue that it is plausible that gender diversity may affect the probability that a bank receives a 
bailout. This hypothesis stems from previous literature which posits that gender diversity in 
boardrooms affects economic outcomes (i.e. Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). 
In particular, female directors may influence both bank profitability and risk (Matsa and Miller, 2013; 
Berger et al., 2014), and ultimately the probability that the bank receives a public bailout.  
 The risk-taking channel is important because the decision to rescue a bank depends mainly on a 
bank’s financial distress costs and systemic risk (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012), and female 
directors tend to be more risk averse and less confident than their male counterparts (Brody, 1993; 
Arch, 1993; Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Adams and Funk, 2012; Huang and Kisgen, 2013). Therefore, 
gender diversity may reduce bank risk-taking, and ultimately the probability that the bank needs a 
public bailout to avoid liquidation.  
                                               
34 As reported by Calderon and Schaeck (2016), government interventions during crises can affect banking competition. 
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 A second channel through which gender diversity may reduce the probability of a public bailout 
is performance, because a key determinant for a public bailout is bank profitability (Dam and Koetter, 
2012). Female directors are likely to exert stronger monitoring efforts, and gender diversity tends to 
improve the performance of firms with weak governance mechanisms (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
However, empirical contributions on the association between gender diversity in the board and firm 
profitability have provided mixed findings, both in the management literature (Kramer, 1991; 
Eisenhardt et al., 1997; Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman et al., 2002; Peterson and Philpot, 2007; 
Francoeur et al., 2008; Adams and Funk, 2012) and in the finance literature (Campbell and Minguez-
Vera, 2008; Cheng, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012; Liu et al., 2014). 
probably due to discrepancies in the institutional and legal environments in different countries.35 In 
particular, Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) find a positive impact of gender diversity on the 
profitability of Spanish firms. Similar results are provided by Francoeur et al. (2008) and Liu et al. 
(2014) for Canada and China, respectively. In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Ahern and 
Dittmar (2012) provide evidence of a negative relationship between gender diversity and firm 
profitability.36 Finally, Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) show that gender diversity in the board of UK 
companies does not affect firm performance. 
 In addition to the two channels above, the impact of gender diversity in boards on bank dividend 
policy may also play a role. Dividend payouts can be used as a monitoring device to decrease agency 
costs (Easterbrook, 1984; Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013; Onali et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2017), 
because dividends decrease the amount of excess cash that insiders can invest in projects with a 
negative net present value (Jensen, 1986). Chen et al. (2017) report that gender diversity in corporate 
boards increases payout ratios for firms with weak governance structures, indicating that female 
                                               
35 There are also non-academic studies about gender diversity and corporate performance. A report by Credit Suisse 
(2012) about the impact of gender diversity on the performance of around 2,400 companies from 2005 to 2011 suggests 
that companies with at least one woman on the board tend to have better stock price performance than companies without 
women on the board. However, most of the outperformance occurred in the post-2008 period, suggesting that gender 
diversity on the board is particularly important in periods of falling stock prices and high volatility. 
36 Recent contributions provide two potential explanations for a negative relationship: women may exert stronger 
monitoring efforts than men, leading to higher monitoring costs and lower profitability (Adams and Ferreira, 2009); 
women may be less experienced, on average, than men (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012).  
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directors use dividends to decrease agency costs. However, Chen et al. (2017) focus on non-financial 
firms. Recent literature finds that the relationship between bank dividend policy and corporate 
governance variables is subject to dynamics which differ from those typical of non-financial firms 
(Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013; Onali et al., 2016). In particular, banks may pay dividends to shift 
default risk to bank creditors and, in the case of bailouts, to the taxpayer (Acharya et al., 2011; Onali, 
2014). 
 Empirical contributions on the relationship between gender diversity in boards and risk have 
provided conflicting findings (Matsa and Miller, 2013; Sila et al., 2016). For example, Berger et al. 
(2014) find a positive association between gender diversity in the executive board and bank risk in 
Germany, while Adams and Ragunathan (2015) and Sila et al. (2016) do not find any significant 
association between gender diversity and bank risk in the US. It is important to emphasise that the 
inconsistencies in these results may be due to different factors, such as: the proxy for risk used, the 
country under examination, and the type of banks examined. For example, Sila et al. (2016) focus on 
large listed companies (including Bank Holding Companies) in the US, while the sample used in 
Berger et al. (2014) consists mainly of unlisted German banks. Moreover, results from non-financial 
firms may not be valid for banks, because banks tend to have different governance arrangements 
(Adams and Mehran, 2003; Mulbert, 2010).37  
 The considerations above suggest that ex-ante the relationship between gender diversity in bank 
boards and the probability of a public bailout is unclear:  
 H1a: Banks with a more gender-diverse board are less likely to receive a public bailout. 
   H1b: Banks with a more gender-diverse board are more likely to receive a public bailout. 
  The hypotheses H1a and H1b are concerned with the probability of a bailout. However, we can 
also develop similar hypotheses about the size of the bailout received by a bank. Since bank size can 
                                               
37 Monitoring from a variety of stakeholders complicates the governance of financial institutions. For instance, bank 
regulators can act on behalf of depositors, and the government can actively seek to monitor bank conduct (Onali et al., 
2016). Additionally, bank instability can lead to severe negative externalities (Adam and Mehran, 2003). 
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of course affect the overall amount of a bailout, we focus on the size of the bailout scaled by a bank’s 
total assets. Consistent with H1a and H1b above, we put forward two additional hypotheses:  
 H2a: Gender diversity in bank boards reduces the amount public funds scaled by total assets. 
 H2b: Gender diversity in bank boards increases the amount public funds scaled by total assets. 
4. Data and Methodology  
This section describes the methodology and data. Section 4.1 describes our econometric strategy. 
Section 4.2 describes our dataset. Section 4.3 provides descriptive statistics. 
 4.1 Methodology 
 4.1.1 Estimating the probability of a bailout 
 To test our hypotheses, we first use a broad definition of “public bailout” which includes any kind 
of last-resort measures by public authorities to support ailing banks. To this end, we build the variable 
Bailout,38 defined as a dummy variable takes on the value of one if the bank i’s receives a public 
bailout at time t, and zero otherwise. 
 To test H1, we rely on a Probit model, in line with previous literature on bank bailouts (Faccio et 
al., 2006; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012):  
   
 ![#$%&'()*,,|	/01203	4%5036%)7, 8'1)3'&6	] = ;	(/01203	4%5036%)7*,,=>, 8'1)3'&6*,,=>)   
    (1) 
where i = 1,2, …N labels banks, while t = 1, 2…T labels years. To reduce simultaneity concerns, we 
consider the first lag of the explanatory variables. We cluster standard errors on the bank-level to 
                                               
38 In further tests, we distinguish among different kinds of bailouts:  
• Capital injections: a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the capital support for bank i’s at time t is 
provided and zero otherwise (Berger et al., 2016);  
• Guarantees: a dummy variable that takes on the value one if one or more guarantees are provided for the bank 
i’s at time t and zero otherwise;  
• Credit lines: a dummy that takes on the value one if the bank i’s at time t receives a favoured credit line from 
the government and zero otherwise. 
Past studies document mainly the importance of capital injections (Philippon and Schnabl, 2013; Berger et al., 2016) as 
the core of rescue programs. However, in Europe guarantees played a very important role. In contrast with capital 
injections, guarantees require neither to be shown in public budgets nor to be allotted after an explicit legislative process. 
For these reasons, they were used extensively during the financial crisis and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. 
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correct for serial correlation in the errors within each bank and, in alternative specifications, on the 
country-level.39 Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board of bank i at time 
t (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2007; Gimeno and Nieto, 2012), and Controls is a vector of bank-
specific variables and macroeconomic variables to allow for country-level time-varying factors that 
may affect bailout probability.40  
 We choose the variables to include in the vector Controls on the basis of previous literature on 
bank bailouts (Faccio et al. 2006; Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012; Dam and Koetter, 2012; Berger 
et al., 2014; Berger et al., 2016, Vallascas et al., 2017). In line with a Too-Big-To-Fail (TBTF) 
perspective (O’Hara and Shaw, 1990), we control for bank size, measured as the log of total assets 
(Size).41 For robustness, we use as an alternative proxy for systemic risk the Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (hereafter, MES) (Vallascas et al., 2017).42 We also control for the Market-to-Book Ratio 
(MTB Ratio), a common proxy for growth opportunities, and for bank profitability, proxied by ROA 
and Tobin’s Q. The former is defined as the net income of the bank divided by total assets (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009; Liu et al., 2014). The latter is measured as the ratio of market value of equity plus 
face value of debt divided by book value of equity plus the face value of the debt (Lindeberger and 
Ross, 1981; Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Onali et al., 2016). 
 We also allow for the potential impact of bank funding structure and asset composition: Capital 
Ratio, defined as bank equity capital to total assets (Gropp et al. 2011; Acharya and Thakor, 2016); 
Tier 1 ratio, defined as the Tier 1 regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012); 
                                               
39 Since the bank clusters are nested within the country clusters, we cannot cluster on both levels at the same time. We 
consider clustering at the bank level in our baseline regressions because clustering at the country level may result in biased 
standard errors because the number of clusters is small (Cameron and Miller, 2015).  
40 We do not include fixed effects in our specifications because Probit models with fixed effects are inconsistent 
(Fernàndez-Val, 2009; Wooldridge, 2010; Brückner and Ciccone, 2010; Cole et al., 2017). Moreover, corporate 
governance variables are sticky (Zhou, 2001; Coles et al. 2012). However, we allow for the impact of bank fixed effects 
in further tests using panel tobit models (Honoré, 1992). 
41 As well as being a rough indicator of a bank’s systemic relevance (Tarashev and Drehmann, 2013), Size is also a proxy 
for a bank’s market power and a measure of diversification (Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Gropp et al., 2011). 
42 MES is defined as the one-day loss expected if market returns are less than 2% and it is measured as at 31 December 
of a given year (Acharya et al., 2012). 
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Deposits Ratio, defined as the ratio of deposits divided by total assets;43 Liquid Assets Ratio, 
calculated as the ratio of cash plus marketable securities to total assets (Wang et al., 2009); and the 
Derivatives to Assets Ratio, which is the amount of derivatives scaled by total assets (Bayazatova and 
Shivdasani, 2012). We control for ownership concentration, which may decrease bank risk according 
to some literature (Iannotta et al., 2007): we use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (hereafter, HHI), 
calculated as the sum of squared ownership shares for each recorded shareholder.44 
 We also consider an array of country-level variables commonly used in the banking literature as 
controls. This is necessary because bailout policies and bank performance could be influenced by 
institutional and macroeconomic factors (Faccio et al., 2006; Gropp et al., 2011). We control for the 
annual GDP growth (real), to allow for business cycle effects at the country level (Anginer et al., 
2013). To capture changes in the probability of a bailout due to financial crises, we include two 
dummy variables: US-Mortgage Crisis Dummy takes on the value one for the years 2007 and 2008 
(and zero otherwise); and EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Dummy takes on the value one for the period 
from 2010 to 2012, and zero otherwise (Erkens et al., 2012; Arellano et al., 2012).  
 In further tests and consistent with the corporate governance literature, we also include controls 
on Board size (the log of the number of the board members) and Board independence ratio (the 
number of independent directors45 divided by the number of board members) similar to previous 
literature (Erkens and et al., 2012; Vallascas et al., 2017). We also control for the presence of a female 
CEO (Faccio et al., 2016), using a dummy variable takes on value one if the CEO is female and zero 
otherwise (Female CEO).  
                                               
43 By scaling deposits by total assets, we measure the degree to which bank activities depend on deposits funding (Demsetz 
and Strahan, 1997; EBA, 2016).   
44 In the specifications related to the mechanism we also employ the dummy variable Widely Held, which is an indicator 
variable equal to one if there is no owner with more than 10% of bank share rights, and zero otherwise. This variable has 
been employed previously in the literature about bank risk taking (Laeven and Levine, 2009).  
45 To identify independent directors, we follow the same criteria followed by Onali et al. (2016). 
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 4.1.2 Instrumental variables (IV) estimation 
 It may be argued that gender diversity is not exogenously determined, as may be the case for a 
number of corporate governance mechanisms (Coles et al., 2012). In our case, there could be a reverse 
causality problem between public bailouts and Gender Diversity: when a bank receives a bailout, 
dismissals of executives and board replacements may ensue (Berger et al., 2016). Moreover, in our 
specifications we may be omitting unobservable variables that are correlated with board composition. 
 For these reasons, in addition to a Probit model specified as described in section 4.1.1, we employ 
an IV-Probit model, based on a two-stage approach: 
?@A/!	1:	/01203	4%5036%)7*,, = D(EF*,,=>, 8'1)3'&6*,,=>)         
 (2a) 
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where Bailout is the probability that a bank receives a public bailout, and Controls is a vector of 
control variables (as discussed before).  
IV-estimation methods rely on two assumptions: the relevance restriction requires that the 
instrument affects the potentially endogenous variable (Gender Diversity); and the exclusion 
restriction requires that the instrument is not directly correlated to the dependent variable (Bailout). 
To choose an appropriate instrument, we thus have to search for a source of exogenous variation in 
our main variable of interest, Gender Diversity. We borrow the idea for our instruments from 
Knyazeva et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2017) who show that local labour market conditions affect 
board composition. We identify two instruments based on regional labour-market characteristics: 
Female Participation Rate, or the female labour force participation divided by the male labour force 
participation in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located; and Female employment 
rate, calculated as employment rate for women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 where the 
bank’s headquarter is located. Both of these instruments are likely to be positively correlated with 
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Gender Diversity, and therefore they satisfy the relevance restriction, a necessary condition for 
instrumental variables to be valid.  
However, Female Participation Rate is based on the total number of women who are economically 
active in a particular region, and one may argue that this could be a weak instrument because board 
directors tend to be highly qualified individuals. For this reason, we also consider Female employment 
rate, which allows for the educational attainment of women, focusing on the regional employment 
rate of women with tertiary education only. We expect this instrument to have a larger coefficient 
than that of Female Participation Rate in the first-stage of our IV-regressions, because it is very likely 
that female board of directors have tertiary education.    
The second necessary condition for the validity of our instruments is that they do not have any 
first-order effect on our dependent variable. Since the percentage of women in the local labour market 
is unlikely to bear a direct impact on the probability of financial distress of a specific bank, this 
variable also plausibly satisfies the exclusion restriction. In fact, the banks in our sample are large 
listed banks, for which geographical diversification occurs at the national (and possibly international 
level). For this reason, it is unlikely that local labour market conditions play an important role in the 
probability of distress of the bank (and vice versa). It may be argued, however, that the economic 
conditions of the country where the bank has its headquarters can affect the soundness of the bank, 
especially for countries for which there is a feedback effect between sovereign debt risk and the risk 
of the domestic financial sector (Acharya et al., 2014), and omitting such a variable from the analysis 
may generate omitted variable bias. For example, if economic growth is positively related to female 
labour participation and employment rates, then banks located in countries with higher-GDP growth 
rates may be more likely to have a higher value for Gender Diversity. For this reason, we allow for 
potential omitted variable bias by controlling for national GDP growth rate in our regressions (GDP 
growth).  
Using regional labour market characteristics is also superior to using national labour market 
characteristics, because it reduces the probability that correlation between the instrument and the 
 122 
endogenous variable depends on other national-level variables that are omitted from the analysis. In 
fact, one may argue that national-level labour market variables may be important factors in the 
decision making process of national governments when assigning bailouts to local banks. However, 
this last point is (in our view) rather weak, because a bailout cannot be granted without the approval 
of the European Commission (in particular, the Directorate General for Competition), which needs 
to consider potential distortions in competition resulting from a bailout (Dewatripoint, 2014).46 
4.1.3 Duration models 
 As a robustness check, we also use survival data analysis to estimate the impact of gender diversity 
on the probability that a bank receives a bailout (Cox, 1972, Cleves et al., 2016, Chen et al., 2017). 
We employ both a Cox hazard model47 and a parametric Weibull regression, and we estimate the 
probability that bank i receives a bailout since the start of the financial crisis.48 More specifically, we 
implement the following regression setup: 
PrI#$%&'(),MN[O* = /01203	4%5036%)7*,PQRSQ*T*T , 8'1)3'&6*,PQRSQ*T*T]J = 
						= ℎV())0WX∑ Z*N(O*) + 8'(1)37	\! + ]*^*_>           (3) 
 We estimate the bank’s probability of receiving a bailout as a function of the number of years 
starting from the beginning of the crisis to the end of the sample period as well the mean value of the 
variable of interest, Gender Diversity (and other control variables), across the pre-crisis period (2005-
2006). Furthermore, to improve robustness, instead of using macroeconomic and institutional factors 
(see Section 4.1.1), we also consider in the specification country fixed-effects (Country FE). In 
                                               
46 It may be argued that national programs on gender-quotas in boards mandated by EU-15 governments (or other 
authorities) could be exploited as exogenous shocks that could be used as instrumental variables or for a difference-in-
differences approach. However, as we show in Supplementary Appendix C, in most cases these quotas were for state-
owned companies or companies with state ownership, therefore they were not binding for listed banks. Moreover, since 
the implementation periods of these regulations tend to fall after the end of our sample period (or before the start of our 
sample period) such an econometric strategy is infeasible. Finally, in some cases there were no specific sanctions for non-
compliance. Italy is the only country for which the gender quotas apply to listed banks, are implemented between the start 
and end date of our sample period, and there are specific sanctions for non-compliance. In this case, we do observe an 
increase in the number of sample banks that comply with the quota from 1 (pre-quotas period) to 7 (post-quotas period).    
47 The Cox proportional hazard model (1972) is less restrictive than full parametric Probit regression since it requires 
fewer assumptions (that is fixing any distribution on the failure event) and fits better smaller samples (Cleves et al., 2016; 
Chen et al., 2017). 
48 If a bank receives more than a public bailout during the crisis, we consider the date of the first bailout. 
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further tests, we also estimate the bank’s probability of receiving a bailout as a function of the number 
of days starting from the beginning of the crisis to the end of the sample period. 
 4.1.4 Tobit regressions for the size of the public bailout  
 Gender Diversity may not only affect the probability to receive a public bailout, but also the 
amount of funding granted to the bank. In particular, consider for each specific type of public bailout 
the total amount of funding scaled by total assets (Public Funds). Clearly, this is a censored variable, 
since  
`(a&%b	\(126c,*,,∗ = D(/01203_4%5036%)7c,*,,=>, 8'1)3'&6c,*,,=>)       
   where                  (4)                                                   
where j = 1,2, 3 labels the specific type of public bailout (Capital Injections, Credit Lines or 
Guarantees), i = 1,2, …N labels banks, and t = 1, 2…T labels years. The vector Controls is defined 
as before. 
 To test whether this is the case, we employ IV-Tobit models, with the same instruments as for 
the IV-Probit regressions above, as well as panel censored regression models (Honoré, 1992; Arena 
and Kutner, 2015), which allow for the estimation of limited dependent variables in presence of panel 
fixed effects. 
4.2 Data and sample selection 
 To test our hypotheses, we build a new and unique hand-collected dataset with information on 
all public bailouts and board composition for listed banks in 15 EU-countries during the period from 
2007 through 2013. Concentrating the analysis on listed EU banks is useful to improve the within-
sample comparability of the banks from different countries, because these banks have to comply with 
IFRS and the market for their shares tends to be liquid.49 Choosing 2013 as the final year of our 
                                               
49 These considerations are consistent with those put forward by Laeven and Levine (2009), who select an international 
sample of large banks because “Focusing on the largest banks enhances comparability because they tend to comply with 
international accounting standards and have more liquid shares, reducing concerns that accounting or liquidity 













sample period allows us to avoid potential distortions in the analysis caused by the Capital 
Requirements Directives (CRD) IV, which took effect on January 1, 2014. Since this directive 
implements the new rules introduced in Basel 2 and Basel 3 regulations on capital requirements, and 
because it is hard to disentangle the effect of this new regulation from other determinants of public 
bailouts, it is likely from 2014 onwards the data may contain noise due to the implementation of this 
reform. Our choice also allows for consistency with recent literature on policy actions on banks 
(Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2016).  
 Our sample selection steps are as follows. In the same vein as Onali et al. (2016), we select all 
banks defined by Bankscope as commercial banks, Bank Holding Companies (BHC), or cooperative 
banks. Second, we consider only listed banks, which adopt International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), to avoid confounding effects from differences in national accounting standards. 
Next, we select all banks for which information on total assets is available for at least one of the 
sampled years (resulting in 118 banks). Finally, we exclude financial institutions for which data on 
regulatory and other financial ratios are unavailable (13 banks) over the sample period. The final 
sample consists of 105 banks and covers the largest banks in EU-15.  
 Table 2 summarises the main steps of our sample construction. In the multivariate regressions 
below, some of the 105 banks exit the sample, and the exact number of banks entering each regression 
depends on the specification employed. 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 Table 3 provides an analysis of the number of banks for each country and the sample 
representativeness in relation to the population of listed banks in the EU-15 over the sample period. 
While we select only a sub-sample of banks in the EU-15, our sample covers more than 90% of the 
whole European Banking System in terms of total assets, deposits or total lending.  
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
  For our econometric analysis, we match data collected from multiple data sources. The data on 
public bailouts is from the document “Public Support Measures in Europe and in the United States”, 
 125 
available on Mediobanca’s website (http://www.mbres.it/en/)50 and the European Commission 
Database.51 Bank-specific variables are collected from either Bankscope (balance sheet and income 
statement items) or V-Stern-lab (Marginal Expected Shortfall, MES). Information on macroeconomic 
and institutional factors variables is taken from AMECO database of the European Commission and 
the World Bank Database. 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics 
 In this section, we discuss the distribution of bailouts across the sample period and we provide 
summary statistics for the main variables under examination. The total number of bailouts during the 
period from 2007 to 2013 was 140: 38 capital injections, 23 credit lines, and 79 guarantees. Figure 1 
reports the distribution of public bailouts during the sample period. No bailout event occurred in 
2007, and the majority of public bailouts took place in 2008 and 2009 (25 and 43 bailouts, 
respectively).  
 [INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 Table 4 reports summary statistics (mean, median, minimum and maximum) for each variable used 
in the subsequent multivariate analysis. We also report the statistics for proxies of bank performance, 
risk, and dividend payout ratios, and a short explanation for each of them (we will provide a more 
detailed explanation in Section 6). The mean and standard deviation for Gender Diversity are 11.84% 
and 10%, respectively. Female Participation Rate ranges between 69.98% and 100%, while Female 
employment rate goes from 65.50% to 88%, suggesting substantial variation in the extent to which 
women are involved in the social and economic environments in Europe (European Commission, 
2012).  
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
Additionally, we also report further statistics focusing on the distribution of our main explanatory 
variable, Gender Diversity. Panel A reports the distribution of Gender Diversity by country, while 
                                               




Panel B report the distribution of our key variable by year. Panel A of Table 5 suggest that there are 
eleven countries in our sample – Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom – where female directors account for at least 10% 
in average of total number of board members, while countries, such as Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
and Portugal, presents a fraction of female directors below the aforementioned threshold of 10%.   
[INSERT FIGURE 2] 
[INSERT TABLE 5] 
Furthermore, in line with Figure 2, Panel B shows a remarkable increase in the percentage of 
female directors on bank boards over the sample period. In fact, the percentage of female directors 
changed from 8.67% to 16.57% in only 7 years reaching peak of 50% in the number of female 
directors in 2013. This is line with the initiatives of the European Commission and Member States to 
boost and ensure a better gender equality in companies’ boards in terms of female representations.52 
In fact, the share of female directors rose from 8.67% to 16.57%, meaning an increase of around 7.9 
percentage points (pp) over the sample period or an average increase of 1.12 pp per year. 
Do rescued banks differ from non-rescued banks? Table 6 provides the results of two-sided t-
tests53 for differences in means of a set of variables that may be related to the probability of receiving 
a public bailout. We also provide the results separately for the pre-crisis period and the crisis period, 
and for capital injections, credit lines, and guarantees.  
[INSERT TABLE 6] 
 Our results suggest that non-rescued banks had on average a higher value for Gender Diversity 
than rescued banks in the post-crisis period (for the pre-crisis period, the difference in means is 
statistically insignificant). This result suggests that more gender-diverse boards are less likely to need 
a public bailout during the crisis. The results tend to change slightly, however, once different types 
                                               
52 For instance, in 2011 the European Commission introduced legislation to improve gender balance in EU-listed 
companies: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?doc_id=46280. 
53 In addition to the t-tests reported above, we also conduct Wilcoxon-test to allow for the possibility that the Normality 
assumption does not hold in our sample. The results shown in Supplementary Appendix B reiterate the results for the t-
tests. 
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of bailout are considered. In particular, banks bailed out by means of guarantees have a lower fraction 
of female directors both in the crisis-period and the pre-crisis period.  
 Consistent with TBTF considerations, rescued banks are significantly larger than non-rescued 
banks in both periods. These results are line with the argument that larger banks are more likely to 
attract public support (Dam and Koetter, 2012) because of their stronger spill-over effects in case of 
liquidation (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). As expected, this result is also confirmed by the 
differences-in-means regarding the MES, but only for the post-crisis period. 
 Our results also show that non-rescued banks have a higher MTB Ratio both in pre-crisis period 
and in the post-crisis period. Furthermore, rescued banks tend to have a lower Deposits Ratio than 
rescued peers, consistent with the view that deposits provide a stable source of funding for banks 
(Bruno et al., 2018). Unsurprisingly, non-rescued banks have, on average, better profitability (proxied 
by Tobin’s Q) and lower riskiness (proxied by the Z-score and NPL Ratio) than rescued banks, 
although for the Z-score the results are significant only for the crisis period. Comparing the results 
for the post-crisis period with those for the pre-crisis period, we notice that the 2007-financial crisis 
weakened the profitability and growth opportunities of both rescued and non-rescued banks, but 
affected rescued banks more severely. Similar results are confirmed in Brei and Gadanecz (2012). 
Since dividend payout ratios may be related to risk-shifting incentives (Acharya et al., 2011), we also 
report the results for t-tests based on the dividends to equity ratio (DPE). On average, non-rescued 
banks have higher DPE than rescued banks during the crisis. A possible explanation for this result is 
that rescued banks are subject to higher monitoring intensity from public authorities, resulting in 
lower payout ratios (Onali et al., 2016).  
5. Results 
5.1 Probit regressions: Results 
 Table 7 presents the results for the probit regressions for the likelihood that a bank receives a 
public bailout. To improve robustness, we present the results with different sets of controls, different 
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levels of clustering for the standard errors, with and without year fixed effects, and in the last column 
we also present the results collapsed at the bank level, to reduce the possibility that our results depend 
on within-bank time trends in both the dependent and independent variables.   
 We find that banks with a higher fraction of female directors are less likely to receive a bailout, 
with the coefficient on Gender Diversity statistically significant at the 5% level or 1% level for all 
ten specifications. The magnitude of the marginal effects suggests that an increase by one percent in 
Gender Diversity decreases the probability of a bailout by around 0.36%-2.09%, depending on the 
specification chosen.  
 The coefficient on Size is statistically insignificant in all regressions. This result is not unexpected, 
since our sample is mainly composed by larger EU-banks and it is also line with the previous literature 
arguing that Size is a rough indicator of bank systemic importance (Drehmann and Tarashev, 2013), 
because it is unable to capture the potential distress costs and negative externalities associated with 
bank default. Systemic risk, proxied by MES, increases the probability of a public bailout, consistent 
with the view that banks that are systemically important are more likely to be rescued by the 
government if they are in distress.  
 In line with Bayazatova and Shivdasani (2012), we find that higher profitability (proxied by ROA) 
reduces the probability of a public bailout, in most specifications. Capital Ratio is negatively related 
to the probability of obtaining a bailout. The coefficients for Tier 1 Ratio are also negative and 
significant in the specifications where Capital Ratio is excluded. The fact that Tier 1 Ratio loses 
significance when Capital Ratio is included in the regressions indicates that authorities may consider 
Capital Ratio as a more informative variable when deciding which bank should be bailed out.  
 The coefficients on HHI are negative and statistically significant at the 5% level in six 
specifications out of nine, consistent with the view that ownership concentration decreases bank risk 
(Iannotta et al., 2007). 
 129 
 In Columns (7) and (8) of Table 7 we present the results after replacing the Tier 1 Ratio with either 
the Liquid Assets Ratio (Column (7)) or the Derivatives to Assets Ratio (Column (8)). The coefficient 
on the former is negative and significant at the 10% level, consistent with the view that a higher 
degree of short-term liquidity reduces the probability of financial distress. The coefficient on 
Derivatives to Assets Ratio is insignificant. The results for the other variables remain substantially 
unaltered. 
 The results for the control variables are, therefore, consistent with our expectations: better-
capitalised and profitable banks, with low systemic risk, are less likely to obtain a public bailout. 
However, gender diversity on the board also plays a key role.  
   [INSERT TABLE 7] 
5.2 IV-Probit Regressions: Results 
 Table 8 reports the results of the IV-Probit regressions: Panel A shows the results for the second-
stage regressions, where the dependent variable is Bailout; and Panel B reports the results of the first-
stage regressions, where the dependent variable is Gender Diversity. We report the results using two 
instrumental variables: Female Participation Rate and Female employment rate.  
 Consistently with Table 7, the results for the second-stage regressions reported in Panel A indicate 
that banks with a higher fraction of female directors on the board are less likely to receive a public 
bailout. The coefficient on Gender Diversity is statistically significant at the 1% level in five 
specifications and at the 5% in one specification. The economic magnitude of the impact of Gender 
Diversity is also significant: an increase by 1% in Gender Diversity decreases the probability of 
receiving a bailout by around 1.69%-4.68%, depending on the specification. Thus, the economic 
magnitude is larger than for the Probit regressions (see Table 7). Therefore, neglecting to use IV 
models leads to an underestimation of the magnitude of the negative effect of Gender Diversity.54  
                                               
54 To provide further evidence for the validity of our instruments, we run our IV-models again using Female Participation 
Rate at the country level (the data are collected from the World Bank database). This IV is less likely to satisfy the 
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 The results reported in Panel B suggest that our instruments are strongly and positively correlated 
with the potentially endogenous regressor in all specifications, in line with our predictions. The z-
statistics for both instruments are higher than 4 in all cases, suggesting that our instruments are 
unlikely to be weak. Moreover, the coefficients on Female employment rate are larger than those on 
Female Participation Rate, consistent with our expectations.  
 Larger and better-capitalised banks are more likely to have a more diverse board, consistent with 
previous literature (De Cabo et al., 2012), and banks located in countries with higher-GDP growth 
rates are more likely to have a higher fraction of female directors in the board.55 
 At the bottom of Panel B, we report the results for the Wald Test under the null hypothesis of no 
endogeneity of Gender Diversity. The p-value is lower than 5% in four specifications out of six, 
suggesting that the null hypothesis of no endogeneity of Gender Diversity can be rejected. Thus, the 
coefficient estimates for these four specifications are inconsistent for the probit regressions without 
IVs. The instruments employed are also strong: for example, the Kleibergen-Paap rank test statistics 
range between 19.25 and 30.44. 
[INSERT TABLE 8] 
5.3 Duration Models  
 In this section, we test our main hypotheses by using survival data analysis. As before, we expect 
that banks with a higher proportion of women on the board are less likely to receive a public bailout 
from 2007 until the end of the sample period.  
                                               
exclusion restriction than the one at the regional level, in particular because of the feedback effect between sovereign risk 
and the risk of the domestic financial sector (Acharya et al., 2014). We re-estimate the regressions as per Columns (1)-
(2) and (5)-(6) of Table 8. The IV at the national level enters the first-stage regressions with a positive and significant 
sign (t-stats > 5). In the second-stage regressions, we find that the coefficient on Gender Diversity is between the one for 
the corresponding Probit model the one for the IV-Probit model using the regional instruments. This finding confirms 
that our IV at the regional level is correcting endogeneity to a greater extent than the one at the national level. 
55 In unreported results, we also re-run the analysis by replacing the GDP growth at the country-level with the GDP growth 
at the NUTS2-level to allow for differences in economic development across regions. The results remain virtually 
unaltered. 
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 Table 9 complements the results in Tables 7 and 8. The coefficient on the hazard ratio for Gender 
Diversity is less than one and statistically significant in all specifications, suggesting that banks with 
a higher value of Gender Diversity in the pre-crisis period are less likely to receive a bailout during 
the financial crisis.56 In column (2), we control for the presence of female CEO in the bank, while in 
Column (3) we control for bank’s board characteristics. The results for these tests remain unaltered.  
In Column (4) and (5) we employ a duration model estimating the probability of receiving a bailout 
as a function of the number of calendar days from the beginning of the crisis to the end of the sample 
period.57 In Column (5), we implement a parametric survival model, whose baseline hazard function 
has the Weibull form because the proportional-hazards assumption58 does not hold when we consider 
the probability of receiving a bailout as a function of the number of calendar days. The results are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar across specifications. 
[INSERT TABLE 9] 
 In Figure 3 we report graphs of the estimated survival functions. In particular, we show the graphs 
separately for countries which experienced sovereign debt problems during the period 2009-2013 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), and for the whole sample. From the graphs, it is clear 
that for Greek banks the estimated survival function starts from a lower value (around 0.2) and 
decades more rapidly than for the whole sample. This finding suggests that Greek banks were likely 
to receive a bailout earlier than banks from other countries. 
 [INSERT FIGURE 3] 
5.4. Amount of Public Bailouts: Tobit Models 
  Table 10 shows the results of IV-Tobit regressions (Panel A) and panel Tobit regressions (Panel 
B). For Panel A, the coefficients on Gender Diversity are negative and significant at the 5% level in 
                                               
56 For the sake of brevity, we do not tabulate the results for the bank-specific control variables. However, as reported in 
Table 8, we have included these variables in our regressions. 
57 For the scope of this analysis we define the starting day of the crisis as 1st January 2007, following Erkens et al. (2012) 
and Ryan (2008). 
58 We check the proportional-hazards assumption using Schoenfeld’s (1982) residuals test. 
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five cases out of six (and at the 10% level in the remaining case), indicating that banks with a higher 
fraction of female directors tend to receive a smaller amount of capital injections, credit lines and 
guarantees as a percentage of total assets. For Panel B, the coefficient on Gender Diversity in the 
regressions on Guarantees, reported in Column (3) is statistically insignificant, but the results for 
Capital Injections and Credit Lines are consistent with those reported in Panel A.  
[INSERT TABLE 10] 
6. The mechanism: Bank Profitability, Risk and Dividend Payout Ratios 
 In this section, we aim to identify the channels through which gender diversity in bank boards 
influences the probability of a public bailout during the financial crisis. We identify three potential 
channels: bank profitability, bank soundness, and bank dividend policy.  As before, we rely on an IV 
setup for our inferences. 
 6.1 Instrumental Variables (IV) Regressions 
 To test the profitability-channel, we use two measures widely employed in the finance literature: 
Tobin’s Q and ROA. To investigate the risk-channel, we employ backward-looking and forward-
looking proxies for bank risk (see results in Supplementary Appendix F). First, following Dam and 
Koetter (2012), we consider a proxy for credit risk, the non-performing loans ratio, calculated as non-
performing loans to total loans (NPL Ratio). Second, consistent with recent literature on risk-shifting 
(Onali, 2014), we employ two distance-to-default measures: (i) the Z-score, which is an accounting-
based and backward-looking proxy for bank soundness, is calculated as the ratio of the ROA plus the 
ratio of equity to total assets, divided by the standard deviation of the ROA; and (ii) its log 
transformation (Z-score (ln)). Because of the Z-score is positively skewed, using its log 
transformation is more common (Onali, 2014). As additional market-based measure of risk, we also 
consider the standard deviation of monthly stock returns (Volatility).  
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 To test the dividend-policy channel, we employ dividends to equity ratio in logs, DPE (ln), in the 
main specifications as the dependent variable. We use the log transformation because dividend payout 
ratios are highly skewed to right (Onali et al., 2016).  
 To explore the mechanism behind the relation between gender diversity in the bank boards and 
probability of receiving a bailout, we rely on an IV framework. More precisely, we run three sets of 
regressions based on: 
f*,, = DI/01203	4%5036%)7*,,=>, 8'1)3'&6*,,=>J 
         /01203	4%5036%)7*,,=> = D(EF*,,=>, 8'1)3'&6*,,=>)         (5)  
where Yi,t  is the variable of interest of our hypotheses (profitability, risk, dividends),59 and Controls 
is a vector of bank-level and macroeconomic control variables. As before, we cluster the standard 
errors on the bank-level.  
 We employ the same instruments used in the previous section: Female Participation Rate and 
Female employment rate. We choose to do so for three reasons. First, reverse causality could drive 
our results due to the so-called sorting-effect: better-performing banks are more likely to hire female 
directors on their board (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). This effect is likely to affect the regressions on 
profitability proxies as well as those on proxies for risk and dividend policy, because these three 
variables are strongly associated with each other (for example, more profitable banks are likely to 
have higher payout ratios). Second, provided that women are indeed more risk averse than men, it is 
plausible that women can self-select in boards of less risky banks. Finally, there may be factors that 
are unobservable to the econometrician and correlated with Gender Diversity, engendering an omitted 
variable bias problem (Coles et al., 2012).60  
                                               
59 In robustness checks, we use the dividends-to-equity ratio without any log-adjustment. The results are virtually the 
same. 
60 Other previous studies (Sila et al., 2006; Chhaochharia and Laeven, 2009; Faccio et al, 2016), employ a dynamic panel 
data model using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 
1998). We obtain similar results using these models: Gender Diversity is positively related to Tobin’s Q and the ROA, 
and negative related to the NPL Ratio. However, this approach can lead to bias in presence of time-varying omitted 
variables (Wintoki et al., 2012).  
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6.2 Main Results  
 The results reported in Table 11 confirm that our instruments are significant and enter the first-
stage regressions with the predicted sign. 
The results for the second-stage regressions are shown in Table 11, Panel A. Our results related to 
the profitability channel provide mixed evidence that Gender Diversity affects bank performance: the 
coefficients on Tobin’s Q (reported in Columns (1) and (2)) are positive but statistically insignificant; 
however, the coefficients on ROA are positive and statistically significant. An increase by 1 
percentage point in Gender Diversity increases ROA by 0.0724 percentage points, and because ROA 
has a mean of 0.4331 percentage points, the increase is economically significant: around 16.72% of 
ROA's average.61 These findings contradict management theories arguing that a more diverse board 
might be more likely to disagree in the decision-making process, resulting in lower profitability 
(Eisenhardt et al., 1997). In contrast, they support the hypothesis that female directors can help their 
firm by attracting valuable resources and producing better profitability (Hillman et al., 2002), and 
they also corroborate the findings reported by Berger et al. (2014).62 
The results for the NPL Ratio (Columns (5) and (6)) support the hypothesis that Gender Diversity 
has a negative and statistically significant impact on credit risk. However, we find that if Gender 
increases by 1 percentage point, NPL Ratio decreases by 0.5386 percentage points. Considering that 
the average NPL Ratio is around 5.27 percentage points, the economic magnitude of the impact of 
Gender Diversity is moderate, but not negligible (around 10.22% of NPL Ratio’s mean). 
The negative impact of Gender Diversity on bank risk is confirmed when we replace NPL Ratio 
with the Z-score (ln) and Volatility: Gender Diversity correlates positively with the former (which is 
a proxy for distance-to-default Laeven and Levine, 2009), and negatively with the latter. We report 
                                               
61 The results remain unaltered when we control for the presence of a Female CEO (Faccio et al., 2016), the Board 
Independence Ratio, and Board Size (Erkens et al., 2012; Vallascas et al., 2017), as reported in Supplementary Appendix 
E. 
62 Berger et al. (2014) suggest that, although female directors represent a minority in banks’ boards (European 
Commission, 2012), they are not marginalised in male-dominated boards. 
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these results in Supplementary Appendix F.63 These findings may be interpreted as evidence of 
stronger monitoring efforts by female directors relative to their male counterparts (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Chen et al., 2017). An alternative view could be that women tend to be more risk-
averse (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), leading to stricter bank-lending policies. 
In Columns (7) and (8) of Table 11, we analyse the results for DPE (ln). The coefficient of Gender 
Diversity is positive and statistically significant for Column (8), but not for Column (7). The 
economic magnitude of the impact for the results reported in Column (8) suggest that if Gender 
Diversity increases by 1 percentage point, DPE (ln) increases by 0.0568. Considering that DPE (ln) 
has a mean of 0.505, the increase is moderate but not economically insignificant (around 11.25% of 
its mean). This finding confirms those reported by Chen et al. (2017) with respect to non-financial 
firms in the US: a larger representation of female directors in boards is associated with higher 
dividend payout ratios. In Supplementary Appendix H, we re-estimate the results for dividend policy 
channel by replacing DPE (ln) with DPE (without using a log transformation for the dividend payout 
ratio) and DPE/TA, which is the ratio between dividends and total assets instead of equity (in line 
with Abreu and Gulamhussen, 2013).64 Except for column 1 of Supplementary Appendix H, we 
reported similar results in line with Table 11. As a further robustness check (reported in 
Supplementary Appendix I), we provide some evidence that the positive relationship between DPE 
(ln) and Gender Diversity remains statistically and economically significant after controlling for other 
board characteristics, such as the presence of a female CEO, board size, the fraction of independent 
directors. Particularly, they remain statistically significant in all specifications, where we use Female 
employment rate as instrument for Gender Diversity.  
[INSERT TABLE 11] 
                                               
63 As a further robustness check for the risk-channel, we re-estimate the results reported in Table 11 (Columns (5) and 
(6)) by allowing for other corporate governance variables. The results, which we report in Supplementary Appendix G, 
remain statistically and economically similar to those reported in Table 11. 
64 Similar to Evgeniou and Vermaelen (2017), we also examine the impact of Gender Diversity on the probability of share 
buybacks, using probit and logit models. However, the coefficients on Gender Diversity are insignificant. 
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 To sum up, our findings show that Gender Diversity has a negative effect on bank risk, as proxied 
by the NPL Ratio and Volatility, a positive effect on ROA, and we also provide some evidence that 
Gender Diversity increases dividend payout ratios. Consistent with findings reported by Berger et al. 
(2014), our results suggest that, although female directors represent a minority in banks’ boards 
(European Commission, 2012), they are not marginalised in male-dominated boards. 
6.2 Robustness tests: 3SLS regressions  
 One may argue that if Gender Diversity increases payout ratios and decreases the probability of a 
bailout, then higher dividend payout ratios should decrease the probability of a bailout. In section 6.1 
we argued that the channel through which a higher dividend payout ratio decreases the probability of 
a bailout is a decrease in agency costs. However, it may be pointed out that this is counterintuitive 
because dividends reduce, ceteris paribus, the capital ratio of the bank.  
 To explore this alternative mechanism, we investigate in more depth the channel through which 
Gender Diversity leads to higher payout ratios. In particular, Gender Diversity increases ROA and 
decreases the NPL Ratio, and both of these variables may influence payout ratios: banks with a higher 
profitability and lower credit risk may have higher payout ratios. Following these considerations, and 
in a similar vein as Bhagat and Bolton (2008, 2013) and Onali et al. (2016), we employ a 3-Stage 
Least Squares (3SLS) framework to examine the interlinkages across the following variables: Public 
Bailout, ROAA, NPL Ratio, DPE (ln), and Gender Diversity. In particular, we implement the 
following econometric strategy:65 
(6) 
                                               
65 We also run 3SLS regressions similar to equations (6), where DPE (ln) replaces ROA. The results are consistent with 
those reported in section 6.2, in that DPE (ln)t-1 has a positive and significant coefficient in the regression where Public 
Bailoutt is the dependent variable, Gender Diversityt-1 has a positive and significant coefficient in the regression on DPE 
(ln)t-1, and Female Participation Ratet-1 and Female Employment Ratet-1 have positive and significant coefficients in the 




































 In equations (6) and (7), Public Bailout is a function of either profitability (proxied by ROA) 
or credit risk (proxied by the NPL Ratio), which depend, in turn, on Gender Diversity. In equations 
(8) and (9), DPE (ln) is a function of profitability or credit risk. 
 To improve the robustness of our results in section 6.2, for the equation on Gender Diversity 
we use both of our instruments to be able to run Hansen tests for over-identifying restrictions (using 
2SLS regressions). In all cases, we obtain Hansen tests greater than 0.10.66 
[INSERT TABLE 12] 
 The results reported in Table 12 confirm that: profitability (proxied by the ROA) decreases 
the probability of a bailout and increases dividend payout ratios (proxied by DPE (ln)); credit risk 
(proxied by the NPL Ratio) increases the probability of a bailout and decreases dividend payout 
ratios (proxied by DPE (ln)); Gender Diversity increase profitability (proxied by the ROA) and 
decreases credit risk (proxied by the NPL Ratio); Female Participation Rate and Female 
Employment Rate increase Gender Diversity. 
 
                                               































































































 7. Conclusions and recommendations 
 This paper is the first attempt to estimate the impact of gender diversity in bank boards on the 
probability that a bank needs a public bailout. Leveraging a painstakingly hand-collected dataset on 
a large sample of European banks, we have shown that gender diversity reduces the probability of a 
public bailout, although this effect is economically moderate in comparison with the impact of the 
overall degree of systemic risk of an institution. Moreover, conditional on a public bailout happening, 
the amount of public funding received, as a percentage of bank assets, decreases as the fraction of 
women on the board increases.  
 An investigation of the drivers of such a phenomenon suggests that gender diversity bears a 
positive impact on bank profitability (proxied by the ROA) and decreases the non-performing loans 
ratio. Consistent with our expectations, banks with higher ROA have a lower probability of a bailout, 
as do banks with a lower non-performing loans ratio.  
 Moreover, gender diversity correlates positively with dividend payout ratios, suggesting a decrease 
in agency costs, which consequently leads to a lower probability of a bailout. We also investigate an 
alternative channel: gender diversity increases payout ratios because it increases profitability and it 
decreases the non-performing ratio, and payout ratios tend to be higher in more profitable banks with 
a lower non-performing loans ratio.   
 In light of recent reforms in several EU countries regarding gender quotas and the current debate 
about the need to understand and enhance corporate governance mechanisms in banks (de Larosière 
Group, 2009; Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance, BCBS, 2010), our results provide 
important insights on the role of female directors for bank conduct: our findings may be interpreted 
as evidence that female directors exert stronger monitoring efforts than their male counterparts 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Chen et al., 2016, Evgeniou and Vermaelen, 2017), leading to stricter 
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Panel A summarises briefly the main differences between the US Banking Market and the EU Banking Market. Panel B provides a numerical comparison between the two rescue 
programs launched in both markets. 
 
Sources: Bordo et al. (1994); Stiroh and Strahan (2003); Dermine and Schoenmaker (2010); Stolz and Wedow (2010); Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012); Woll (2014); Danisewicz et al. (2017); Bulletin of Mediobanca.. 
Panel A: A comparison between the US Banking Market and the EU Banking Market 
Features US Banking Market EU-Banking Market 
Type of financial system 
Market-based System: Securities markets satisfy firms’ funding 
needs in the credit allocation by exerting control over firms’ 
managers. Generally, this kind of system requires no direct 
government intervention or ownership. 
Bank-based System: Banks play a key role in the credit allocation 
both by mobilizing savings and by monitoring the decision of 
investments undertaken by firms’ managers (particularly, in 
Continental Europe). 
Banking market structure US banking system: Widely-fragmented and characterized by a large number of small financial intermediaries.   
EU banking system: Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
(SIFIs) representing the 65% of the whole banking market. 
Supervisory Authorities’ Reaction 
Prompt Corrective Actions: The supervisory agency intervenes 
and arranges the liquidation or unconventional measures once the 
ailing institution does not meet the minimum regulatory standards.  
In the case of a small bank’s distress, the FDIC may easily arrange 
the closure or the takeover of the ailing financial institutions. 
Forbearance: Supervisory agency tolerates that the ailing bank 
continues operating even if it does not satisfy minimum regulatory 
standards in order to avoid bank runs. 
Rescue schemes 
TARP: Banks submit their application for the rescue-program. The 
US Treasury decides on the approvals of bank’s applications.  As 
a result, the US Treasury approved injections in banks with better 
asset quality (“Healthy Banks”). 
EU-Member States Rescue Programs: Governments and other 
specific public authorities arrange the national schemes and ad-hoc 
measures for ailing banks. The European Commission (DG-
Competition) approves the national scheme or the ad-hoc 
measures on the premise that the measures do not distort the level 
playing field both within the local market and across UE-Member 
States markets. 
Approval Decision for rescue schemes U.S. Treasury European Commission (DG-Competition) 
Approach to Globally Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs)  Privileged Treatment Privileged Treatment 
Other provision(s) National Depositor Preference(s):  In case of bank liquidation, this law confers priority to depositors relatively to general creditors.  
EU-depositor preference. EU-directive in force since 2014. EU-
member states have to enforce the directive into national laws after 
one year. 
 
Central Banking features FED carries out its functions independently and discretionally over monetary policy, even by supporting banks at individual basis. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) refinances financial 
intermediaries mainly through liquidity extensions.  The ECB 
reduced the corridor of the standing facilities in 2009, that is, the 
difference between the interest rate of the marginal lending facility 
and that of the deposit facility. 
Panel B: A comparison between the US-TARP and EU-Member States Rescue Schemes (31/12/2013) 
Features US-TARP (€ billion) EU-Rescue Schemes (€ billion) 
Injections 408.3 472.3 
Guarantees 1,356. 0 2,442.6 
Others 305.9 250.7 
Overall Amount 2,070.2 3,165.6 
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 Search criteria Number of banks 
Step 
1 
Universe of European publicly quoted banks listed on Bankscope 2,662 
Step 
2 
World region: European Union (15) 232 
Step 
3 
Accounting Standards: International Financial Reporting Standards 185 
Step 
4 










Information availability: regulatory data and other financial ratios 105 
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Panel A: Overview 
Country Name Banks  Sample % Observations  
Austria 7 6.67 49 
Belgium 3 2.86 16 
Denmark 11 10.48 77 
Finland 3 2.86 26 
France 8 7.62 56 
Germany 9 10.48 63 
Greece 11 9.35 63 
Ireland 2 1.90 14 
Italy 20 19.05 151 
Luxembourg 2 1.90 14 
Netherlands 4 3.81 33 
Portugal 4 3.81 27 
Spain  8 7.62 55 
Sweden 4 3.81 28 
United Kingdom 9 8.41 63 
Total 105 100.00 735 
Panel B: Sample Representativeness 
Sample Banks in 2013   








The table reports summary statistics for all the variables used in our empirical analysis. We also report a short description of the variables. All ratios are shown in 
percentage terms. The sample period is from 2007 to 2013. For each variable, we report the following statistics: number of observations (“Obs”), mean (“Mean”), 
standard deviation (“SD”), minimum value (“Min”) and maximum value (“Max”). The last column of the table reports the source of the data for each variable. All 































 Description Obs Mean SD. Min Max Source 
Dependent Variable for the key hypothesis 
    
 
Public Bailout 1 if the bank was bailed out during the crisis period, and 0 otherwise. 735 0.1537 0.3609 0.0000 1.0000 Mediobanca 
Capital injections 1 if the bank received a public capital injection during the crisis period, and 0 otherwise. 735 0.0517 0.2216 0.0000 1.0000 Mediobanca 
Credit Lines 1 if the bank received a credit line from the government during the crisis period. 735 0.0327 0.1778 0.0000 1.0000 Mediobanca 
Guarantees 1 if the bank received a guarantee from the government during the crisis period. 735 0.1075 0.3099 0.0000 1.0000 Mediobanca 
Public funds (Capital 
Injections) 
Amount of the capital injection received by the bank scaled by total assets. 705 0.1627 1.3848 0.0000 33.3800 Authors’ 
calculation 
Public funds (Credit lines) Amount of the credit line received by the bank scaled by total assets. 705 0.1656 2.3490 0.0000 59.6533 Authors’ 
calculation 
Public funds (Guarantees) Amount of the guarantee received by the bank scaled by total assets. 705 0.6864 2.9181 0.0000 30.2263 Authors’ 
calculation 
Dependent Variables used to explore the mechanism       
Tobin Market Value of equity plus the face value of debt divided by the book value of equity plus the face value of debt. 674 0.9936 0.8957 0.0375 6.3000 Authors’ 
calculation 
NPL Ratio (%) Non-performing loans to total loans. 714 5.2693 6.6500 0.0000 33.9530 Bankscope 
Z-score (ln) Natural log of the sum of return on assets (ROA) and the capital assets ratio divided by standard deviation of ROA. 664 3.0694 1.2249 -0.1677 5.7596 Authors’ 
calculation 
DPE (ln) Natural log of dividends paid for a given year divided by bank equity. 705 0.5050 0.9415 -2.7558 2.9548 Authors’ 
calculation 
Potentially Endogenous Explanatory Variable       
Gender Diversity The percentage of female directors on the board. 724 11.8404 10.0067 0.0000 40.0000 Annual Reports 
Instruments       
Female Participation Rate (%)  Female labour force participation (unit: thousands of people) divided by male labour force participation (unit: 
thousands of people) in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. 
666 84.3809 6.9806 69.9805 100.6332 Eurostat 
Female employment rate (%)  Employment rate for women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. 663 79.1751 4.7391 65.5000 88.0000 Eurostat 
Other corporate governance variables 
Female CEO 1 if the bank CEO is female, 0 otherwise. 726 0.0262 0.1598 0.0000 1.0000 Annual Reports 
Board Size Number of board members. 731 13.9207 5.7960 0.0000 34.0000 Annual Reports 
Board Size (ln) Number of board members (ln). 724 2.5622 0.4086 1.3863 3.5264 Authors’ 
calculation 
Board Independence Ratio (%) Proportion of independent directors on the board. 724 50.2464 28.8695 0.0000 100.0000 Annual Reports 
Controls       
Size Logarithm of total assets. 705 17.3016 2.3847 12.0816 21.4275 Bankscope 
Marginal Expected Shortfall Marginal contribution of the bank to the expected shortfall of the financial system in a left-tail scenario. 565 3.0801 1.2920 0.5400 6.3700 V-Stern Lab 
Market-to-Book Ratio Market value of equity divided by book value of equity. 679 0.9906 0.9080 0.0128 6.3408 Authors’ 
calculation 
ROA Net-income to total assets. 708 0.4331 2.2527 -7.2410 13.7400 Bankscope 
Capital Ratio (%) Equity capital to total assets. 705 9.5237 10.9667 1.4490 66.8950 Bankscope 
Tier 1 Ratio (%) Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets. 705 9.7148 6.0960 0.0306 34.9000 Bankscope 
Deposits Ratio Deposits divided by total assets. 674 1.0879 1.3968 0.0296 10.3198 Bankscope 
Widely Held 1 if there is no owner with more than 10% of bank share rights, and zero otherwise. 731 0.2408 0.4278 0 1 Authors’ 
calculation/FactSe
t 
HHI Sum of squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. 694 0.3678 0.3182 0.0167 1.0000 Authors’ 
calculation/FactSe
t 
GDP growth Gross domestic product annual growth rate. 735 -0.2587 2.9132 -8.2690 5.6767 AMECO 
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Table 5. Distribution for Gender Diversity 
The table presents the distribution of female directors. Panel A shows the distribution of female directors by country. 
Panel B reports the distribution of female directors by year. Each panel reports the average number of female directors 
on board (Number of female directors), the maximum number of female directors on board (Max), the average 
percentage of female directors on the board (%), the maximum percentage of female directors on board by country 




Panel A: Distribution of Gender Diversity by country 
Country Number of female directors Max % % Max 
Austria 3 7 13.2458 33.3333 
Belgium 2 4 8.9619 22.2222 
Denmark 2 5 15.7289 41.6666 
Finland 2 4 25.2350 50.0000 
France 3 6 19.1741 45.4545 
Germany 2 7 14.7249 35.0000 
Greece 1 3 7.9831 25.0000 
Ireland 2 3 11.2832 20.0000 
Italy 1 4 5.1705 27.2727 
Luxemburg 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 
Netherlands 1 4 13.8965 33.3333 
Portugal 1 2 4.1363 20.0000 
Spain 1 4 9.5643 25.0000 
Sweden 3 8 25.4536 47.0588 
United Kingdom 2 3 12.3475 27.2727 
Panel B: Distribution of  Gender Diversity by year   
Year(s) Number of female directors Max % %  Max 
2007 1 6 8.6698 37.5000 
2008 1 7 9.8901 41.6666 
2009 1 6 9.7962 36.3636 
2010 2 7 11.5482 45.4545 
2011 2 7 12.2151 41.1764 
2012 2 8 14.6839 47.0588 
2013 2 8 16.5704 50.0000 
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Table 6. T-tests for subsamples of rescued and non-rescued banks. 
We report summary statistics of EU 105 listed banks: mean differences between rescued banks (that is, those that received a bailout) and non-rescued banks (that 
is, those that did not receive a bailout) for the pre-crisis period and post-crisis period. Panel A reports results for the pre-crisis period. Panel B presents these 
statistics for the post-crisis period.  Both panels make a distinction among different kinds of public bailouts – Capital injections, Guarantees, and Credit lines. 
Variances between groups are assumed to be unequal. All variables are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Panel A: Pre-Crisis Period 












lines Significance No Guarantee Guarantee Significance 
Gender Diversity 9.4980 8.2851  8.1791 10.6359 ** 8.8183 8.7879  9.6753 7.7573 * 
Size 16.5667 17.7618 *** 16.7676 18.6562 *** 16.9487 18.4954 *** 17.0522 17.4831 
 
MES 1.9670 1.9663  1.8958 2.1361 * 1.9366 2.0807  2.0997 1.7968 *** 
MTB Ratio 2.0540 1.6839 ** 1.8635 1.8079  1.8625 1.7966  2.0121 1.6351 *** 
Tobin’s Q 2.0420 1.6663 ** 1.8526 1.7813  1.8509 1.7683  1.9991 1.6167 *** 
Deposits Ratio 1.5246 0.7661 *** 1.1766 0.7833 *** 1.1423 0.8066 *** 1.4293 0.6936 *** 
NPL Ratio 1.3941 2.3976 ** 1.6403 2.9243 *** 1.9473 2.0366  1.3987 2.6268 *** 
Z-score (ln) 3.0844 3.0909  3.1878 2.7906 ** 3.0788 3.1259  3.0436 3.1409  
DPE 3.5669 3.7531  3.5924 3.9092  3.3018 5.1971 *** 3.9660 3.3362  
DPE (ln) 0.9111 1.0609  0.9786 1.0503  0.9056 1.3715 *** 0.9909 1.0041  
Panel A: Post-Crisis Period 












lines Significance No Guarantee Guarantee Significance 
Gender Diversity 12.7925 10.3925 *** 12.4416 11.1114  12.4684 9.6671 * 12.7464 9.6676 *** 
Size 17.0887 18.2647 *** 17.2025 18.8646 *** 17.2252 19.1570 *** 17.1943 18.0361 *** 
MES 3.0563 3.8409 *** 3.1332 4.2609 *** 3.1739 3.9429 *** 3.1258 3.7368 *** 
MTB Ratio 0.9376 0.6016 *** 0.8921 0.6626 ** 0.8900 0.5977 ** 0.9205 0.5788 *** 
Tobin’s Q 0.9435 0.6104 *** 0.8980 0.6757 ** 0.8960 0.6080 ** 0.9266 0.5862 *** 
Deposits Ratio 1.1876 0.6924 *** 1.1167 0.7295 *** 1.1090 0.7133 *** 1.1592 0.6651 *** 
NPL  Ratio 5.4168 7.5160 *** 5.6836 7.6171  5.7992 5.6640  5.4691 8.0522 *** 
Z-score (ln) 3.1967 2.6206 *** 3.1573 2.0539 *** 3.1306 2.2528 ** 3.1373 2.7843 ** 
DPE 2.0830 1.3409 ** 2.0830 1.3409  1.9634 1.6241  2.0713 1.0971 *** 
DPE (ln) 0.4637 0.2014 *** 0.4357 0.1102  0.4185 0.3761  0.4542 0.1536 *** 
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Table 7. Gender Diversity and Public Bailouts 
This table shows results of Probit regressions. The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to one if bank i receives a bailout during the sample period 
(2007-2013) and zero otherwise. Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board of bank i at time t. Female Participation Rate is defined as 
the female labour force participation divided by male labour force participation in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Female employment 
rate is defined as the employment rate for women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Size is the log of total 
assets. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5th percentile. MTB Ratio is the market value of equity divided by 
the book value of equity. ROA is net income scaled by total assets. Tobin’s Q is the market value of equity plus the face value of debt divided by the book value of 
equity plus the face value of debt. Capital Ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital over total assets. Tier 1 Ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by 
risk-weighted assets. Deposits Ratio is the ratio of bank customer deposits to total assets. Liquid Assets Ratio is calculated as cash plus marketable securities to 
total assets. Derivatives to Assets Ratio is the amount of bank’s derivatives scaled by total assets. HHI stands for Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated as 
the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate of GDP. US-Mortgage Crisis 
dummy is a dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years 2007 and 2008. EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis a dummy takes the value on one if the 
observation refers to the years from 2010 and 2012. Constant included but not reported. All variables are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. Robust z-




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 






















at the bank 
level 
           
Gender Diversityt-1 -0.0304*** -0.0282*** -0.0299*** -0.0223** -0.0269*** -0.0243** -0.0249*** -0.0301*** -0.0273*** -0.0548** 
 (-3.7165) (-3.3555) (-3.5635) (-2.4695) (-2.7902) (-2.5327) (-3.0351) (-3.2066) (-3.2031) (-2.1731) 
Marginal effects -0.0060 -0.0057 0.0059 -0.0048 -0.0058 -0.0052 -0.0036 -0.0066 -0.0050 -0.0209 
Sizet-1 -0.0231 -0.0444 -0.0255    0.0282 0.0223 -0.0130 -0.0470 
 (-0.5662) (-1.0491) (-0.5709)    (0.5942) (0.3412) (-0.2995) (-0.4934) 
MESt-1    0.2213*** 0.1695** 0.1940**     
    (2.9970) (2.2076) (2.4372)     
MTB Ratiot-1 -0.1089 -5.7644 -0.1498 0.0403 0.0561 -2.2750 -0.3613* -0.2381 -0.1435 -0.1135 
 (-0.8880) (-0.7951) (-1.2458) (0.2476) (0.3495) (-0.2870) (-1.8436) (-0.9872) (-0.9931) (-0.3188) 
ROAt-1 -0.1349**  -0.1374 -0.1395** -0.1705**  -0.3071*** -0.3481*** -0.1691** -0.1199 
 (-2.0929)  (-1.3848) (-2.0009) (-2.4086)  (-3.4654) (-3.7232) (-1.9786) (-0.4167) 
Tobin’s Qt-1  5.6360    2.3162     
  (0.7675)    (0.2900)     
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.0809*** -0.0954** -0.0831***    -0.0827*** -0.0789*** -0.0843*** -0.1501* 
 (-2.7207) (-2.2752) (-3.5931)    (-2.9823) (-2.6331) (-2.7599) (-1.8258) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 -0.0193 -0.0247 -0.0178 -0.0566** -0.0629** -0.0746**   0.0020 0.1004* 
 (-0.7878) (-0.9222) (-0.9075) (-2.4215) (-2.2108) (-2.4136)   (0.0776) (1.6475) 
Deposits Ratio t-1 -0.6340*** -0.5942*** -0.6095*** -0.9004*** -0.8888*** -0.9674*** -0.6365** -0.5494* -0.5855** -0.6977* 
 (-2.6793) (-2.6757) (-2.6854) (-3.0343) (-2.9580) (-3.3056) (-2.1559) (-1.7794) (-2.4464) (-1.8509) 
Liquid Assets Ratiot-1        -0.0096*    
       (-1.9012)    
Derivatives Ratiot-1        -1.8049   
        (-1.1302)   
HHIt-1 -0.7632*** -0.6739** -0.7629***  -0.7250** -0.5221* -0.5721* -0.9710*** -0.7818*** -0.9788 
 (-2.8519) (-2.5725) (-2.5867)  (-2.3368) (-1.6744) (-1.6716) (-2.7186) (-2.7158) (-1.5209) 
GDP growth t-1 0.0101 -0.0029 0.0057 0.0151 0.0224 0.0090 -0.0222 0.0128 -0.0562 -0.2800 
 (0.3146) (-0.0864) (0.0860) (0.3509) (0.5379) (0.2286) (-0.6103) (0.3168) (-1.1121) (-1.6166) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 514 519 514 433 420 420 400 333 514 92 
Banks 96 96 96 78 76 76 76 67 96 92 
US-Mortgage Crisis No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
EU-Sovereign Crisis No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year FEs No No No No No No No No Yes No 
Cluster S.E. Bank Bank Country Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank N/A 
 154 
Table 8. Gender Diversity and Public Bailouts: IV-Probit regressions 
This table shows results of IV Probit regressions used to predict bank bailouts. The dependent variable is an indicator 
variable equal to one if bank i receives a bailout during the sample period (2007-2013) and zero otherwise. Gender 
Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board of bank i at time t. Female Participation Rate is defined 
as the female labour force participation divided by male labour force participation in the NUTS 2 region where the 
bank’s headquarter is located. Female employment rate is defined as the employment rate for women with tertiary 
education in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Size is the log of total assets. MES is the 
marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5th percentile. MTB Ratio is the market 
value of equity divided by the book value of equity. ROA is net income scaled by total assets. Tobin’s Q is the market 
value of equity plus the face value of debt divided by the book value of equity plus the face value of debt. Capital 
Ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital over total assets. Tier 1 Ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital divided 
by risk-weighted assets. Deposits Ratio is the ratio of bank customer deposits to total assets. HHI stands for 
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated as the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded 
shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate of GDP. US-Mortgage Crisis dummy is a 
dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years 2007 and 2008. EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis a 
dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years from 2010 and 2012. Constant included but not 
reported. Cragg-Donald test refers to the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic. Kleibergen-Paap test refers to the Kleibergen-
Paap Wald rank F statistic. All variables are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at 




Panel A: Second Stage     
Variables Baseline IV-1 Baseline IV-2 Alternative IV-1 Alternative IV-2 Collapsed IV-1 
Collapsed IV-
2 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Gender Diversityt-1 -0.0790*** -0.0700*** -0.0753*** -0.0762*** -0.0989** -0.1202***  
(-5.2355) (-4.0700) (-4.1761) (-3.6735) (-2.3707) (-3.0756) 
Marginal effects -0.0169 -0.0150 -0.0182 -0.0188 -0.0383 -0.0468 
Sizet-1 0.0653 0.0580  
 
-0.0358 -0.0246  
(1.4162) (1.1758)  
 
(-0.3409) (-0.2433) 
MESt-1   0.2106*** 0.2141**   
   (2.5823) (2.5258)   
MTB Ratiot-1 -0.0873 -0.0775 0.9237 1.1302 0.0034 0.0385 
 (-0.6169) (-0.5504) (0.1093) (0.1337) (0.0096) (0.1160) 
ROAt-1 -0.0143 -0.0073   0.0818 0.1610 
 (-0.2086) (-0.1059)   (0.2619) (0.5454) 
Tobin’s Qt-1   -0.8524 -1.0593   
   (-0.0998) (-0.1243)   
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.1266*** -0.1106***  
 
-0.1742* -0.1706**  
(-3.5014) (-3.2087)  
 
(-1.9420) (-2.0044) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 -0.0137 -0.0256 -0.0438 -0.0497* 0.0815 0.0720 
 (-0.5807) (-1.0792) (-1.5426) (-1.7385) (1.1794) (1.0992) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 -0.5159** -0.5069** -0.9334*** -0.8818*** -0.7436** -0.7048**  
(-2.5401) (-2.4618) (-3.6017) (-3.3907) (-2.0124) (-2.0734) 
HHIt-1   -0.7710** -0.8006** -0.7288 -0.6803 
   (-2.2115) (-2.2998) (-0.9987) (-0.9753) 
GDP growtht-1 0.0329 0.0300 0.0381 0.0385 -0.2070 -0.1447  
(0.9523) (0.8020) (1.0699) (1.0161) (-1.0776) (-0.7519) 
Observations 482 479 384 381 82 82 
Banks 90 90 70 70 82 82 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
EU-Sovereign Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank N/A N/A 
Panel B: First Stage        

























Sizet-1 0.8424*** 1.2777***  
 
0.7091* 1.2853***  
(2.6773) (3.4289)  
 
(1.7213) (2.7768) 
MESt-1   0.7055 1.6889***   
   (1.3258) (2.9135)   
MTB Ratiot-1 1.2884** 1.3298** 53.1960* 55.1526* 1.6160 1.6883 
 (2.3593) (2.2605) (1.9052) (1.8678) (1.5361) (1.5498) 
ROAt-1 -0.0902 -0.4576   0.8212 1.4064* 
 (-0.2773) (-1.1537)   (0.9680) (1.6470) 
Tobin’s Qt-1   -52.7997* -54.6916*   
   (-1.8447) (-1.8117)   
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.0915 0.0180  
 
-0.0461 -0.0277  
(-0.6991) (0.1067)  
 
(-0.3018) (-0.1723) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 0.2259*** 0.2735*** 0.2687** 0.2958** 0.1353 0.1341 
 (2.7708) (2.7958) (2.4292) (2.1206) (0.8187) (0.7822) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 -0.3870 -0.3800 -0.3697 -0.5855** -0.5339 -0.6432  
(-0.9877) (-0.9711) (-1.2201) (-2.0023) (-1.0720) (-1.2514) 
HHIt-1   -6.8429*** -5.0022* 0.4186 2.9235 
   (-2.7988) (-1.9361) (0.1544) (1.0157) 
GDP growtht-1 0.3169** 0.3856*** 0.3080** 0.3604*** 0.2815 -0.0430  
(2.5473) (3.5891) (2.2352) (3.0126) (0.4280) (-0.0587) 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
EU-Sovereign Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes No No 
Wald exogeneity test 9.903 6.092 7.806 5.420 0.864 1.873 
(Prob>Chi-Squared) 0.00165 0.0136 0.00521 0.0199 0.353 0.171 
Cragg-Donald test 122.6 73.36 101.3 53.44 21.43 15.46 
Kleibergen-Paap test 30.44 27.24 27.81 19.25 N/A N/A 
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Table 9. Timing of Public Bailout and Gender Diversity 
The table shows the results of Cox (1972) and Weibull regressions (Column 5) where the dependent variable is the 
probability that a bank receives a bailout since the start of the financial crisis (2007). Predictors are expressed in 
average and calculated across the pre-crisis period. The variable of our interest is Gender Diversity. The controls are 
Size, Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Ratio, Deposits Ratio, CEO female Dummy, Board Independence Ratio, and Board Size. 
CEO female Dummy is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the CEO is a woman, and zero otherwise. 
Board Independence Ratio is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Board Size (ln) is the natural 
logarithm of the number of board members. In Column 5 and in Column 6, we estimate the Cox hazard model (1972) 
using a duration based on the number of days. Regressions include also country fixed-effects (Country FE). We report 
the Hazard Ratio for ease of the interpretation. PH test stands for the Schoenfeld residuals test (Schoenfeld, 1982). 

























Proportional Hazard Models     












Gender Diversityprecrisis 0.9487*** 0.9487*** 0.9537*** 0.9002** 0.9806**  
(-3.1067) (-3.1100) (-2.7380) (-2.5538) (-2.3058) 
Bank-specific controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
CEO female Dummy No Yes No No No 
Board size (ln) – Board 
Independence Ratio 
No No Yes No No 







Intercept No No No No Yes 
PH-test (Chi-Squared) 8.56 8.56 8.61 38.45*** (N/A) 
Rescued banks 47 47 47 50 50 
Banks 105 105 105 105 105 
Duration Years Years Years Days Days 
Log-Likelihood -133.10 -133.10 -132.54 -116.90 -51.71 
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Table 18. Censored Regression Models: Amount of Public Bailouts and Gender Diversity. 
 
This table shows results of IV-Tobit models (Panel A) and Panel Data Censored Regression Models (Panel B) with 
bank fixed effects (Honorè, 1992). The dependent variables are: Capital Injections, Credit Lines, Guarantees. Capital 
Injections is the amount of equity capital injections for bank i in year t, scaled by total assets. Credit Lines is the 
amount of credit lines for bank i in year t, scaled by total assets. Guarantees is the amount of guarantees for bank i in 
year t, scaled by total assets. Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board of the bank i’s at 
time t. The control variables are: MES, Tobin’s Q, Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Ratio, Deposits Ratio, HHI, GDP growth, US-
Mortgage Crisis, and Sovereign Debt Crisis. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market 
return is below its 5th percentile. Tobin’s Q is calculated as the Market Value of equity plus the face value of debt 
divided by the book value of equity plus the face value of debt. Capital Ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital over 
total assets. Tier 1 is the ratio between the regulatory capital and the risk-weighted assets. Deposits Ratio is the 
proportion of the bank customer deposits to total assets. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate of GDP at 
market prices based on constant local currency.  US-Mortgage Crisis dummy is a dummy takes the value on one if the 
observation refers to the years 2007 and 2008. EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis a dummy takes the value on one if the 
observation refers to the years from 2010 and 2012. For Panel A, all control variables are lagged by one year. For 
Panel B, the variables are not lagged, because this would be inconsistent with the assumptions of the model. Constant 
included but not reported. All variables are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at 
bank-level. Robust z-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Panel A: IV Tobit Regressions 












Gender Diversityt-1 -0.3237** -0.2998** -0.1199* -0.2004*** -0.9458*** -0.8922** 
 (-2.3625) (-2.3608) (-1.7083) (-3.0464) (-3.4701) (-2.4856) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 378 375 378 375 378 375 
Banks 70 70 70 70 70 70 
First stage results 
Female Participation Ratet-1 0.5348***  0.5348***  0.5348***  
 (3.9044)  (3.9044)  (3.9044)  
Female employment ratet-1  0.7069***  0.7069***  0.7069*** 
  (4.3279)  (4.3279)  (4.3279) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 378 375 378 375 378 375 
Banks 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Panel B: Panel Tobit Regressions (Honorè, 1992) 





Gender Diversity -0.1039**  -0.1056**  -0.3855  
 (-2.1044)  (-2.5187)  (-0.8367)  
Controls YES  YES  YES  
Observations 428  428  428  
Bank FE Yes  Yes  Yes  
Banks 77  77  77  
Chi-Squared 69.22  669.81  51.12  
Fraction Censored 0.08  0.05  0.14  
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Table 11. The mechanism 
This table shows results of IV regressions where the dependent variables are proxies for bank profitability, bank’s risk 
and, dividend payout ratios. Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board of bank i at time t. Female 
Participation Rate is defined as the female labour force participation divided by male labour force participation in the 
NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Female employment rate is defined as the employment rate for 
women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Size is the log of Total 
Assets. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5th percentile. Capital 
Ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital over total assets. Tier 1 Ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by 
risk-weighted assets. Deposits Ratio is the ratio of bank customer deposits to total assets. Widely Held is a dummy equal 
to one if there is no owner with more than 10% of bank share rights and zero otherwise. HHI stands for Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index and is calculated as the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. 
GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate of GDP. US-Mortgage Crisis dummy is a dummy takes the value on one if 
the observation refers to the years 2007 and 2008. EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis a dummy takes the value on one if the 
observation refers to the years from 2010 and 2012. Cragg-Donald test refers to the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic. 
Kleibergen-Paap test refers to the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic. Constant included but not reported. All variables 
are wisorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at bank-level. Robust z-statistics are reported in 






































Panel A: Second Stage 
Variables Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q ROA ROA NPL Ratio NPL Ratio DPE (ln) DPE (ln) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                  
Gender Diversityt-1 0.0208 0.0308 0.0724** 0.0792* -0.5386*** -0.8526*** 0.0287 0.0568** 
 (0.9260) (1.0838) (2.1391) (1.8222) (-3.0627) (-4.0373) (1.2668) (2.2233) 
Sizet-1     0.5200* 0.7276**    
    (1.9418) (2.1634)   
MES t-1 -0.0552 -0.0696 -0.1452* -0.1590*   -0.0306 -0.0606 
 (-1.1187) (-1.2298) (-1.8776) (-1.9013)   (-0.5982) (-0.9092) 
Capital Ratiot-1 0.0044 0.0087 0.1211*** 0.1238*** -0.2682* -0.3929** 0.0373*** 0.0502***  
(0.2944) (0.6004) (3.1069) (2.9187) (-1.8635) (-1.9704) (2.7537) (3.3425) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 -0.0395 -0.0434 -0.0262 -0.0305 0.1954** 0.2760** -0.0195 -0.0281  
(-1.1596) (-1.1915) (-1.2957) (-1.5423) (2.1056) (2.0992) (-0.8226) (-1.1573) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 0.2438* 0.2399* 0.0971* 0.0940 -0.6326** -0.5412 0.0351 0.0255 
 (1.8746) (1.8826) (1.6899) (1.6240) (-2.3207) (-1.4576) (0.6011) (0.4854) 
Widely Heldt-1 -0.2229 -0.1689 0.1157 0.1744 0.4295 -0.6776 -0.1310 0.0068 
 (-1.6402) (-1.1875) (0.4992) (0.5500) (0.3430) (-0.4239) (-0.8165) (0.0323) 
HHIt-1 -0.1433 -0.0229 -0.1512 -0.0593 3.0877 0.8338 -0.4763 -0.1483  
(-0.3900) (-0.0640) (-0.2543) (-0.0845) (1.1167) (0.2574) (-1.5066) (-0.3873) 
GDP growtht-1 -0.0100 -0.0127 0.0564 0.0563 -0.0324 0.1240 0.0075 -0.0039 
 (-0.8370) (-0.9617) (1.5079) (1.4887) (-0.2092) (0.8261) (0.5334) (-0.2464) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 429 425 441 437 532 528 440 436 
Banks 71 71 72 72 88 88 72 72 
R-squared 0.238 0.224 0.005 -0.031 -0.173 -0.871 0.165 0.055 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: First Stage 
         









         








Sizet-1     0.5204 0.9883***   
     (1.6200) (2.8000)   
MESt-1 0.4333 1.3211** 0.5897 1.3504**   0.5812*** 1.3493** 
 (0.8000) (2.2100) (1.0600) (2.2800)   (1.0400) (2.2800) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.3022 -0.4136* -0.3143 -0.4216* -0.2691 -0.2972* -0.3086 -0.4155* 
 (-1.3800) (-1.8500) (-1.4000) (-1.8400) (-1.6400) (-1.8400) (-1.3700) (-1.8200) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 0.2545** 0.3066** 0.2634** 0.3101 0.2581** 0.3237** 0.2599** 0.3060** 
 (2.1700) (2.1000) (2.2000) (2.1200) (2.1700) (2.5400) (2.1700) (2.0900) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 0.2265 0.0581 0.2094 0.0632 0.1553 0.1904 0.2130 0.0645 
 (0.5800) (0.1600) (0.5300) (0.1700) (0.4000) (0.4800) (0.5300) (0.1800) 
Widely Heldt-1 -1.1760 -2.5443 -1.7527 -2.9972 -1.3759 -2.6093* -1.6955 -2.9259 
 (-0.7100) (-1.3300) (-1.0700) (-1.6300) (-1.0500) (-1.7900) (-1.0400) (-1.5900) 
HHIt-1 -8.6242*** -8.0487** -8.2856*** -8.0040*** -5.0270** -4.3470* -8.2059*** -7.8800*** 
 (-2.9800) (-2.6100) (-2.9500) (-2.7100) (-2.3200) (3.0600) (2.9100) (-2.6600) 
GDP growtht-1 0.3650*** 0.3417*** 0.3486** 0.3284*** 0.3438*** 0.3395* 0.3428** 0.3206*** 
 (2.6500) (2.8600) (2.5700) (2.7200) (2.7400) (3.0600) (2.5100) (2.6400) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 429 425 441 437 528 528 440 436 
Banks 71 71 72 72 88 88 72 72 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
Cragg-Donald test 61.55 48.92 54.76 44.88 78.49 74.49 55.26 45.71 






Table 12. 3SLS regressions 
This table reports the results for 3SLS regressions investigating the mechanism underlying the relationship between Gender Diversity and public bailouts. The controls include: 
Widely Held, MES, Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Ratio, HHI, GDP growth, US-Mortgage Crisis Dummy, and EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis.  Except for Bailout and Widely Held, all controls 























DPE(ln) ROA t-1 Gender 
Diversityt-1 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
                          
ROAt-1 -0.6065*** 
     
0.8154***      
 (-4.3285) 
     
(3.0766)      
NPL Ratiot-1 
   
0.0699*** 
  
   -0.0910***   
 
   
(4.7609) 
  











  -0.4826*** 
(-5.2375) 
 









(3.3893)   (3.7848)   (3.4062) 









(6.9222)   (5.0291)   (6.8284) 
 
      
      
Observations 486 486 486 486 486 486 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Figure 3. Average Gender Diversity over the sample period.
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Supplementary Appendix A. Correlations 
 
The table shows pairwise correlations among the main explanatory variables.  
 
Pairwise correlations 
             
Variables 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
             
Gender Diversity (1) 1 
          
Size (2) 0.1953*** 1 
         
MES (3) 0.1033** 0.5001*** 1 
        
MTB Ratio (4) 0.0626 -0.268*** -0.2121*** 1 
       
ROA (5) 0.1009*** -0.2096*** -0.2451*** 0.3108*** 1 
      
Tobin (6) 0.0662* -0.2727*** -0.2105*** 0.9999*** 0.3140*** 1 
     
Capital Ratio (7) -0.0602 -0.5459*** -0.1951*** 0.1224*** 0.4945*** 0.1247*** 1 
    
Deposits Ratio (8) -0.0599 -0.2835*** -0.0061 0.3124*** 0.0872** 0.3117*** 0.1033*** 1 
   
Tier 1 Ratio (9) 0.0951** -0.0249 0.0436 -0.1479*** -0.0807** -0.1470*** -0.1466*** -0.0772** 1 
  
HHI (10) -0.1318*** -0.2244*** -0.2478*** -0.0452 -0.0162 -0.0437 0.0314 0.1506*** 0.0553 1 
 
























Supplementary Appendix B. Wilcoxon Tests 
This table reports Wilcoxon-Test for rescued banks and non-rescued banks. Panel A reports results for the pre-crisis period and Panel B for the post-crisis period.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Rescued and Non-rescued banks: An overview 
Panel A: Pre-Crisis Period 
 Public Bailouts 
 Bailout Capital Injections Credit Lines Guarantees  
Variables Z-statistic Significance Z-statistic Significance Z-statistic Significance Z-statistic Significance 
Gender Diversity 0.9242  -2.4435 ** -0.5046  1.7654 * 
Size -3.6983 *** -5.5732 *** -4.0545 *** -1.1170  
Deposits (%TA) 2.5278 ** 0.6893  0.5157  4.5847 *** 
NPL Ratio -5.4208 *** -4.4377 *** -2.5489 ** -5.0455 *** 
Z-score (ln) -0.1400  2.4657 ** -0.1094  -0.9385  
Tobin’s Q 1.4993  -0.6718  -0.2343  2.0721 ** 
MES -0.1168  -2.0783 ** -1.3244  2.5870 *** 
DPE -1.1159  -0.6862  -3.1442 *** 0.0328  
DPE (ln) -1.2550  -0.6637  -3.2267 *** -0.0394  
MTB Ratio 1.4248  -0.8305  0.3931  1.9955 ** 
Panel B: Post-Crisis Period 
 Public Bailouts 
 Bailout Capital Injections Credit Lines Guaranteess 
Variables Z-statistic Significance Z-statistic Significance Z-statistic Significance Z-statistic Significance 
Gender Diversity 1.8645 * 0.6231  1.0799  2.1842 ** 
Size -4.6945 *** -4.110674 *** -3.837331 *** -2.908283 *** 
Deposits (%TL) 4.6287 *** 0.9122  1.3173  4.8121 *** 
NPL Ratio 4.0988 *** 4.3770 *** 2.5534 ** 2.5250 ** 
Z-score (ln) 4.2992 *** 1.2603  2.3045 ** 3.8869 *** 
Tobin’s Q -5.2207 *** -4.7754 *** -2.9363 *** -3.4732 *** 
MES 3.0659 *** 1.5162  1.2229  3.2586 *** 
DPE 2.7038 *** 1.3821  0.4547  2.9522 *** 
DPE (ln) 4.2665 *** 1.2829  2.3110 ** 3.8425 *** 













Supplementary Appendix C. Impact of gender-quotas programs     
The table shows the change in the number of sample banks that satisfy the gender-quota (if any) before and after the implementation of gender-quotas programs in EU-15 countries. 
In most cases, the rules are applicable only to state-owned companies. In some cases, listed companies are considered, or large firms. For more details, see: Legal Instruments for 
Gender Quotas in Management Boards.67 For cases where the implementation stage evolves over two phases, we consider only the phases that end within our sample period. If the 
implementation started before the start of our sample period, we report the number of banks above the quota as “Banks above quota post-program”. 
                                               
67 This document can be found at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/workshop/join/2013/474413/IPOL-FEMM_AT(2013)474413_EN.pdf 
Country Gender Quotas Implementation Year Targeted organisations Banks above quota pre-program Banks above quota post-program D no. 




companies 1 1 0 
Belgium 33% 2012 (state-owned companies) 2016 (listed companies) 
State-owned and listed 
companies 0 0 0 
Denmark 30% 2000 Only state-owned companies - 3 - 
Finland 20% 2005 Only state-owned companies - 1 - 









7 7 0 
Ireland 40% 2004 Only state-owned companies - 0 - 









1 7 6 
Netherlands 30% 2016 




1 - - 
Spain 40% 2015 
Public limited 
companies with 
> 250 employees. 
0 - - 
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Supplementary Appendix D. Main studies on the impact of gender diversity on performance, risk, and dividend policy. 
 
Selected literature  
Authors Sample Method Dependent Variable Main independent Variable Main findings 
    Panel A: Performance  
Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) 
US sample of 1,939 listed non-





Tobin's Q (ln) Proportion of female directors Proportion of female directors is negatively related to firm 
profitability. 
Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012) 
All public limited Norwegian firms 
traded on the Oslo Stock Exchange 
(2001-2009) 
DID estimator Tobin's Q Proportion of female directors Introduction of the gender-quota in Norway in 2003 
determined both younger and less experienced board and a 
deterioration of firm's profitability 







ROA, ROS Proportion of female directors Positive relationship between the proportion of female 
directors and firm profitability.  
Adams and 
Ragunathan (2015) 
US-listed BHC companies and 
commercial banks (2006-2009)  
 
OLS, IV(s) Tobin’s Q, ROA Proportion of female directors Banks with a higher proportion of female directors perform 
better (for Tobin’s Q).  
Panel B: Risk 
Berger et al. (2014) German sample of 2,490 small and 
medium-sized banks (1994-2010) 
DID 
estimation 
Risk Weighted Assets to total 
assets/Total Assets,  
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index  
for loan portfolio  
Proportion of female executives Female executives have less expertise than their male-peers. 
More gender-diverse executive teams increase bank portfolio 
risk. 




Proxies for equity risk, 
systematic risk, and 
idiosyncratic risk 
Proportion of female directors There exists no relationship between female boardroom 
representation and equity risk. Similar evidences are reported 
for BHCs. 
Panel C: Dividend Policy 
Chen et al. (2017) US sample of 1,691 firms (1997-
2011) 
IV estimation Dividends/Equity, 
Dividends/Total Assets 




Supplementary Appendix E.  Gender diversity, corporate governance mechanisms, and bank 
profitability 
This table shows results of IV regressions where the dependent variables are proxies for bank profitability. Gender 
Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board of bank i at time t. Female participation rate is defined as the 
female labour force participation divided by male labour force participation in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s 
headquarter is located. Female employment rate is defined as the employment rate for women with tertiary education in 
the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Female CEO is a dummy variable takes on value 1 whether 
the CEO is female, and 0 otherwise. Board size is the logarithm of board members. Board Independence ratio is measured 
as the proportion of independent directors on the total board. Size is the log of total assets. MES is the marginal expected 
shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5th percentile. Capital Ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital 
over total assets. Tier 1 Ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Deposits Ratio is 
the ratio of bank customer deposits to total assets. Widely Held is a dummy variable equal to one if there is no owner with 
more than 10% of bank share rights, and zero otherwise. HHI stands for Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated 
as the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP. US-Mortgage Crisis dummy is a dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years 
2007 and 2008. EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis a dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years from 
2010 and 2012. Cragg-Donald test refers to the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic. Kleibergen-Paap test refers to the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic. Constant included but not reported. All variables are winsorised at the 1th and 99th 
percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 






























































Panel A: Second Stage  
Tobin’s Tobin’s ROA ROA Tobin Tobin ROA ROA 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)          
Gender Diversityt-1 0.0212 0.0326 0.0760** 0.0864* 0.0119 0.0125 0.0763** 0.0864  
(0.8887) (1.0295) (2.0885) (1.7706) (0.5174) (0.4762) (2.0211) (1.5900) 
Female CEOt-1 -0.0660 -0.1619 -0.5689 -0.6493 
    
 
(-0.2619) (-0.5036) (-1.5601) (-1.4497) 
    
Board Size (ln)t-1 
    
-0.4467* -0.4970* -0.1017 -0.1278      
(-1.7832) (-1.9129) (-0.4337) (-0.4736) 
Board Independence Ratiot-1 
    
0.0007 0.0010 -0.0026 -0.0030      
(0.3127) (0.4447) (-0.6838) (-0.6475) 
MESt-1 -0.0552 -0.0702 -0.1458* -0.1625* -0.0507 -0.0644 -0.1469* -0.1633*  
(-1.1166) (-1.2167) (-1.8606) (-1.8775) (-0.9563) (-1.1541) (-1.7888) (-1.7509) 
Capital Ratiot-1 0.0044 0.0090 0.1212*** 0.1254*** -0.0083 -0.0100 0.1201*** 0.1237***  
(0.2943) (0.6241) (3.0513) (2.8137) (-0.4556) (-0.5325) (3.0461) (2.7564) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 -0.0392 -0.0430 -0.0242 -0.0291 -0.0390 -0.0418 -0.0280 -0.0333  
(-1.1778) (-1.2036) (-1.2123) (-1.4650) (-1.1736) (-1.1798) (-1.3120) (-1.5421) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 0.2435* 0.2390* 0.0951 0.0906 0.2079* 0.2024* 0.0854 0.0787  
(1.8798) (1.8917) (1.6345) (1.5332) (1.7229) (1.6958) (1.4124) (1.2743) 
Widely Heldt-1 -0.2250 -0.1707 0.1004 0.1714 -0.2381 -0.2092 0.1522 0.2296  
(-1.6391) (-1.1912) (0.4338) (0.5260) (-1.4891) (-1.3720) (0.6422) (0.6411) 
HHIt-1 -0.1449 -0.0174 -0.1619 -0.0346 -0.2312 -0.2161 -0.1740 -0.0510  
(-0.3947) (-0.0483) (-0.2708) (-0.0477) (-0.5804) (-0.5785) (-0.2824) (-0.0684) 
GDP growtht-1 -0.0100 -0.0133 0.0557 0.0540 -0.0085 -0.0054 0.0594 0.0583  
(-0.8304) (-0.9449) (1.4793) (1.4075) (-0.8297) (-0.5083) (1.5862) (1.5008) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 429 425 441 437 429 425 441 437 
R-squared 0.238 0.220 -0.010 -0.070 0.271 0.278 -0.013 -0.071 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: First Stage          









         













Female CEOt-1 6.3850** 5.3127** 6.5202** 5.5030**     
 (2.4193) (2.2808) (2.4992) (2.3611)     
Board Size (ln)t-1     -1.2245 -0.6952 -0.9097 -0.4320 
     (-0.5749) (-0.3346) (-0.4287) (-0.2074) 
Board Independence Ratiot-1     0.0383 0.0296 0.0403 0.0310 
     (1.5549) (1.0739) (1.6512) (1.1456) 
MESt-1 0.4185 1.2673** 0.5731 1.2975** 0.4350 1.2050* 0.5928 1.2481** 
 (0.7714) (2.0992) (1.0349) (2.1745) (0.7641) (1.9620) (1.0305) (2.0667) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.2901 -0.4017* -0.3024 -0.4096* -0.3302 -0.4269* -0.3349 -0.4284* 
 (-1.3261) (-1.7865) (-1.3475) (-1.7785) (-1.5319) (-1.9694) (-1.5180) (-1.9270) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 0.2206* 0.2762* 0.2294* 0.2792* 0.2537** 0.2974* 0.2637** 0.3028** 
 (1.8998) (1.8847) (1.9448) (1.9017) (2.1024) (1.9905) (2.1576) (2.0222) 
Deposits Ratio t-1 0.2398 0.0818 0.2239 0.0876 0.1539 0.0493 0.1619 0.0738 
 (0.6026) (0.2223) (0.5563) (0.2365) (0.3539) (0.1181) (0.3663) (0.1746) 
Widely Heldt-1 -0.9312 -2.3411 -1.5049 -2.7874 -1.6332 -2.8451 -2.1994 -3.2954* 
 (-0.5648) (-1.2138) (-0.9267) (-1.4989) (-0.9787) (-1.4566) (-1.3547) (-1.7695) 
HHIt-1 -8.1399*** -7.7674** -7.8205*** -7.7210** -8.0127** -7.8195** -7.5472** -7.6480** 
 (-2.8302) (-2.5037) (-2.8028) (-2.5982) (-2.4589) (-2.4577) (-2.3624) (-2.4998) 
GDP growtht-1 0.3579** 0.3402*** 0.3425** 0.3272*** 0.2982** 0.3071** 0.2775** 0.2890** 
 (2.6300) (2.8239) (2.5528) (2.6918) (2.2889) (2.6279) (2.1753) (2.4393) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 429 425 441 437 429 425 441 437 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
Cragg-Donald test 56.93 42.25 50.31 38.44 47.67 31.79 41.97 28.93 
Kleibergen-Paap test 12.98 16.35 11.02 14.82 11.66 10.92 9.812 10.04 
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Supplementary Appendix F. Gender diversity and alternative measures of bank risk 
This table shows results of the relation between gender diversity and bank risk. Gender Diversity is the percentage of 
female directors on the board of bank i at time t. Female participation rate is defined as the female labour force 
participation divided by male labour force participation in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. 
Female employment rate is defined as the employment rate for women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 region 
where the bank’s headquarter is located. Size is the log of total assets. Capital Ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital 
over total assets. Tier 1 Ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Deposits Ratio is 
the ratio of bank customer deposits to total assets. Widely Held is a dummy variable equal to one if there is no owner with 
more than 10% of bank share rights, and zero otherwise. HHI stands for Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated 
as the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP. US-Mortgage Crisis dummy is a dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years 
2007 and 2008. EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis a dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years from 
2010 and 2012. Cragg-Donald test refers to the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic. Kleibergen-Paap test refers to the 
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic. Constant included but not reported. All variables are winsorised at the 1th and 99th 
percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 





















































Panel A: Second Stage       
Variables Z-score Z-score Z-score (ln) Z-score (ln) Volatility Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
      
Gender Diversityt-1 -0.0317 2.3467* 0.0184 0.0525* -0.0023** -0.0049** 
 (-0.0389) (1.7228) (0.8085) (1.8088) (-2.0685) (-2.5649) 
Size t-1 -1.1555 -2.7708 -0.0012 -0.0224 0.0050** 0.0067**  
(-0.5132) (-0.9710) (-0.0225) (-0.3645) (2.2150) (2.2898) 
Capital Ratiot-1 0.7212 1.6040 0.0314 0.0441* -0.0018* -0.0027**  
(0.9224) (1.4635) (1.4630) (1.7049) (-1.7410) (-1.9744) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 0.2843 -0.2385 -0.0102 -0.0173 -0.0003 0.0002  
(0.4677) (-0.2919) (-0.5742) (-0.8313) (-0.3362) (0.2610) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 -0.9819 -1.6694 -0.0096 -0.0184 -0.0005 0.0001  
(-0.4880) (-0.6190) (-0.2103) (-0.3279) (-0.3978) (0.0306) 
Widely Heldt-1 -17.6006** -9.7159 -0.1363 -0.0293 0.0059 -0.0018  
(-2.4149) (-1.1603) (-0.6820) (-0.1267) (0.5483) (-0.1261) 
HHIt-1 -26.9677* -10.1990 -0.2260 0.0187 -0.0139 -0.0320  
(-1.8299) (-0.5973) (-0.5705) (0.0402) (-0.9980) (-1.6403) 
GDP growtht-1 1.2695 0.1460 0.0232 0.0044 0.0009 0.0023*  
(1.2695) (0.1440) (1.0397) (0.1965) (0.7881) (1.7312) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 512 508 502 498 507 503 
R-squared 0.067 -0.090 0.029 -0.090 0.040 -0.209 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Panel B: First Stage 
      
       

























Sizet-1 0.4986 0.9851*** 0.5231 1.0491*** 0.5927* 1.0628*** 
 (1.5506) (2.7723) (1.6142) (2.9428) (1.8353) (3.0005) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.2631 -0.2787* -0.2450 -0.2554 -0.2475 -0.2544 
 (-1.6020) (-1.7367) (-1.4948) (-1.6058) (-1.5588) (-1.6545) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 0.2353* 0.3064** 0.2405* 0.3209** 0.2395** 0.2917** 
 (1.9315) (2.3462) (1.9728) (2.4667) (2.0859) (2.3516) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 0.1225 0.1970 0.1264 0.2102 0.1648 0.1848 
 (0.3153) (0.5017) (0.3289) (0.5386) (0.4251) (0.4753) 
Widely Heldt-1 -1.2758 -2.4417 -1.2095 -2.3909 -1.3885 -2.4955 
 (-0.9574) (-1.6461) (-0.9064) (-1.6189) (-1.0216) (-1.6479) 
HHIt-1 -4.9109** -4.4243* -4.9614** -4.3418* -5.0609** -4.0099* 
 (-2.0966) (-1.8669) (-2.1000) (-1.8290) (-2.2783) (-1.7265) 
GDP growtht-1 0.3629*** 0.3361*** 0.4191*** 0.3975*** 0.3480** 0.3402*** 
 (2.7922) (2.8974) (3.2035) (3.5387) (2.5958) (2.8641) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 512 508 502 498 507 503 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank Bank 
Cragg-Donald test 72.91 72.39 77.81 80.78 66.70 63.13 
Kleibergen-Paap test 14.76 26.46 15.73 31.33 13.68 23.24 
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Supplementary Appendix G. Gender diversity, corporate governance mechanisms, and bank 
risk. 
This table shows results of the relation between gender diversity and bank’s risk, considering control variables related to 
the corporate governance mechanism. Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the board of bank i at 
time t. Female participation rate is defined as the female labour force participation divided by male labour force 
participation in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Female employment rate is defined as the 
employment rate for women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Female 
CEO is a dummy variable takes on value 1 whether the CEO is female, and 0 otherwise. Board size is the logarithm of 
board members. Board Independence ratio is measured as the proportion of independent directors on the total board. Size 
is the log of total assets. Capital Ratio is the ratio of bank equity capital over total assets. Tier 1 Ratio is the ratio of Tier 
1 regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Deposits Ratio is the ratio of bank customer deposits to total assets. 
Widely Held is a dummy variable equal to one if there is no owner with more than 10% of bank share rights, and zero 
otherwise. HHI stands for Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated as the sum of the squared ownership shares for 
all recorded shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate of GDP. US-Mortgage Crisis dummy 
is a dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years 2007 and 2008. EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis a 
dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years from 2010 and 2012. Cragg-Donald test refers to the 
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic. Kleibergen-Paap test refers to the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic. Constant 
included but not reported. All variables are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at the 
















































Panel A: Second Stage     
 NPL Ratio NPL Ratio NPL Ratio NPL Ratio 
          
Gender Diversityt-1 -0.5627*** -0.9137*** -0.5890*** -1.0346***  
(-2.9458) (-3.9238) (-2.6843) (-3.3746) 
Female CEOt-1 4.1984* 7.5954***    
(1.8921) (2.7385)   
Board Size (ln)t-1   -1.3590 -3.2751  
  (-0.6197) (-1.1469) 
Board Independence Ratiot-1   0.0065 0.0274  
  (0.3513) (0.9597) 
Size t-1 0.5375** 0.7739** 0.6708* 1.1035**  
(1.9718) (2.1851) (1.7800) (2.3575) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.2641* -0.3919* -0.2878* -0.4664**  
(-1.8187) (-1.9026) (-1.8435) (-1.9908) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 0.1865** 0.2648** 0.2191* 0.3548**  
(2.0151) (1.9640) (1.9295) (2.0911) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 -0.6270** -0.5247 -0.7023** -0.6996  
(-2.2476) (-1.3434) (-2.2726) (-1.4807) 
Widely Heldt-1 0.5131 -0.5925 0.2003 -1.4653  
(0.4094) (-0.3567) (0.1441) (-0.7288) 
HHIt-1 3.2412 0.9911 2.9565 0.2479  
(1.1726) (0.2989) (1.0208) (0.0673) 
GDP growth t-1 -0.0293 0.1369 -0.0328 0.1365  
(-0.1864) (0.8769) (-0.2096) (0.8164) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 532 528 532 528 
R-squared -0.196 -1.021 -0.244 -1.379 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: First Stage          




 (3.7687)  (3.4944)  
Female employment ratet-  0.6593***  0.5905*** 
  (4.9621)  (4.2040) 
Female CEOt-1 7.0747*** 6.1545***   
 (2.9422) (3.1226)   
Board Size (ln)t-1   -3.3681 -3.3927 
   (-1.5076) (-1.6564) 
Board Independence Ratiot-1   0.0243 0.0176 
   (1.1999) (0.8151) 
Sizet-1 0.5289 0.9769*** 0.8225** 1.2199*** 
 (1.6403) (2.7607) (2.4355) (3.5392) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.2513 -0.2816* -0.2873* -0.3131* 
 (-1.5561) (-1.7558) (-1.7781) (-1.9826) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 0.2327** 0.2986** 0.2903** 0.3400** 
 (1.9883) (2.3542) (2.3274) (2.5550) 
Deposits Ratio t-1 0.1584 0.1943 -0.0346 -0.0106 
 (0.4066) (0.4954) (-0.0815) (-0.0250) 
Widely Heldt-1 -1.1791 -2.4111 -1.8588 -2.8588** 
 (-0.9052) (-1.6452) (-1.4880) (-2.0241) 
HHIt-1 -4.5644** -4.0042* -4.6490** -4.1859* 
 (-2.1152) (-1.7586) (-2.0009) (-1.8137) 
GDP growth t-1 0.3351*** 0.3332*** 0.2882** 0.3015*** 
 (2.7172) (3.0128) (2.5178) (2.7598) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 532 528 532 528 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank 
Cragg-Donald test 72.02 65.85 52.07 46.82 
Kleibergen-Paap test 14.20 24.62 12.21 17.67 
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Supplementary Appendix H. Gender diversity and alternative measures of bank dividend 
policy. 
This table shows results of IV regressions used to analyse the relation between gender diversity and bank dividend policy. 
We use two alternative dependent variables, namely DPE and Dividend to total Assets Ratio. DPE is the dividend to 
equity ratio. DPE/TA is the ratio of dividends to total assets Gender Diversity is the percentage of female directors on the 
board of bank i at time t. Female participation rate is defined as the female labour force participation divided by male 
labour force participation in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Female employment rate is 
defined as the employment rate for women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is 
located. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that the market return is below its 5th percentile. Tier 1 
Ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Deposits Ratio is the ratio of bank customer 
deposits to total assets. Widely Held is a dummy variable equal to one if there is no owner with more than 10% of bank 
share rights, and zero otherwise. HHI stands for Herfindahl–Hirschman Index and is calculated as the sum of the squared 
ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. GDP growth is annual percentage growth rate of GDP. US-
Mortgage Crisis dummy is a dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years 2007 and 2008. EU-
Sovereign Debt Crisis a dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to the years from 2010 and 2012. Cragg-
Donald test refers to the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic. Kleibergen-Paap test refers to the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F 
statistic. Constant included but not reported. All variables are winsorised at the 1th and 99th percentiles. Standard errors 













































Panel A: Second Stage 
 DPE DPE DPE/TA DPE/TA 
          
Gender Diversityt-1 0.1325 0.2699** 0.0186** 0.0174* 
 (1.2886) (2.1480) (1.9973) (1.8662) 
MESt-1 -0.2222 -0.3616 -0.0349 -0.0343  
(-1.1031) (-1.2660) (-1.3374) (-1.2391) 
Capital Ratiot-1 0.1104 0.1746*** 0.0692*** 0.0681***  
(1.5862) (2.7933) (3.2284) (3.2668) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 -0.1116 -0.1540 0.0074 0.0086  
(-0.8398) (-1.1080) (0.7004) (0.7876) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 0.2976 0.2504 0.1418** 0.1476***  
(0.7698) (0.7110) (2.5264) (2.9085) 
Widely Heldt-1 0.0254 0.6865 0.0746 0.0678  
(0.0404) (0.8184) (0.8059) (0.6796) 
HHIt-1 -1.9968 -0.3897 0.1102 0.0915  
(-1.6037) (-0.2576) (0.7382) (0.5861) 
GDP growtht-1 0.0365 -0.0210 0.0062 0.0070  
(0.6836) (-0.3326) (1.0109) (1.1585) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 440 436 283 281 
R-squared 0.175 -0.003 0.491 0.508 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
cdf 55.26 45.71 34.66 36.34 
widstat 12.20 18.41 7.708 15.20 
Panel B: First Stage         
     
Female participation ratet-1 0.4343***  0.4512***  
 (3.4931)  (2.7764)  
Female employment ratet-1  0.6405***  0.7002*** 
  (4.2906)  (3.8982) 
Size t-1 0.5813 1.3493** 0.7961 1.7107** 
 (1.0443) (2.2826) (1.1175) (2.4497) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.3086 -0.4155* -0.5494** -0.6397*** 
 (-1.3747) (-1.8234) (-2.4427) (-3.3185) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 0.2599** 0.3060** 0.6855*** 0.7784*** 
 (2.1704) (2.0907) (3.5136) (4.0603) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 0.2130 0.0646 3.1366* 3.0281* 
 (0.5334) (0.1754) (1.6762) (1.6866) 
Widely Heldt-1 -1.6956 -2.9259 -2.5410 -3.7202* 
 (-1.0361) (-1.5866) (-1.2745) (-1.8311) 
HHIt-1 -8.2059*** -7.8800*** -10.1509** -10.4179*** 
 (-2.9108) (-2.6610) (-2.5918) (-2.9620) 
GDP growth t-1 0.3428** 0.3206** 0.3943** 0.4038** 
 (2.5080) (2.6365) (2.4331) (2.6417) 
Observations 440 436 283 281 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cragg-Donald test 55.26 45.71 34.66 36.34 












Supplementary Appendix I. Gender diversity, corporate governance mechanisms, and bank 
dividend policy. 
This table shows results of the relation between gender diversity and bank’s dividend policy. The dependent variable is 
DPE in log. Gender Diversity is measured as the percentage of female directors on the board of the bank i’s at time t. 
Female participation rate is defined as the female labour force participation divided by male labour force participation 
in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Female employment rate is defined as the employment 
rate for women with tertiary education in the NUTS 2 region where the bank’s headquarter is located. Our regressions 
include bank-specific variables and macroeconomic variables. Female CEO is a dummy variable takes on value 1 whether 
the CEO is female, and 0 otherwise. Board size is the logarithm of board members. Board Independence ratio is measured 
as the proportion of independent directors on the total board. MES is the marginal expected shortfall of a stock given that 
the market return is below its 5th percentile. Tier 1 Ratio is the ratio of Tier 1 regulatory capital divided by risk-weighted 
assets. Deposits Ratio is the ratio of bank customer deposits to total assets. Widely Held is a dummy variable equal to one 
if there is no owner with more than 10% of bank share rights, and zero otherwise. HHI stands for Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index and is calculated as the sum of the squared ownership shares for all recorded shareholders of the bank. GDP growth 
is annual percentage growth rate of GDP. US-Mortgage Crisis dummy is a dummy takes the value on one if the observation 
refers to the years 2007 and 2008. EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis a dummy takes the value on one if the observation refers to 
the years from 2010 and 2012. Cragg-Donald test refers to the Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic. Kleibergen-Paap test refers 
to the Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic. Constant included but not reported. All variables are winsorised at the 1th 
and 99th percentiles. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Robust z-statistics are reported in parentheses. *** 




































Panel A: Second Stage     
Variables DPE (ln) DPE (ln) DPE (ln) DPE (ln) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
Gender Diversityt-1 0.0312 0.0643** 0.0300 0.0675**  
(1.3043) (2.2484) (1.1214) (2.2275) 
Female CEOt-1 -0.4006 -0.6836    
(-0.4473) (-0.8119)   
Board Size (ln)t-1   -0.0597 -0.0327  
  (-0.2861) (-0.1287) 
Board Independence Ratiot-1   -0.0011 -0.0032  
  (-0.3403) (-0.8504) 
MESt-1 -0.0310 -0.0641 -0.0310 -0.0667  
(-0.6022) (-0.9285) (-0.6108) (-0.9577) 
Capital Ratiot-1 0.0373*** 0.0518*** 0.0363** 0.0536***  
(2.7057) (3.1466) (2.1822) (2.8758) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 -0.0180 -0.0266 -0.0202 -0.0312  
(-0.7925) (-1.1386) (-0.8387) (-1.2716) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 0.0336 0.0219 0.0287 0.0174  
(0.5841) (0.4303) (0.5396) (0.3473) 
Widely Heldt-1 -0.1423 0.0023 -0.1162 0.0707  
(-0.8673) (0.0104) (-0.6884) (0.3016) 
HHIt-1 -0.4849 -0.1251 -0.4898 -0.1075  
(-1.5236) (-0.3108) (-1.4544) (-0.2541) 
GDP growtht-1 0.0070 -0.0061 0.0089 -0.0030  
(0.4929) (-0.3675) (0.6794) (-0.1900) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 440 436 440 436 
R-squared 0.164 0.018 0.163 -0.011 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: First Stage         
     
Female participation ratet-1 0.4166***  0.3888***  
 (3.3379)  (3.1517)  
Female employment ratet-1  0.6017***  0.5581*** 
  (3.9188)  (3.2259) 
Female CEOt-1 6.5759** 5.5410**   
 (2.5143) (2.3793)   
Board Size (ln)t-1   -0.9064 -0.4205 
   (-0.4268) (-0.2018) 
Board Independence Ratiot-1   0.0408 0.0312 
   (1.6641) (1.1517) 
Sizet-1 0.5638 1.2959** 0.5833 1.2466** 
 (1.0162) (2.1721) (1.0123) (2.0642) 
Capital Ratiot-1 -0.2962 -0.4030* -0.3284 -0.4216*  
(-1.3234) (-1.7601) (-1.4922) (-1.9078) 
Tier 1 Ratiot-1 0.2253* 0.2748* 0.2598** 0.2987** 
 (1.9074) (1.8743) (2.1234) (1.9964) 
Deposits Ratiot-1 0.2278 0.0892 0.1666 0.0765 
 (0.5618) (0.2388) (0.3743) (0.1798) 
Widely Heldt-1 -1.4408 -2.7122 -2.1401 -3.2250* 
 (-0.8857) (-1.4543) (-1.3159) (-1.7270) 
HHIt-1 -7.7300*** -7.5908** -7.4488** -7.5168** 
 (-2.7627) (-2.5448) (-2.3202) (-2.4474) 
GDP growtht-1 0.3362** 0.3192** 0.2703** 0.2807** 
 (2.4869) (2.6107) (2.0959) (2.3507) 
Cluster Bank Bank Bank Bank 
US-Mortgage Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
EU-Sovereign Debt Crisis Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cragg-Donald test 50.86 39.28 42.49 29.65 
Kleibergen-Paap test 11.14 15.36 9.933 10.41 
